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91“It is not easy to predict the future course of events, 
which will depend to a large extent on the overall political 
situation in the USSR” is the cautious evaluation of the 
confidential expert report for the North Atlantic Council 
in October 1989. In 1988‒1991, the relationship was 
fundamentally transformed between the Western alliance 
system led by the United States and the East European 
socialist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union. The military, 
political, cultural, and ideological confrontation – with the 
weakening of Moscow and the collapse of its empire – was 
replaced during a few months by a new type of cooperation 
of the parties separated previously by the Iron Curtain. The 
eight reports from the NATO Archives (formerly classified 
confidential), published in the present volume for the first 
time in English, illuminate the East European events of these 
four eventful years from the perspective of expert advisors 
of the alliance. How were these dramatic changes in Eastern 
Europe perceived and interpreted in Brussels?
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9Foreword of the Editor 
The relationship between the western alliance system led by the us and the east 
european socialist bloc dominated by the soviet union fundamentally changed in 
1988–1991. with the weakening of moscow and the subsequent, sudden collapse 
of its empire, the political, cultural, military, and ideological confrontation called 
the cold war was replaced within months by a new type of cooperation between 
the two parts of europe previously divided by the iron curtain. The eight reports 
from the NAto Archives, formerly classified confidential, that are published in 
english for the first time in the present volume present the events of these stirring 
four years from the perspective of western experts meeting together in Brussels: 
how they perceived and interpreted the events in this transforming region.
The term eastern europe applied in the title is a political one, and refers to the 
allies of the soviet union, the ussr itself, and Yugoslavia and Albania. in this way 
we invoke the original term commonly used in these documents (eastern europe, in 
french: europe orientale) without taking sides in the terminological debate about 
the proper name for the region.
in the introduction we seek to illuminate the nature of relations between 
NAto and eastern europe as they evolved in the period when the documents were 
written. we also highlight the operating principles and structural basis of NAto 
and analyze the far reaching transformation of the alliance. finally, we examine the 
circumstances under which these reports were born, touching also on the work of 
NAto experts on eastern europe as early as the 1950s.  
The Documents section publishes these reports in chronological order in their 
original (english) language. The names and geographical names appear in their 
original form as written in the reports. in the Biographical Notes and index of 
Names both the official english version and the version used in the documents are 
identified, the latter in brackets. we strove for consistency in the use of abbrevia-
tions for organizations; in most cases the english and the native forms are given. in 
the footnotes we provided additional information for the better understanding of 
events discussed in the documents. in case of recurring problems the footnotes al-
ways refer back to the first detailed mention of the problem. The original footnotes 
of the documents are in brackets.
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The Biographical Notes in the Appendix contain the persons occurring in the 
reports; biographical data relevant for the reports are summarized here. The list of 
Abbreviations contains acronyms and abbreviations: in case of acronyms in foreign 
languages the english translation is always given. The figures promote the better 
understanding of the military and political structure and organizations of NAto. 
The Bibliography contains literature used for the completion of the footnotes of the 
documents and the Appendix, while the literature used in the introduction can be 
found after the study itself. The index of Names refers to the whole volume (includ-
ing the introduction, footnotes, etc.) and not only to the Documents. in the list of 
Geographical Names one can find the name of the geographical or political entity, 
and the adjectives formed from the noun are also mentioned here.
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Introduction 
NATO and the Transformation of Eastern Europe
1988–1991
It is not easy to predict the future course of events, which will depend to a large extent on 
the overall political situation in the USSR is the cautious evaluation of the confidential 
expert report for the North Atlantic council in october 1989.1 But how was the 
transformation of eastern europe as the result of the collapse of communism per-
ceived by NAto officials? in order to understand the meaning and circumstances of 
the confidential reports published in this volume more clearly, first the tasks, struc-
ture, and the organization of the western political and military alliance (based on the 
official documents) should be discussed. After this the radical change in the policies of 
NAto as approaching the end of the cold war will be evaluated, and finally the ad-
ministrative framework for NAto experts on eastern europe will be discussed.
NAto: its principles, structure, and operation in 1989
NAto is a political and military alliance that was established on April 4, 1949 with 
the signature of the North Atlantic treaty (also referred to as the washington trea-
ty). it was intended to function as a counterweight to the soviet army deployed in 
central and eastern europe after the second world war. The founding members 
were Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, iceland, italy, luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, portugal, the united Kingdom, and the united states. in 1952 
Greece and turkey joined the alliance, in 1955 west Germany, and in 1982 spain 
also became a member. in 1966 france left the military organization of NAto, but 
remained a member of the political alliance.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack oc-
curs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recog-
nised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
1  NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(89)57 (November 8, 1989). 
Document No. 4.
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the security of the North Atlantic area.2 Article 5 also regulates the geographical 
scope of the treaty: armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America. other paragraphs of the treaty identify other basic principles, like the 
strengthening of democracy, the development of joint military capacities and capa-
bilities, and consultation between the members.
The primary aim of NAto during the cold war was to unify and strengthen 
the military response of the western alliance in the case of an attack on western 
europe by the soviet union and its allies.3
NAto consists of sovereign countries, which preserve their independence in 
foreign as well as domestic policy. According to the founding documents all mem-
bers have equal rights and possibilities to express their views through public forums 
of the organization regardless of the size, population, or political influence of the 
country. Decisions are achieved by consensus and not by majority vote. This implies 
that all decisions should enjoy the full support of all member states and express the 
common decisions of all sovereign member states. to achieve close political cooper-
ation, the member states undertake to inform one another about the goals of their 
foreign policies and about their changing views with regard to each issue that arises.4
pursuant to Article 9, the governments of the member states established the 
NAc (North Atlantic council), in which each government is represented. This is the 
highest political decision making forum of the organization, whose task is to realize 
the aims laid down in the treaty. This is the only organization created directly by the 
treaty with full legal and political authority in decision making. it constitutes the 
highest authority, which coordinates the network of subordinated committees and 
working groups. The decisions of the council are often based on the reports and re-
commendations of these committees. each member state sends one representative to 
the NAc, which can convene at the level of permanent delegates, foreign, or defense 
ministers and at the level of prime ministers or presidents (heads of state). Decisions 
made are compulsory and bear full authority regardless of the level at which the deci-
sions were made. The sessions are chaired by the secretary General of NAto. The 
international secretariat located at the NAto headquarters supports the entire work 
of the NAc, under the direction of the secretary General.5
2  The North Atlantic treaty, 1949.
3  haglund. for the organizational structure, strategy, and activity of NAto see details in: The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989; and Encyclopedia of NATO Topics, see further: De Velasco Valle-
jo, 2002. 505–520. for a general history of NAto see: Zorgbibe, 2002; Kaplan, 2004; risso, 2014; 
Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. see also the following volumes: The Atlantic Pact Forty Years 
Later, 1991; A History of NATO. The First Fifty Years, 2001.; Open Door, 2019.
4  The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989. 185. provides information on the structure and oper-
ating principles of NAto.
5  The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989. 321–328. see also the website of NA: http:// 
archives.nato.int/north-atlantic-council-2 (date of last download: August 2, 2018.)
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The political committee of NAto also supports the activity of the NAc. The 
members of this forum are the deputy permanent representatives or political experts 
of the member states’ delegations. Besides the regular exchange of information and 
discussion of problems, the political committee prepares reports requested by the 
council. its sessions are chaired by the Deputy secretary General responsible for 
political affairs.
further forums of consultation are the ad hoc committees dealing with special 
topics and the discussions of the experts of certain regions, sent by the member 
states, held twice a year (for details, see below). The material for working papers and 
reports is provided by the delegations of the member states, while the editing and 
coordinating activity is supervised by the political Affairs Division of the interna-
tional staff. 
The political Directorate operating within this division provides the adminis-
trative basis for all political activity of NAto. its sphere of influence includes politi-
cal aspects of east–west relations, world events concerning non-member states, the 
observation of european political processes, and negotiations on arms reduction.6
transformation and continuity: The Activities and situation  
of the North Atlantic treaty organisation in 1988–1991
Challenges
celebrating in 1989 the fortieth anniversary of its establishment, NAto had to 
face serious challenges. A problem unresolved for a long time was the preponder-
ance of the soviet Bloc in conventional weapons. General John Galvin, the com-
mander in chief of the european forces of NAto, pointed out in 1989 that soviet 
tank and artillery production had steadily increased since march 1985, when 
mikhail Gorbachev came to power. The declarations on arms reduction in Decem-
ber 1988 effected only modest changes in this situation. Among the leaders of 
NAto countries, uncertainty prevailed regarding soviet goals.7
Another problem, which had been unresolved for decades, was the uneven dis-
tribution of the cost of defense within NAto. The cost of common defense was 
primarily borne by the us budget despite the fact that european economies, having 
overcome the crisis caused by wwii, showed better economic performance year by 
year.8 This problem caused tensions in us government circles from the 1960s on. 
The presumption of us politicians that the growing european communities had 
6  The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1989. 191–192, 330.
7  Kaplan, 2004. 104.
8  ibid. 50–51.
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huge unexploited resources for purposes of defense exacerbated the situation fur-
ther at the end of the 1980s.9 on the other hand, there had for a long time been ef-
forts to increase the independence of europe from the us.
But sudden and radical transformation of east–west relations and the prob-
lems related to eastern europe exceeded the above mentioned problems in signifi-
cance. This was considered the main challenge at the end of the 1980s. The bipolar 
world system dominated by the us and the soviet union ceased to exist by 1991: 
the soviet union gradually retreated, first militarily, than politically from the re-
gion, the east european communist regimes collapsed, and Germany united. Thus, 
the eastern safety zone of NAto transformed radically. The competing alliance sys-
tem, the warsaw pact, eroded, then ceased to exist by July 1991.10 The soviet union 
even disintegrated by the end of that year. The destabilization of an eastern europe 
that had been immobile for decades, the revival of suppressed nationalisms,11 the 
mass movements generated by social crises, and conflicts within some states of the 
region posed a persistent threat in the view of the leading circles of NAto.12 The 
character of the transformation and its fast pace surprised observers who were un-
able to clearly foresee the further development of the region of the soviet bloc.13 
The us ambassador to NAto shared his doubts with his colleagues with the fol-
lowing words: “we do know nothing sure about the future direction of reforms in 
the soviet union. Are moscow and his allies heading toward the establishment of 
stable political systems? The situation is in fact fluid and unpredictable”.14
it is important to emphasize that archival documents now accessible to re-
searchers, interviews with political decision makers, and diplomatic memoirs agree 
that the us and its western allies experienced the democratic transformation of 
eastern europe and the loosening control of the ussr over the region with a grow-
 9  ibid. 104.
10  see horváth, 2016. 
11  experts convening to elaborate the 1988 April report [c-m(88)14, see document No. 1] on east-
ern europe completely agreed that “the question of nationality in its globality” is the most impor-
tant issue to resolve for Gorbachev. AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882. 
Note de Bernard fassier, chef de la section urss à la sous-Direction d’europe oriental, réunion 
du groupe d’experts “urss et pays de l’est” de l’otAN, à evère les 23, 24 et 25 mars 1988, 995/
eu (march 29, 1988).
12  for the latter the evolving conflict between hungary and romania is a good example regarding 
the increasing oppression of the hungarian minority in romania, or the tension between hunga-
ry and czechoslovakia regarding the power plant in Gabčikovo and Nagymaros. for the impact of 
this in 1989, see: Békés, 2012. 337–341.
13  The notes of michael Alexander, the permanent representative of the uK in the NAto council, 
to Douglas richard hurd, foreign secretary of the uK. revolution of 1989: how should the alli-
ance respond? ( January 4, 1990) see: Britain in the NATO, 2009. 144–145. 
14  AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882. rapport du représentant permanent 
de la france au conseil de l’Atlantique Nord au ministre des Affaires étrangères – Affaires 
stratégiques et Désarmement, rapports des groupes d’experts au conseil, 597/str (may 17, 
1989).
15
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ing fear of the modification of the decades long relative equilibrium. The direction 
of changes, which were welcomed in accord with their liberal stance and values, 
were to be accepted only if they happened gradually, with the maintenance of the 
ruling reform communist elite in power and in parallel with the maximum accep-
tance of moscow’s desires in security questions. Numerous messages urging caution 
and deceleration were sent to both the opposition and the government forces in the 
soviet bloc. following the traditions of european power politics, stability was val-
ued more than the desires of the small nations for emancipation.15
henning wegener, Deputy secretary General of NAto, stated in his public 
speech in the fall of 1989 that the Warsaw Pact… could well perform useful functions 
and enhance stability if reformed on the basis of strict equality.16 half a year later, in 
february 1990, the spokesman of the alliance replied to the idea of Gyula horn, 
hungarian minister of foreign Affairs, that hungary could become a member of 
the political organization of NAto, as follows: Any future political or military reori-
entation of Hungary is a question that should be left to the Hungarians. However, we 
are unaware of it arising as a serious question in Hungary.17
Another challenge that NAto had to cope with was the deepening, strength-
ening, and broadening of european integration. with the signing of the maastricht 
treaty in December 1991, the eu was born and demands for a common and inde-
pendent european foreign and defense policy were interpreted by many as a de-
mand for independence from the usA or from NAto.18 The alliance also had to 
react to the Gulf crisis. it threatened the petroleum supplies of the member states 
and began with an attack of iraqi troops on Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
The Impact of Challenges to NATO
The summit meeting of the NAc in July 1990 formally concluded that the military 
potential and capacity of the soviet union vis à vis foreign countries, and thus the 
threat it could pose to them, had considerably decreased.19 According to lawrence 
s. Kaplan, with the easing of pressure on NAto some politicians of the member 
states and a part of American and european public opinion questioned the need for 
15  The book of lászló Borhi (Borhi, 2016) provides a thorough overview on the opinions and actions 
of the western powers. see chapter 10. “1989: together we liberated eastern europe”, 364–433. 
read further: Békés, 2002; Békés, 2012. 330–362; Békés, 2016; Békés–Kalmár, 2019. The same 
conclusion: Blanton, 2011. regarding french relations see: Magyar−francia kapcsolatok, 
1945−1990, 2013. 125–145; Garadnai–schreiber, 2008.
16  NAto at forty: New Visions of east–west relations, November 20, 1989. mNl ol, 
Külügyminisztérium (National Archives of hungary, ministry of foreign Affairs), NAto, 1989. 
XiX-J-1-j, 111. box. cited by: Borhi, 2016. 369.
17  Nem ez a kérdés van ma napirenden, 1990. Quoted by pietsch, 1998. 11, 57.
18  Kaplan, 2004. 113.
19  ibid. 109–110. see also: Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990.
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an American military presence in europe. some leftist circles in the us urged the 
withdrawal of American forces from europe. They shared the opinion of the Greens 
in west Germany and the radical wing of the British labour party that the military 
presence of the us was an obstacle to peace.20 in his study on the commitment of 
the us to NAto, robert p. Grant came to the conclusion that after the end of the 
cold war european governments showed a greater interest in the maintenance of 
transatlantic relations and the alliance than did the American leadership.21 At the 
same time, under the circumstances the alternative also arose, that european securi-
ty might be managed better by other organizations than NAto. in connection 
with this, the role of the conference for security and co-operation in europe 
(csce) came up; both the us and the soviet union were members of this organi-
zation. The revitalization of the military staff committee, established by the 47th 
article of the uN statute to assist the uN security council, was also considered.22 
The question seeking an answer was: what will ensure the internal cohesion of the 
alliance if the soviet threat fades?23
in his monograph on the history of NAto, charles Zorgbibe analyzes some of 
the main contemporary arguments in support of its maintenance. one of these was 
that the rapid political and ideological transformation of europe did not immedi-
ately change the strategic environment as new dangers arose to threaten the stability 
of the region. furthermore, the three key players in the new situation all agreed on 
this: the us government did not want to abandon europe militarily, partly in order 
to maintain its political influence, partly because it was convinced that the with-
drawal of us troops would evoke dangers reminiscent of the situation after wwi. 
The western governments and the majority of their countries’ public opinion also 
wished to prolong the presence of us troops. The liberated nations of eastern eu-
rope also viewed NAto sympathetically. The American leadership and Atlantic 
circles persistently emphasized the role of NAto in stabilizing the political situa-
tion while considering its military function less significant. They noted that the or-
ganization relied from the start on a philosophy of collective security and not on a 
coalition of “predatory nations”: thus, NAto is viable also without an external 
threat. As president Bush emphasized in his speech at Boston university on may 
21, 1989: “NAto is not similar to the cynical alliances of powers of the past. it re-
lies upon ties of common culture…and values.”24
20  Kaplan, 2004. 104.
21  Grant, 2001. 43.
22  Kaplan, 2004. 110.
23  ibid. 109.
24  Zorgbibe, 2002. 184. The NAto representative of the uK, michael Alexander, in his summary 
report regarding the year 1989 argued that european states should refrain from expecting their 
security from an unstable “shifting coalition” again. see the notes of michael Alexander to Doug-
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in her study analyzing internal debates in NAto about changes after the cold 
war, réka szemerkényi points out that, as member states failed to provide a general 
response to the new challenges, “many officials in Brussels hastened to elaborate 
their own survival strategy.”25 According to linda risso’s book on the information 
and communication policy of NAto during the cold war, the intensive participa-
tion of General secretary manfred wörner in the contemporary discourse about 
the future of the organization was part of this process. in his press conferences, 
speeches, and many articles in the NATO Review he emphasized the political role of 
the alliance, which is “a motor for peaceful change” in eastern europe, and which 
supports the establishment of democratic political culture and a free market econo-
my in the region.26 
Thus under the leadership of wörner NAto participated actively in the de-
bate about the future of the organization, considering itself an independent actor. 
The secretary General and the information services of NAto emphasized that, de-
spite the deepening of european integration, there was a persistent need for the or-
ganization. They argued that the maintenance of NAto secures the participation 
of canada and the usA, and, furthermore, from among the competing security 
organizations “NAto alone had ’the binding treaty commitments among its mem-
bers and common military assets to act as well as consult’…”27
The Birth of a New Concept
in a study dealing with the adaptation to the new situation after the cold war, Kori 
schake emphasized that for its members NAto always had other functions besides 
averting the soviet threat. it secured the possibility for washington to intervene in 
european affairs, it made the europeans more comfortable with the cooperation 
with increasingly powerful west Germany, and decreased the member countries’ 
defense costs. But these factors were difficult to demonstrate to the broader public 
when it recognized the rapid decrease in the soviet threat. Therefore, for the gov-
ernments of the allied countries it became important to articulate new goals that 
could be communicated better.28 And, in the decision making centers of the mem-
ber states the opinion was gaining strength that, despite the positive direction of the 
east european changes, there was still need for military and security cooperation 
las richard hurd. revolution of 1989: how should the alliance respond? January 4, 1990. see: 
Britain in the NATO, 2009. 143. 
25  szemerkényi, 1997. 93. The author refers to: clarke, 1993–1994. 22–40. 
26  risso, 2014. 141.
27  ibid. 142–143. cites an article from wörner as an example: wörner, 1991. in his book ryan c. 
hendrickson emphasizes the significant role of the first four NAto general secretaries after the 
cold war (including manfred wörner) influences the policies of NAto: hendrickson, 2006. 4.
28  schake, 2001. 31.
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between the member states. in other words, the NAto is necessary, but with a 
more flexible approach29 and a new mission: instead of serving as a deterrent against 
the soviet bloc, emphasis shifted to conflict prevention and crisis management. in 
this process the first Gulf war played a catalyzing role.
Though the war waged against iraq in January–february 1991 was not led by 
NAto but by the us at the head of an international coalition, the participation of 
member states in the campaign exerted strong influence on the development of the 
alliance. twelve member states out of sixteen participated in the war, and Great 
Britain and france even sent troops.30 The session of the NAc on June 7, 1991 in 
copenhagen pointed out in this connection that the long practice of cooperation, 
common procedures, collective defence arrangements and infrastructure developed by 
NATO provided valuable assistance to those Allies that chose to make use of them.31 
The joint victory over saddam hussein contributed greatly to the unity and the fu-
ture mission of NAto, namely organizing crisis management. At the meeting of 
NAto defense ministers in may 1991, plans for handling conflicts with smaller 
forces were negotiated and the plan for a multinational rapid reaction force also 
arose.32
According to Zorgbibe, the lack of unity among europeans regarding com-
mon defense within the framework of european integration provided a favorable 
circumstance for promoting the dynamic transformation of NAto. france, having 
seceded from the integrated military organization of NAto early in 1966, was not 
able to influence the process. Germany was focused on its own unification, and 
sought solutions within the familiar framework of NAto. The British govern-
ment proved to be an ideal partner for washington. These two countries seem to 
have been the motor for the transformation of NAto. And in the final analysis the 
member states were reluctant to take on the financial burden of european strategic 
independence.33
According to the New strategic concept accepted by the NAto summit held 
in rome in November 1991, Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calcu-
lated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse conse-
quences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many 
countries in central and eastern Europe.34 The new concept and tasks emerged more 
vigorously in the meeting, as there were not only predictions of new threats coming 
from the area of the disintegrating soviet union, but the first concrete experiences: 
29  risso, 2014. 142.
30  Kaplan, 2004. 111–112.
31  Zorgbibe, 2002. 185. see: final communiqué, 1991.
32  Kaplan, 2004. 112–113.
33  Zorgbibe, 2002. 185.
34  The Alliance’s New strategic concept, 1991.
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ethnic clashes on the territory of the former soviet union. The unsuccessful coup 
d’etat against Gorbachev was especially disturbing. Thus crisis management arose as 
a new task in view of the politically unconsolidated neighboring regions. NAto 
extended its routine monitoring to the southern mediterranean and the middle 
east. The formulation of this new concept strengthened cooperation between the 
two pillars of the transatlantic alliance, North America and europe. 35 
An essay of frédéric Bozo puts the “survival” and “new tasks” of NAto into 
historical perspective. he points out that an important factor in the capacity of the 
alliance for adaptability in the beginning of the 1990s was the fact that the NAc 
had accepted in 1967 a report of pierre harmel, minister of foreign Affairs in Bel-
gium. The Détente of the 1960s brought a perceived decrease of the soviet threat 
and this threatened to weaken the unity of the alliance. functioning as a political 
actor, in addition to military deterrence, helped to resolve the crisis of legitimacy 
and serve an active role in east–west relations. The transformation of NAto as a 
consequence of regime change in eastern europe in 1989 brought the continuation 
and actualization of this new direction that had begun in 1967. That is why many 
now considered the harmel report a “self-fulfilling prophecy”.36 
The Transformation of the Alliance
in accord with Zorgbibe i will examine three aspects of the transformation of NAto: 
changes in the military doctrine and technology, new tasks, and the opening toward 
eastern europe. The doctrine for the implementation of military force and the possi-
bilities for intervention changed radically. The deepening of the military operational 
zone allowed the alliance to warn any aggressors in time, thus the threat to use nuclear 
weapons now became only a last resort. furthermore, the capacity for intervention 
and the multinational character of the integrated military organization of NAto 
both increased.37 The authority of the military command was transformed: the whole 
of the european part of the alliance now constituted one large district. The operation-
al superiority of the us continued to be evident, as verified by the experience in the 
Gulf war. The power of the commander in chief of the european forces of NAto 
further increased at the expense of the political institutions of NAto.38
The emerging crisis management function of NAto became evident when the 
organization undertook to provide military assistance to the uN and the confer-
ence on security and cooperation in europe. The session of the foreign ministers 
of the NAc held in oslo on July 4, 1992 stated, in accord with the proposal of the 
35  Kaplan, 2004. 114–116.
36  Bozo, 2001. 70–80. The harmel report is accessible: “The harmel report,” 1967.
37  schake, 2001. 33–34. 
38  Zorgbibe, 2002. 186–187, 189.
20
SECRET NATO REPORTS ABOUT THE EAST EUROPEAN TRANSITION, 1988–1991
Netherlands, that NAto member states were ready to support the activity of the 
csce in maintaining peace on a case-by-case basis in accordance with… [NATO’s] 
own procedures offering alliance resources and expertise. The Brussels session of the 
NAc on December 17, 1992 extended the same offer to the uN, subject to the 
authority of the uN security council.39 The war beginning in Yugoslavia in July 
1991 offered an excellent opportunity for the practical application of the crisis 
management function of NAto.40
Kori schake correctly points out that, despite significant changes in the west-
ern alliance after the end of the cold war, its most characteristic features remained 
unchanged: the mechanism of decision making based on consensus, the integrated 
military command, and the commitment to collective defense.41
An Opening towards Eastern Europe
The foreign ministers of NAto countries already in their meeting at turnberry 
(scotland) on June 7–8, 1990 sent a message offering friendly relations to the sovi-
et union and the other european countries.42 soon the establishment of military 
and political relations with eastern europe got underway. 
with regard to military affairs, the NAto council stated at its July 1990 ses-
sion in london: We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO 
military commanders with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capi-
tals.43 By increasing contacts, the military leaders of the alliance wanted to increase 
trust and the sense of community. Another goal was to promote the establishment 
of civilian control over the forces of the warsaw pact.44
to realize this in practice, a direct link was established between NAto institu-
tions and the general staffs of east european countries. in order to make the politi-
cal and military elite well prepared and compatible with the euroatlantic system, 
training courses were organized beginning in october 1991 for the military officers 
of the region.45 Thus in the fall of 1991 special courses began in the NAto Defense 
college in rome and the school of shApe in oberammergau.46 Based on the pro-
posal of hans-Dietrich Genscher, German foreign minister, and James Baker, us 
39  Zorgbibe, 2002. 191–192. final communiqué, 1992a; final communiqué, 1992b. for the relation 
between NAto and uN in historical perspective after the cold war see: Gardner, 2001.
40  Kaplan, 2004. 116. see also spohr, 2012. 53.
41  schake, 2001. 30. 
42  Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. 37.
43  Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990. The Verbatim record of the lon-
don summit [c-Vr(90)36] has been published: 1990 summit.
44  schake, 2001. 31. 
45  Zorgbibe, 2002. 189.
46  risso, 2014. 151. cites the article of wörner (already mentioned): wörner, 1991. 
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secretary of state, on December 20, 1991 the North Atlantic coordinating coun-
cil, NAcc, was established in order to strengthen cooperation with the states of the 
former soviet Bloc, creating an “interlocking network” to discuss any defense policy 
questions. 
NAto also aspired to establish tight connections with russia, in part be-
cause of the danger that nuclear weapons could fall into unauthorized hands.47 
The establishment of the NAcc served to realize the “euroatlantic community 
from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” a concept favoured by Baker.48 moscow yielded 
and accepted that American forces should remain garrisoned in europe, while 
washington accepted that the security concept of NAto be broadened to take 
into consideration russian interests.49 The first assembly of defense ministers of 
the countries participating in the NAcc was held on April 1, 1992, and ten days 
later the chiefs of the General staffs established its military committee. The 
NAcc also participated in the solution of practical questions, like sending food 
aid to russian towns. The session on December 18, 1992 even dealt with the civil 
war in tadjikistan.50 however, the effective operation of the NAcc was limited, 
because it was only a consultative forum without authority to make decisions, the 
number of participants was too high and, because of soviet and russian partici-
pation, concerns of restoration of the old regime in moscow and eastern europe 
could not be discussed on their merits.51
The first significant event in this opening toward the east was the visit of 
 eduard shevardnadze, soviet foreign minister, to NAto headquarters in Brussels 
on December 19, 1989. By receiving him, the Alliance expressed its desire to play a 
crucial role in the support of the transformation process in eastern europe.52 The 
leaders of the soviet union and eastern europe were also invited by the london 
summit of the NAc on July 5–6, 1990, to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to es-
tablish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share 
with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.53 wörner 
himself travelled to moscow in July 1990, but in the next months he also visited 
prague, warsaw, and Budapest. NAto headquarters received several high ranking 
east european politicians, first of all the foreign and defense ministers, later the 
prime ministers and heads of state54 including Vacláv havel and lech wałęsa. in 
June 1990 Géza Jeszenszky, hungarian minister of foreign Affairs, in July and oc-
47  Kaplan, 2004. 115–116. see also: schake, 2001. 35–36.
48  Zorgbibe, 2002. 190.
49  soutou, 2001. 715.
50  Zorgbibe, 2002. 190.
51  Valki, 2001. 389.
52  risso, 2014. 141.
53  Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990.
54  risso, 2014. 141.
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tober 1991 József Antall, prime minister of hungary, then lajos für, minister of 
Defense, visited NAto headquarters.55 The information service of the alliance put 
emphasis on the media effect of these visits.56 The political committee of NAto 
visited many former member states of the warsaw pact and gave advice regarding 
the ongoing political transformation.57 
Another tool that served the deepening of the cooperation and broadening of 
relations was the system of scholarships. from among the 70 grants for 1990/1991, 
55 were available to applicants from east european countries as well as member 
states in order to study the operation of democratic institutions.58 The information 
and press office of NAto organized several seminars on the future of european 
security questions, for which decision makers and government officials of east eu-
ropean countries also received invitations.59
Among the countries belonging to the former, now disintegrating soviet bloc, 
the GDr (united with west Germany in october, 1990) received special treat-
ment. The soviet union agreed to reunited Germany’s full membership in NAto 
after a long negotiation. This agreement became one of the most important pillars 
of the contemporary european security system. us president Bush stated at the 
NAto summit in Brussels in December 1989 that he considered the fulfillment of 
the American demand for the approval of full membership to be one of the basic 
preconditions of German unification.60 The NAto institutions also promoted the 
process of unification. The closing statement of the london NAto summit in July 
proposed that the members of the warsaw pact send envoys to the alliance and 
pledge their mutual non-aggression; it invited Gorbachev to the meeting of the 
NAto council; and it expressed the willingness of the Alliance to revise its strate-
gy by giving it a more defensive character. These gestures induced Gorbachev to 
accept the German unification as the Americans demanded, and made it easier for 
55  for the chronology of the visits of eastern european leaders at NAto headquarters between De-
cember 1989 and 1991 see: Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. 34–48.
56  risso, 2014. 141. The same happened during the visit of Géza Jeszenszky on June 29, 1990, after 
which the hungarian minister of foreign Affairs and the General secretary of NAto held a joint 
press conference, then gave exclusive interviews for the Belgian and hungarian journalists. mNl 
ol: Külügyminisztérium, 001822/3/1990, Vi–l//NAto. [National Archives of hungary: for-
eign ministry]. Jelentés a minisztertanácsnak Dr. Jeszenszky Géza külügyminiszter és manfred 
wörner NAto-főtitkár és peter corterier, az Észak-atlanti Közgyűlés főtitkára közötti meg-
beszélésekről [report to the council of ministers on the talks between Dr. Géza Jeszenszky, mi-
nister of foreign Affairs, and manfred wörner, NAto secretary General, and peter corterier, 
secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly] ( July 5, 1990). source: Iratok az Antall-kormány külpo-
litikájához és diplomáciájához, 2015. 352.
57  risso, 2014. 141.
58  Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. 37.
59  risso, 2014. 151.
60  soutou, 2001. 716. on the so called “two-plus-for” negotiation see also: westad, 2017. 605–
607.
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his internal opponents to accept it too. The practical realization of the unification of 
Germany, which had been unresolved for forty years, proceeded according to a “pre-
fab model”, as mary elise sarotte put it. There were no alternatives, which means 
that the models and instruments already existing in the west and in west Germany 
were adopted. The triumph of the method supported by the us and Germany had 
the advantage that the adaptation of existing structures (NAto, the european un-
ion, the institutions of the west German state) made the transition process simpler. 
later on, something similar ensued in the case of the states of east central europe.61 
The transplantation of western institutions was made easier by the fact that the na-
tions of the region considered them to be an attractive model.62
regarding the eastern enlargement of NAto, David J. rösch has noted that 
the idea occurs in Article 10 of the North Atlantic treaty:63 The Parties may, by 
unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the 
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to 
accede to this Treaty.64
Although in 1989–1991 official forums made no mention of the enlargement 
of NAto, recent studies show there were intensive talks about this question behind 
the scenes.65 During the debates, NAto officials came to the conclusion that it was 
in the interest of NAto that there be peace, security, and “good governance” to the 
east.66 in an interview by lászló Borhi with mark palmer, the former us ambassa-
dor to Budapest mentioned that william odom, the earlier Director of the Nation-
al security Agency, initiated a campaign as early as 1990 to promote NAto mem-
bership for the countries of eastern europe.67 however, us National security Ad-
61  sarotte, 2009. 7–8, 201. The author mentions, besides the “prefab model,” the soviet “restoration 
model” (the occupation by the four powers in 1945) and the “revivalist model” implemented by 
Kohl (adaptive reuse of the confederation model of German states) as possibilities for settling the 
question and the “heroic model of multinationalism” (the concept of the “common european 
home”) advertised by Gorbachev. About the origin and development of the latter see: savran-
skaya, 2011. 18–22.
62  Bottoni, 2017. for the attitude of the peoples of the region (especially the hungarians) towards 
the adoption of the western european model see: Balázs, 2014. in the case of hungary even the 
reform communist leadership tended to strengthen the relations with NAto. in November 
1988, Gyula horn, state secretary in the ministry of foreign Affairs, participated in a meeting 
of the political committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in hamburg. in february 1990, in 
a discussion organized by the hungarian Association for political science, he raised the possi-
bility that hungary could be a member of the political organization of NAto. see also pietsch, 
1998. 10–11, 61–64.
63  rösch, 2016. 60.
64  The North Atlantic treaty, 1949.
65  see: spohr, 2012. cited by risso, 2014. 143.
66  risso, 2014. 151. see: The situation in the soviet union, 1991. on the eastern enlargement of 
NAto see: Asmus, 2002 and Grayson, 1999. for hungarian relations see: pietsch, 1998.; Valki, 
2002.; Jeszenszky, 2016.; Jeszenszky, 2019.; szenes–siposné, 2019.
67  Borhi, 2015. 470.
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visor Brent scowcroft proposed prior to the final dissolution of the warsaw pact in 
July 1991 that NAto should negotiate separately with the member states of the 
east european alliance and (according to philip David Zelikow, a former member 
of the National security council) this preceded the opening of NAto to the east 
and central european states.68 According to ronald D. Asmus, us Deputy secre-
tary of state responsible for european affairs, the idea of the eastern enlargement of 
the alliance came from the former opposition politicians of the soviet bloc who 
were to become leading politicians and diplomats. for them this step was a logical 
extension of their struggle against communism and the culmination of their fight for 
freedom, democracy, and national independence.69 however, even the ruling politi-
cians of the region raised the demand that the western alliance should provide secu-
rity and defend the region from the weakening, but still militarily important soviet 
union.
According to the reminiscences of Géza Jeszenszky, early in June 1990 during 
his visit to NAto headquarters he told General secretary wörner in a one on one 
meeting that the aim of hungary was ultimately to achieve NAto membership.70 
prime minister of hungary József Antall expressed his views in July during a session 
of the NAc: It is very important for us that NATO should consider it its duty to stand 
up against aggression and the violation of frontiers… NATO is for us the guarantor of 
stability in Europe. We… hold NATO to be a really effective security organization.71 
The fact that the politicians of the regions usually saw no need to explain their de-
mand for NAto membership and considered it self evident can be explained by the 
“feeling of insecurity” of the elites in central and east europe. This feeling might be 
explained, in the judgment of lászló Valki, as a byproduct of the traumas experi-
enced by elites in the twentieth century.72
NAto bodies repeatedly issued forceful statements touching on soviet inter-
nal policies concerning questions that were significant for international affairs. This 
indicates a noteworthy change in the former european status quo and the growing 
role of NAto in the region of the former soviet bloc. on January 11, 1991 NAto 
warned the soviet government to refrain from using violence and intimidation in 
the Baltic states.73 on August 21, 1991 during the unsuccessful coup against Gor-
bachev, the session of foreign ministers of the NAc in Brussels clearly pointed out 
that the security of its member states is inseparably linked to that of all other states in 
68  sarotte, 2009. 174.
69  Asmus, 2002. xxvi.
70  An interview of the author with Géza Jeszenszky (Budapest, August 27, 2018).
71  Valki, 2002. 464, 483. The author cites: Különleges elbánást a “Visegrádiaknak”, 1990.
72  Valki, 1997. 159.
73  Manuel de l’OTAN. Chronologie, 1999. 42.
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Europe, particularly to that of the emerging democracies. We expect the Soviet Union to 
respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe.74
The Administrative framework of expertise on eastern europe,  
1951–1991
The analysis of the situation of the soviet union and its allies in central and east-
ern europe had a decades long tradition in NAto by 1988.75 The task of the poli-
tical working Group, operating in london between march 1951 and march 1952 
(besides the reorganization of NAto) was to provide information to the council 
of Deputies. The latter held its sessions between those of the NAc, discussing such 
topics as the situation in the GDr and the soviet union and the relative military, 
political and economic potential and capacity of the soviet union compared to that 
of NAto. After this working group ceased to exist, the NAc had to bear responsi-
bility for proper orientation on political topics until 1957.76
The working Group on trends of soviet policy, established by decision of the 
North Atlantic council of october 8, 195277 as an ad hoc group, prepared its re-
ports for the sessions of the foreign ministers of the NAto council.78 its activity 
was taken over in January 1957 by the political committee, which was formed ori-
ginally as the committee of political Advisors following a proposal by the commit-
tee of Three established for the reform of the alliance. There were five experts’ work-
ing groups belonging to the committee of political Advisors, among them the ones 
examining trends in soviet politics and in the east european satellite states. in their 
reports they also dealt with east–west relations, the development of the states in 
the soviet bloc, and their relation to the soviet union.79 in accordance with the 
general goals of NAto, the working group dealing with eastern europe was con-
sidered the most important one.80
74  The situation in the soviet union, 1991. cited by risso, 2014. 143. During the coup in moscow 
in 1991 manfred wörner (General secretary of NAto) called Géza Jeszenszky on phone to as-
sure NAto support for hungary. see: Jeszenszky, 2002. 172.
75  An excellent good work on NAto expertise regarding the soviet Bloc: hatzivassiliou, 2014. see 
also: hatzivassiliou, 2018.
76  The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/political-working-group (date of last download: Au-
gust 4, 2018).
77  NA: c-r(52)24, item 5.
78  The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/working-group-on-trends-of-soviet-policy (date of 
last download: August 4, 2018).
79  The website of NA: http://archives.nato.int/political-committee (date of last download: August 
4, 2018). Documents published in english from the series up to now: North Atlantic council 
Document c-m(56)110, 2002.
80  see also: NA: united Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic council NAto/otAN, meet-
ings of the NAto experts, pol 4/13/1 [annex ii to polADs(70)46] (september 18, 1970).
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in the elaboration of these analyses about the soviet union and the other states 
of the soviet bloc a great role was played by the preliminary studies of the national 
diplomatic organs and the consultative discussions of the experts delegated by the 
individual states. in the spirit of the decision making principles of NAto, the pur-
pose of these meetings was to develop a consensus. most of the delegated were em-
ployees of the sections of their respective foreign ministries that dealt with eastern 
europe or the soviet union.81
from 1961 onward the reports were intended as “background” documents, 
that is the statements in them [did] not in any way commit governments or the alli-
ance as a whole on policy questions. The experts enjoyed great independence in the 
organization of their work, and in the length and form of their reports. in order to 
facilitate the formulation of the final version of the reports and to unify the criteria 
provided in advance by the individual foreign ministries, the political section of 
NAto international secretariat sent out preliminary questionnaires.82
Acting on the proposal of west Germany, the NAc decided in 1973 that the 
expert reports should be submitted to the regular session of the council right after 
they were finished. This procedure decreased the number of documents that had to 
be prepared for the ministerial meetings, and it also provided an opportunity to use 
these materials in a timely manner, right after their circulation.83
french diplomatic documents provide insight into how the groups of experts 
worked. in the spring of 1981 the canadian and Dutch representatives recom-
mended a new method. They proposed that the international staff should create a 
preliminary report based on the material submitted by the foreign ministries of the 
member states, which could then be revised during the experts meeting. According 
to them this would allow a greater possibility for the exchange of views, yet would 
reduce the number of days they would need to spend together by one day. Discus-
sions lasted two and a half days according to the old method, and then editorial 
groups were selected to frame each part of the report. finally the entire report was 
81  AmAe: série europe 1971–1976, 1928iNVA, carton 2901. secretary of political committee, 
signed m. J. Jordan to expert working Group on the ussr and eastern europe (through mem-
bers of the political committee), meeting of 2nd – 5th may, 1972, mJ/72/35 (April 27, 1972). 
82  NA: Note by the chairman of the committee of political Advisers, reports prepared by expert 
working groups prior to ministerial meetings, Ac/119–wp(62)34 ( July 16, 1962). The note re-
fers to the session of the NAto council on october 4, 1961: c–r(61)50, item iii. Numerous 
similar notes can be found at the Archives of the french foreign ministry. see for example: 
AmAe: série europe 1981–1985, 1930iNVA, carton 5753. mémorandum du président du 
Groupe d’expert (signé m. leveque) au comité politique, Groupe d’expert sur l’union soviétique 
et l’europe de l’est (du 20 au 23 octobre 1981), polADs(81)25 ( July 22, 1981).
83  NA: report by the Acting chairman of the political committee, change in procedures for the 
regional expert working groups, signed: Georges r. Andrews, c–m(73)25 (April 5, 1973). 
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approved at a session where all delegates were present.84 Although the canadian–
Dutch initiative did not yet meet full consent, it is evident from a report of the 
french NAto ambassador in may 1986 that at least some of the half year reports 
was now compiled using this method.85
for the period of the eight reports published in this volume, four documents may 
be found in the french foreign ministry Archives (AmAe) where the french dele-
gates of the working groups report on the sessions. These documents shed light on the 
character of the debates and on the evaluation methods used in the experts’ reports. 
while the reports’ conclusions reflected a consensus, sharp disagreements can be de-
tected in the discussions. for instance, in the course of the meeting in march 1988 the 
west German expert forcefully requested that a statement from the British draft be 
removed from the final text according to which the Brezhnev doctrine was still valid 
in relations between the soviet union and the allied states, and that therefore mos-
cow might still intervene if some of the east european communist regimes were 
threatened by sudden collapse. But the french delegation, supported by the Ameri-
cans and British, spoke out against deleting those sentences.86 But there was general 
agreement with the statement during the April talks in 1990 that in the final analysis, 
Hungary is a nationalist country, where the removal of the prohibitions imposed by com-
munism coercion makes it possible for ’chauvinism’ to reappear.87
western diplomatic representatives in the soviet bloc from the very beginning 
of the cold war often had to face with obstacles in obtaining valuable and reliable 
information on the relations between political leaders in the countries where they 
were stationed.88 This situation prevailed until the end of the 1980s, as demonstrat-
ed by a french document from the meeting of experts in march 1988. in order to 
overcome these obstacles, and also to measure the internal support for Gorbachev 
84  AmAe: série europe 1981–1985, 1930iNVA, carton 5753. Note de la sous-direction d’europe 
orientale, Nouvelle méthode de travail du groupe d’experts “urss–Démocraties populaire” de 
l’otAN, 211/eu (march 13, 1981).
85  AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882. rapport de Gilles curien, représen-
tant permanent de la france au conseil de l’Atlantique Nord au ministre des Affaires étrangères 
– Affaires stratégiques et Désarmement, modalité de fonctionnement des groupes d’experts régio-
naux, 436/str (may 14, 1986).
86  AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882, Note de Jacques faure, chef de la 
section pays de l’est à la sous-Direction d’europe orientale, réunion du groupe d’experts “pays de 
l’est” à l’otAN, les 24 et 25 mars 1988, 993/eu (march 30, 1988). 
87  AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882, Note de christine toudic, sous-Di-
rection d’europe orientale et centrale, compte-rendu de la réunion du groupe d’experts “pays de 
l’est” de l’otAN (9–11 avril 1990), 1118/eu (April 19, 1990).
88  see NA: Note du secrétaire général de la commission permanente du traité de Bruxelles, situa-
tion des missions occidentales dans les pays au delà du rideau de fer, A/1111 (définitif ) (march 27, 
1951). Also: AmAe: europe, 1944−1970, Généralités, 248Qo, dossier 80. Note de la sous-Di-
rection d’europe orientale, Attaques des pays de démocraties populaires contre la france (feb-
ruary 13, 1954).
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among soviet party leaders, the french delegates proposed a peculiar method. They 
defined “concentric zones” with the first circle for those questions on which all sig-
nificant leaders agreed (for instance, the necessity of deep structural reforms in the 
economy and society), and continuing with the next zone, where opinions were less 
likely to coincide (as in the differing content of “democratization”), finally ending 
with the most debated questions in the outermost zone. This method reflected de-
viations in opinion regarding the limits of reforms or their speed. According to the 
french report, this method of evaluation aroused great interest, and it strengthened 
the general view that Gorbachev’s influence had significantly increased since his ac-
cession to power in 1985.89
The remarks of the turkish delegate added a special element to the discus-
sions. he expressed strong opinions on questions in which turkey was deeply 
concerned, like the fate of the muslim minority in Bulgaria or the case of Na-
gorno Karabakh, where he tried to represent the interests of the Azeri population 
against the Armenians.90
The NAc approved new procedures for the working groups on July 17, 1991.91 
They stipulated that the last report of the working group dealing with the soviet 
union and other central and east european countries had to be finished by the fall 
of 1991.92
The documents published in this volume reveal how the situation in the soviet 
bloc was evaluated by the foreign ministries of the NAto powers in 1988–1991 on 
the basis of their internal documentation, the consultations in NAto and among 
each of the foreign ministries, and other sources. But it should be emphasized that 
the NAto states that played a key role in the elaboration of these reports, that is, 
the united states, Great Britain, france, and Germany, did not share all available 
information with their allies. They prepared summaries for the ministerial sessions 
of the North Atlantic council, which occurred twice a year. These documents, 
which review the previous six months of the soviet bloc, constitute an excellent 
source for the views about eastern europe held in the important decision making 
centers of NAto in a given period.
The eight experts’ reports give a comprehensive overview about an eastern 
 europe that was experiencing cataclysmic changes in this period. in the reports the 
summary and the main conclusions typically appear in the introduction. The first 
89  AmAe: série europe 1986–1990, 1935iNVA, carton 5882. Note de Bernard fassier, chef de la 
section urss à la sous-Direction d’europe orientale, réunion du groupe d’experts “urss et 
pays de l’est” de l’otAN, à evère les 23, 24 et 25 mars 1988, 995/eu (march 29, 1988).
90  ibid.
91  NA: c-m(91)54 report.
92  NA: Note by the secretary General, signed m. wörner, The situation in the soviet union and the 
other central and eastern european countries, march to october 1991, c-m(91)93 (November 
22, 1991). see Document No. 8.
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sections generally describe the development of soviet domestic and foreign policy. 
The parts exploring the situation of the allied states are presented in the order of 
importance ascribed to them by the authors, focusing on the issues considered most 
pressing. Although they were not parts of the soviet bloc in this period, the analyses 
examining “eastern europe” report, as in the past, on communist Albania and on 
Yugoslavia, which was sinking into an increasingly serious crisis.
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DOCUMENT 1.
CONSEIL DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH DOCUMENT
27th April 1988 
c-m(88)14
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe 
octoBer 1987 – mArch 1988
Note by the secretary General1
1. i attach the report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern eu-
rope” submitted to me by the chairman of the expert working Group, which met 
at NAto headquarters from 23rd to 25th march 1988.
2. This report engages only the responsibility of the experts who participated 
in the working Group.
3. it will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 11th may 1988.
(signed) cArriNGtoN
NAto,
1110 Brussels.
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
Note by the chairman of the expert working Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
united states met at NAto headquarters from 23rd to 25th march 1988 to pre-
pare the attached report.
2. This report covers the period from 17th october 1987 to 25th march 1988.
(signed) D. i. miller
1  The official leader of the NAto is the General secretary, who is responsible for the coordination of 
work. As chairman he is a member of the North Atlantic council, he organizes the work of the or-
ganization’s staff, and he represents the alliance in external communications and relations.
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coNteNts
item subject paragraph Nos.
i. General trends and outlook 1–12
ii. ussr: towards the 19th party conference 13–19
iii. recent developments in the Baltic states 20–26
iV. Nationalist demonstrations in transcaucasia2 27–34
V. poland: the nature and strength of political opposition 35–42
Vi. hungary: the prospects for political change 43–49
Vii. czechoslovakia in the post-husak era 50–55
Viii. The turkish muslim minority in Bulgaria: recent developments 56–58 
iX. The soviet union and its east european partners: is perestroika3 changing the relationship? 59–62 
i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK23
1. over the past six months, Gorbachev has been forced to slow down some-
what in his efforts to reform soviet society. The eltsin affair in particular exposed 
differences within the regime over the pace of reform. Gorbachev’s statement at 
the 70th anniversary of the october revolution seemed to reflect a need to con-
solidate forces.
2. The slowdown may be only temporary and not likely to affect Gorbachev’s 
personal authority in the longer term. his speech at the february 1988 cpsu ple-
num suggested a determination to continue with his offensive, in preparing for the 
19th Party Conference, due to start on 28th June, he may make a stronger attempt to 
extend his control of the party machinery and to impart new momentum to the 
reform programme.
3. The soviet leadership has been treating nationalities issues on a case-by-case 
basis. There have been public protests by both russian and non-russian groups, and 
growing demands from party officials in both moscow and the periphery for a re-
2  transcaucasia in the southern caucasus is a geographical region in the southern part of the moun-
tains, which refers to the area of present day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
3  perestroika: the name for the socioeconomic reforms in the soviet union initiated by Gorbachev 
(the original meaning of the word is restructuring or reconstruction). its goal was the total reorgan-
ization of the stagnating soviet economy.
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turn to a more ideological approach. The outbursts in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan 
in february and march underscored the new urgency of the problem: Gorbachev 
had already called for a central committee plenum to review the long-neglected 
but crucial policy on nationalities. his ability to control the situation in the origi-
nally may affect his capacity to achieve his aims at the party conference.
4. The economic reform process has continued, with 60% of productive capa-
city now said to be operating under conditions of self-financing and cost account-
ing. it is clear however, that reform has already encountered considerable resistance. 
moreover, through use of state orders, normatives, and other administrative meas-
ures, central planning still dominates the production process and allows little scope 
for initiative and autonomy on the part of individual enterprises.
5. A discussion on the nature of defence planning is underway in politico- 
capacitym-litery circles, with special reference to the “reasonable sufficiency” con-
cept. This remains a political theory for the time being and has yet to be translated 
into practical consequences for military strength, posture and tactics. A distinction 
is seemingly made in this connection. soviet “military doctrine” forms a whole, of 
which military means are only one part, and which is presented as a policy aimed at 
safeguarding the achievements of socialism. “military art”, by contrast, represents a 
combination of exclusively military means and is offensive in character.
6. in the international sphere, long-term objectives remain constant, though 
there continue to be adjustments to policy. The soviets continue in their efforts to 
achieve accommodation with the west, striving to convince the international com-
munity that the ussr is a country playing a responsible role in the pursuit of legi-
timate national interests. Developments include the iNf agreement and the wash-
ington summit of December 19874; the fixing of dates for the moscow summit 
(29th may–2nd June); confirmation of the soviet intention to withdraw from Af-
ghanistan5; more flexibility on regional issues; progress in talks with the ec6; and a 
greater interest in the united Nations and other international institutions.
7. The most prominent feature of the evolving soviet attitude towards East 
European states has been more explicit emphasis on the absence of a soviet “model”, 
and renewed stress on the need for each east european leadership to come to terms 
with its own situation. The limitations on this freedom of action are by no means 
4  The iNf contract (intermediate-range Nuclear forces treaty), which dealt with the intermedi-
ate-range traditional and nuclear ballistic weapons (missiles) and cruise missiles was signed by ro-
nald reagan, us president and mikhail Gorbachev, General secretary of the cc of the cpsu on 
8 December 1987 in washington.
5  The soviet military intervention in Afghanistan began in December 1979 and ended with the with-
drawal of soviet forces in february 1989.
6  european communities (ec): the common name for the montanunion (european coal and steel 
community), european economic community (eec) and the euratom (european Atomic ener-
gy community) between 1967 and 1993.
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apparent yet, but east european regimes seem to be operating cautiously in the cer-
tain expectation that there are boundaries which cannot be overstepped.
8. Gorbachev’s push to get the soviet party out of the business of detailed 
management has also been construed in some quarters, both in the soviet union 
and the other warsaw pact countries, as putting the party more on the sidelines in 
overall economic and political policy formulation. But there have also been efforts 
to counter such an interpretation, including continuing public insistence on the 
party’s leading role and direct criticism of the Bulgarian party’s mistakes in the re-
structuring process.7
9. east european responses to Gorbachev’s initiatives vary widely. internal 
dynamics are driving Poland and Hungary to support restructuring, though indi-
vidual measures are subject to modification by inter-party discussion. Bulgaria’s im-
itation of soviet policies resulted in “confusion”, but Zhivkov has promised to com-
ply with soviet advice. Czechoslovakia has resolved its internal debates, at least on 
the surface, and is proceeding to restructure at a slow pace. The German Democratic 
Republic rejects the applicability of soviet reforms to its economy or to east Ger-
man society as a whole. Romania’s stubborn refusal to reform, even in the face of 
economic near-collapse, may end only with a change of leadership in Bucharest. 
Varying threats to stability in coming months may result from public reaction to 
economic austerity in the hardest-hit countries and the possibility of unrest in one 
or more countries exists.
10. There have been no major developments in the human rights situation in 
the region. The German Democratic republic has however, taken a new, much 
tougher line towards would-be emigrants. The plight of the Turkish minority in Bul-
garia8 continued to be raised in the relevant international fora and in bilateral con-
tacts between certain western and islamic countries and the Bulgarian government. 
extensive reporting of the issue continued to appear in the international press.
* * *
11. in Yugoslavia, the government introduced a controversial programme of eco-
nomic reform, together with proposed constitutional amendments intended to 
strengthen economic levers. progress in restoring economic equilibrium will de-
7  Viktor Vasilevich sharapov, ambassador of the ussr, then of the russian federation to sofia in 
1988–1992, pointed out in an interview conducted in moscow in 2009 that “in 1988–1989 it be-
came clear that todor Zhivkov had his own ideas regarding the transformations. instead of econom-
ic reforms, he initiated massive, but unfruitful administrative changes, like creating a new bureau of 
administration.” The interview of petar-emil mitev (http://www.kultura.bg/bg/print_article/
view/26648 (date of last download: July 13, 2018).
8  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties fixing 
the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” composed of 
various ethnic groups.]
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pend not only on the reform package, but also on Yugoslavia’s negotiations with the 
imf9 and the paris club.10 Gorbachev’s visit to Yugoslavia in march may lead to-
wards a more confident and relaxed relationship between moscow and Belgrade. 
The joint Declaration adopted could also have implications for relations between 
the soviet union and eastern europe as a whole.
12. movement in Albania’s foreign relations in the past few months has tended 
to overshadow domestic developments. in particular, its performance at the Balkan 
foreign ministers’ meeting in Belgrade in march showed a change in Albania’s atti-
tude towards Balkan co-operation from which it had previously stood aloof. in the 
same period there have been several visits by high level western officials to tirana. 
some further normalization with eastern europe has also taken place.
ii. ussr: towArDs the 19th pArtY coNfereNce
13. The 19th conference of the cpsu, which begins on 28th June, is expected to be 
a major political event, almost equivalent in importance to a party congress. The first 
to be held since 1941, the conference is timed to coincide with the half-way mark in 
the current, 12th five Year plan, and falls approximately mid-way between party con-
gresses, thus providing an opportunity to review the progress of perestroïka, the cur-
rent 5 year plan, and to tackle major policy issues. personnel changes at the confer-
ence would give an indication of Gorbachev’s political strength. he himself referred 
last June to the fact that previous conferences had made changes in the composition of 
central party organs. A number of articles in the soviet press have drawn attention to 
the provision in the 1939 party statutes (now superseded) for replacement of up to 
20% of central committee members. (This would more than allow for the removal 
of the “dead souls”11 in the central committee at present – i.e. people no longer in 
jobs with which their cc membership was associated).
14. The idea of holding a conference was first mooted by Gorbachev at the 
January 1987 party plenum, but it was only given full central committee endorse-
ment at the plenum in June. There are two items on the agenda:
 9  The international monetary fund (imf) was established in 1945 with its seat in washington. it is 
a central organization of the international financial system. The goal of its establishment was to 
promote international financial cooperation and exchange rate stability, to enhance economic 
growth, and to create full employment. furthermore, it issued loans to member countries with fi-
nancial-budgetary problems.
10  The paris club is an informal group of officials of lending countries searching for integrated and 
sustainable solutions to indebted states suffering from difficulties. if indebted states are willing to 
accept the economic and financial reforms proposed by the lending countries, the latter offer rea-
sonable terms. The first meeting of the club members was organized in 1956.
11  reference to the novel of Nikolay Vasilevich Gogol, Dead souls, first published in 1842. The 
“hero” of the novel, chichikov, buys up the property rights for dead peasants.
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– progress in the implementation of decisions of the 27th party congress, the 
basic results of the first half of the 12th five Year plan and tasks of party organisa-
tions in deepening the process of perestroïka; and
– measures for the further democratisation of the life of the party and society.
15. The election of delegates to the conference, one for every 3,780 party 
members, is to take place in April–may at plenums of regional party committees in 
the 5 largest republics, and of central committees of the smaller republics. Dele-
gates from party organisations of the armed forces, internal and border troops will 
be elected at the same meetings.
16. The current party statutes say very little about the holding of party con-
ferences, except that they can be convened to discuss pressing matters of party poli-
cy, and that procedures for them are decided by the central committee. But there 
have been strong hints that amendments will be made to the party statutes, in par-
ticular concerning “démocratisation” of elections to party organs, and possibly con-
cerning limits to the number of terms officials may remain in office, such as were 
agreed recently at the Bulgarian communist party conference, and which existed 
under Khrushchev and until the 23rd party congress in 1966.
17. other suggestions have been put forward, mostly concerned with proce-
dures in local party organisations. They include:
– the selection of party officials no longer by written application and inter-
views alone, but on the basis of proven ability;
– in reducing the overall size of the party apparatus, the pay of certain catego-
ries of party worker should be raised, so as to attract people with high political and 
operational qualifications;
– amendment to Article 12 of the statutes, concerning party membership after 
prosecution in a court;
– reviewing procedures and documents which specify the frequency of holding 
party meetings and plenums;
– redefining the tasks, rights and obligations of party control commissions;
– reorganising regional party apparats, especially their organisational-party 
work (i.e. personnel), ideology and economic departments;
– decentralising decisions concerning the structure and staffing of local party 
organisations;
– amending the party rules for elections to local organisations (e.g. direct elec-
tions of officials by all party members, not only committee members; genuine secret 
ballots, and multiple candidate elections without pre-selected candidates).
18. These issues will probably be discussed under item 2 on the agenda, as well 
as other aspects of electoral reform, e.g. elections to local soviets and the supreme 
soviet (the first multiple candidate election for a ussr supreme soviet seat took 
place in January). progress of legal reforms may also be discussed.
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19. The first item on the agenda will provide an opportunity for an assessment 
of the economic reforms introduced this year and perhaps for some fine-tuning. 
There may be further discussion of sensitive aspects such as price reform and unem-
ployment. But above all it will be an opportunity to give a further push to perestroi-
ka, to try to convince the naturally conservative institutions and population of the 
soviet union that the reforms are essential.
iii. receNt DeVelopmeNts iN the BAltic stAtes
20. The politically unsettling effect of glasnost12 and other developments set in train 
by Gorbachev have been particularly marked in the three Baltic republics of the 
ussr. even if similar strands can be found in their recent histories, latvia, lithua-
nia and estonia have important historical, linguistic and religious differences. it is 
still relatively unusual to find nationals of all three republics taking a common 
stand against russian/soviet political or cultural dominance. The co-ordinated 
mass demonstrations which occurred in the capitals of the republics and elsewhere 
on 23rd August 1987, the anniversary of the German soviet non-aggression pact of 
1939,13 set them apart from several others which preceded and followed them in 
the individual republics. As in the case of the other demonstrations, the Baltic me-
dia did their best to condemn these events (although the demonstrations were not 
banned outright) and to attack individual ringleaders, to minimise the turn-outs 
and – particularly – to allege western incitement. some of the leading organisers 
were severely harrassed [harassed] subsequently.
21. in estonia, one of the unofficial groups behind these demonstrations was 
pressing for publication of the secret protocols of the two German–soviet agree-
ments of 1939 (the non-aggression pact of 23rd August and the Agreement on 
friendship and frontiers signed on 28th september14). These secret protocols, which 
touch on the sensitive issue of spheres of influence in the Baltic area and in poland, 
have never been published in the ussr and their existence is not admitted by most 
soviet historians.
12  Glasnost’: new political style in the soviet union, implemented by Gorbachev in 1985. The origi-
nal meaning of the russian word is “publicity, openness, overtness,” the abandonment of restric-
tions. its goal was to convince the “hardliner” conservative communists to accept the necessity of 
economic transformation.
13  The bilateral treaty signed by Joachim von ribbentrop, German minister of foreign Affairs, and 
Vyatcheslav molotov, soviet people’s commissar for foreign Affairs, on August 23, 1939 contains 
a public agreement on cooperation and non-aggression and a secret protocol delimiting spheres of 
influence. The latter stipulates that the future German–soviet boundary should run on the north-
ern boundary of lithuania.
14  The German–soviet friendship Agreement, signed on september 28, 1939 also had a secret an-
nex, which modified the agreement of August 23. The Germans were allowed to keep more polish 
areas, and in return lithuania was moved to the russian sphere of influence.
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22. emotive historical issues have featured in other historical writings, both 
unpublished and published. The estonian cultural weekly Sirp ja Vasar of 27th No-
vember provided detailed statistics of the deportations which took place on 14th 
June 1941, as well as further figures on an even larger deportation in 1949. figures 
were also given about the number of estonian partisans who had taken up an armed 
struggle against the postwar soviet occupants. These exceeded estimates published 
in the west by 50%. in July, the estonian literary monthly Looming published the 
first part of a novel, written about a decade previously, dealing with the fate of six-
teen estonian families deported to siberia. Another remarkable example of glasnost 
in estonia was the publication in the cultural monthly Vikerkaar in July 1987 of a 
survey of (mainly literary) samizdat writing which had appeared in estonia over the 
last 20 years.
23. Both the finnish press and estonian samizdat have reported that the cen-
tral committee in moscow issued a secret resolution about nationalism in the Bal-
tic republics on 14th December 1987 which condemned liberal publications. A 
meeting was reportedly held on 22nd December to discuss ideological issues in es-
tonia at which several individual authors, editors and publications were sharply at-
tacked by name. 
24. There are numerous overt indications that the groundswell of nationalism 
is still high in the Baltic republics. Demonstrations continued in Vilnius on 16th 
february 1988, the anniversary of the proclamation of an independent lithuania15; 
in parnu and tartu on 7th November and 2nd february respectively; other an-
ti-russian incidents were reported by the soviet press to have taken place in estonia 
earlier. official attempts were made to counter the demonstrations by a variety of 
means, including regulations on procedures to be followed by would-be demonstra-
tors, and a massive counter-propaganda effort which has even included the wheel-
ing-out of Kim philby on latvian television in october and December in order to 
suggest that western intelligence services, with the aid of emigres, were behind such 
disturbances.
25. on another level, steps have been taken to placate public opinion over is-
sues tinged to a greater or lesser extent with nationalism. for example, some old 
street names have been restored in Vilnius and riga; pressure has been stepped up 
on the non-indigenous inhabitants of the republics to learn the local languages; the 
Queen of peace cathedral in Klaipeda, built at the expense of believers but confis-
cated in 1962 and turned into a concert hall, has been restored to its congregation; 
15  on september 22, 1917 began the first session of the conference of Vilnius with the permission of 
the occupying German authorities to discuss organizational issues for a lithuanian state to be estab-
lished within ethnic boundaries. The conference created a council of twenty (taryba, lithuanian 
council), which declared the independence of lithuania on December 11, 1917 as a German pro-
tectorate. The Declaration of independence was issued on february 16, 1918, which defined lithua-
nia as a democratic state.
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also in lithuania, increasing numbers of students are being permitted to study in 
the Kaunas catholic seminary; work on the Daugava river hydro-electric project, 
which evoked strong protest in latvia and lithuania, has been officially abandoned, 
while a hotly-disputed plan to mine phosphorite in estonia has been shelved.
26. in the meantime expressions of nationalism have diversified even further. 
one of the most remarkable examples was a call published in september 1987 by 
four people with entirely conformist track-records to turn estonia into an “econom-
ic development zone”16 similar to those established in china. A central feature of 
their plan was the reorienting of the estonian economy towards the international 
market, based on direct links. Their proposals also referred to the sensitive issue of 
the movement of labour from other regions of the ussr into the republic. similar 
ideas are being discussed in the other Baltic republics.
iV. NAtioNAlist DemoNstrAtioNs iN trANscAucAsiA
27. in february–march 1988, nationalist demonstrations of unprecedented scope 
took place in erevan, capital of the soviet Armenian republic, and in the autono-
mous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, 76% of whose population are Armenian. Their 
proportion in terms of the overall population of the autonomous region is constant-
ly waning, by contrast with the Azerbaijani inhabitants of the same administrative 
unit. Nagorno-Karabakh has formed part of Azerbaijan since the latter’s declara-
tion of independence in 1918. it was declared an autonomous region in 1923 and 
became an enclave in the soviet republic of Azerbaijan.
28. These events are important, as is shown by the scale of the demonstrations, 
their diversity, duration and resolve: gatherings, strikes of both workers and stu-
dents and public discussions were organised for several successive days. even though 
the agitation in erevan was sparked off by a local problem (pollution), all the 
demonstrations seemed designed to support the call for the incorporation of Na-
gorno-Karabakh into the Armenian republic. This is a long-standing and seeming-
ly well organised movement: the erevan demonstrations went off quietly, in compli-
ance with the law, and dispersed in an orderly manner. local communist party of-
ficials were involved in the unrest: and on 20th february, the 110 Armenian deputies 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh soviet voted massively for its incorporation in the Arme-
nian republic. This was firmly rejected by moscow’s emissary (Demichev) on 23rd 
february and by the presidium of the supreme soviet on 23rd march. The first 
16  As a part of the policy of opening up in china in 1978, the communist party of china created 
special economic zones in 1980 functioning as duty free areas. investors received large tax exemp-
tions and other advantages. in 1984 fourteen coastal towns also received these privileges. Thus 
separated zones were created similar to “free ports” and “free trade zones,” with considerable for-
eign trade, where enterprises produced for external markets.
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secretary of the region’s cp, Kevorkov, was dismissed. These events were bound to 
have an impact abroad, not only because of the scale of Armenian emigration and 
the trans-national dimension of the Armenian church but also owing to the solici-
tude for soviet Azerbaijanis of some peoples who have blood and religious ties with 
them, both inside and outside the soviet union.17
29. Nor was their importance underestimated by the soviet leadership, which 
dispatched to the area several leading cpsu officials, including three candidate 
members of the politburo. on 26th february, Gorbachev called on the peoples of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain calm. on the next day, the General secretary 
received two Armenian literary notabilities, the poetess sylvia Kaputikyan and the 
writer Zori Balayan. Gorbachev is reported to have promised them a “just solution” 
to the problem, while making it clear that this would take time. it is highly unusual 
for a soviet leader to receive people with no official standing.
30. The announcement that two Azerbaijanis had died in Agdam18 during the 
Armenian demonstrations of 28th february led, on the same day, to violent clashes 
at sumgait19 between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, in which over thirty people 
were killed.
31. The Armenian problem, is a special one for, unlike expressions of national-
ism in other regions of the ussr (especially the Baltic countries), the Armenian 
events do not signify a protest against the policy of russification. The aim (for the 
present, at any rate) is not to hark back to past independence but to seek the incor-
poration in a single administrative entity – the Armenian republic – within the 
soviet state, of ethnically identical peoples. Also, unlike other peoples which have 
recently experienced national demonstrations but are primarily (the Kazakhs) or 
almost exclusively (the Yakutis) located in the ussr, many Armenians have been 
dispersed abroad. Approximately four million live in the ussr, including 2.7 mil-
lion in the Armenian republic, and some 2–3 million abroad, mainly in the united 
states, europe and the middle east. The Armenian church, too, serves as a power-
ful link between all Armenians living in the ussr and in the diaspora.
32. The soviet leaders have little room for manoeuvre. A brutal clampdown on 
the demonstrations, together with the outright and sustained rejection of all the 
demands underlying them, would be perceived, both in the ussr and abroad, as 
testifying to certain limitations in the “democratization” process. The immense ef-
fort that has been made to enhance the ussr’s image in the outside world could be 
partly compromised. Also, the situation in transcaucasia is so complex (overlapping 
17  Azeri people: A turkish-speaking nation living in the southern foothills of the caucasus moun-
tains. Besides Azerbaijan, Azeri people also live in iran, iraq, turkey, and in Georgia and russia.
18  Ağdam: town located at the border of the former Nagorno (mountainous) Karabakh Autono-
mous region and Azerbaijan.
19  sumgait, sumqayit: towns in the area of the former ssr of Azerbaijan.
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of ethnic, religious and administrative problems, impact of history, implications for 
relations with neighbouring turkey – moscow and Kars agreements20 – and iran) 
that the status quo is particularly difficult to alter. in addition, any major change in 
the administrative order inherited from the stalin era would inevitably encourage 
the Armenians to press ahead with their demands (another enclave, with a small 
Armenian minority – Nakhichevan, on the iranian frontier, is likewise attached to 
Azerbaijan21) and harden those of other ethnic groups which consider themselves 
prejudiced (tartars, Balts, moldavians, etc.). finally, should it persist, this instabili-
ty in the outlying republics could combine with that encouraged in certain east 
european countries by the ussr’s internal reform policy.
33. however, there seems to be no prospect of evading the nationalities issue. 
in fact, the problem is now one of the soviet leaders’ main concerns, as was empha-
sised by both ligachev and Gorbachev at the february 1988 plenum. The General 
secretary even stated that a future plenum should be devoted to the nationalities 
question, which he described as “a vital problem, the most essential for soviet soci-
ety”. for a time, Gorbachev engaged in stalling tactics; in his appeal to the Armeni-
an and Azerbaijani peoples, he was careful to point out the need for a “patient ap-
proach”. But the supreme soviet subsequently came down clearly against any idea of 
territorial changes.
34. what sort of measures could be taken in future? Generally speaking, the 
soviet leaders can be expected to have to reckon with inevitable irritation at the 
growing disturbances on the part of a soviet people inured to order, and which 
looks to the authorities to take a firm line. it could have implications for a slowing 
down of the “democratization” process within soviet society. where the nationali-
ties issue is concerned, restructuring is an especially delicate process (given the com-
plexity of the measures needed and the prospect that the movement might spread), 
but some arrangements catering more effectively for cultural identities are certainly 
feasible, even if they do not necessarily settle the basic problems in the long term.
20  The peace treaty of moscow was concluded on march 16, 1921 between the Great Assembly of 
turkey and the russian ssr (neither the republic of turkey nor the soviet union had yet been 
established at that date). mustafa Kemal Atatürk and lenin undertook to establish friendly rela-
tions between the two countries. former agreements between the ottoman empire and the rus-
sian empire were nullified. The turks handed over Batumi and areas north of sarp village to Geor-
gia, while turkey received Kars in return. (These were acquired by the russians as the result of the 
war in 1877–78.) The boundary between turkey and the transcaucasian ssr (from 1936 onward 
Georgian ssr, Armenian ssr and ssr of Azerbaijan) was officially defined on october 13, 1921 
in the peace treaty of Kars.
21  The history of the area of Nakhchivan is usually considered as a part of the Armenian history. 
however, due to the increasing persian influence and muslim penetration, it became a multiethnic 
region of tsarist russia by the beginning of the twentieth century. paragraph five of the convention 
of Kars defined Nakhchivan as an autonomous exclave under the administration of the Azeri ssr.
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V. polAND: the NAture AND streNGth  
of politicAl oppositioN
35. The major domestic problem facing the polish authorities is still the economy’s 
poor performance and difficulties in implementation of the economic reforms. The 
referendum held on 29th November asked in effect for a mandate for tough eco-
nomic austerity measures while holding out the prospect of political concessions.22 
The authorities have used consultations on price rises in recent years, in the hope 
that public discussion would both prepare the population and provide a safety valve 
for discontent. A clear mandate from the referendum would have made it easier to 
defuse resistance to change from within the establishment and from the workers 
themselves. The authorities appeared embarrassed by the result, which gave less than 
the 51% majority required to make the referendum binding. But there is specula-
tion that at least some at the top may have wanted a more cautious approach. The 
authorities made it clear afterwards that the changes would go ahead, but more 
slowly. politically, it remains an important fact that for the first time an unmanipu-
lated consultation of the population has taken place.
36. on the economic side, the clearest example yet of the slowing of the pace is 
on prices. The announcement of some very steep proposed price rises just before the 
referendum was considered partly responsible for the failure to reach the 51% ma-
jority. After the referendum, the proposals were revised to spread one year’s price 
rises over 3 years. even so, the authorities were obliged, not least by heavy pressure 
from the official trade unions, to cover over half the increase in the cost of living by 
additional wage supplements. shortly before the referendum, the sejm23 passed a 
series of laws aimed chiefly at the restructuring and decentralisation of the economy 
– the “second stage” of reform. many of the points covered, such as reductions in 
subsidies and in central control of factories, had been tried over the last 5 years with-
out success.
37. The authorities’ ability and political will to implement their economic pol-
icy, including this new legislation, must be questioned: as before, they are likely to 
be faced with passive and even active, if unco-ordinated, opposition from many 
quarters including local party and administration, factory management, and work-
ers. moreover, the underlying problems facing the economy, in which growth fell 
below 1986 levels and failed to meet plan targets, are so severe that it will take years 
for any noticeable improvement to appear, let alone be felt by the man in the street.
22  The questions raised at the referendum by the polish authorities on November 29, 1987 were 
mainly of general character, like a “sane economic life,” and “deep democratization of the political 
life.” At least half of the electors would have needed to vote “yes” to consider the referendum valid. 
The opposition recommended either a boycott or a “double no” vote. According to official data, 
the participation rate reached 63.3%, but the “yes” voters did not exceed 50%.
23  The name of the parliament in poland.
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38. The emphasis may now be shifting from the debate on how far to take eco-
nomic reform to a more political/ideological campaign aimed at convincing all lev-
els of society and all political groups of the importance of implementing reform. 
The appointment of rakowski to the politburo in December may be in preparation 
for this. he has some experience in operating this kind of consultative machinery 
favoured by Jaruzelski,24 but he is not a person who has the confidence of the popu-
lation in view of his somewhat dubious role in 1980.25 A politburo report on pro-
posed political changes was published before the referendum, after apparently heat-
ed internal party discussions on how far to go. it includes a number of ideas that 
have been in circulation for some time, e.g. amendments to the constitution, a new 
law on associations, and expansion of powers of local government. many of these 
will take some time to come to fruition.
39. meanwhile, the regime still refuses to deal with solidarity as such,26 to 
avoid legitimising it as the representative of polish society. instead, Jaruzelski seems 
to be probing at the margins of the opposition, seeking to draw so-called moderate 
elements into discussions without making major concessions to the opposition as a 
whole, in effect splitting it.
40. Though its active membership has declined with society’s general with-
drawal into political apathy, solidarity is still the major opposition force for politi-
cal change in poland. Nevertheless it has had difficulties co-ordinating timely deci-
sions on major issues at the national level and exercising real leadership to take ad-
vantage of its considerable strength at the grass roots. for the most part, these 
problems stem from the fact that solidarity is forced to operate clandestinely. how-
ever, they also reflect internal policy disputes regarding appropriate tactical ap-
proaches towards the Jaruzelski regime. The movement is faced with a major dilem-
ma because the government’s economic reform programme parallels many of its 
own demands.
24  The unsuccessful referendum (November 29, 1987) and the increasing strike movement in 1988 
led to the fall of the messner government. Jaruzelski, as he did not want to implement martial law 
again, then initiated consultations with wałęsa. interior minister Kiszczak led the secret negotia-
tions from August onward, which became official on september 16. This was the precursor of 
round table negotiations.
25  The report rather refers to the 1981 role of rakowski, when he became the deputy of premier 
Jaruzelski, and was appointed as leader of the government committee negotiating with the trade 
unions. Beginning in spring 1981 he negotiated with solidarity. he was considered a “reformist” 
but even after the implementation of the state of emergency and martial law he remained Deputy 
prime minister until 1985. in December 1987 he became a member of the political committee of 
the polish united workers’ party as a reformer. see more about him in the Appendix (Biographi-
cal notes).
26  solidarity (in polish: solidarność), a polish trade union established in August 1980 in the lenin 
shipyard of Gdańsk to secure workers’ rights. it became the largest oppositional mass movement 
against the socialist regime up to 1989.
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41. in the absence of a strong central leadership, regional activists have seized 
the initiative and tailored their response to regime tactics in ways best suited to the 
local situation. solidarity members have infiltrated regime-inspired workers’ coun-
cils and, to a lesser degree, official unions. moreover, local activists are preserving 
close ties to the church even though, at the national level, church-opposition dia-
logue shows signs of strain.
42. The public, however, shares solidarity’s skepticism about regime-pro-
posed reforms in general, and all opposition circles are apprehensive about get-
ting ahead of public sentiment by appearing to make pre-emptive concessions to 
the authorities.
Vi. huNGArY: the prospects for politicAl chANGe
43. After decades of relative tranquility, the hungarian regime is now beset by fac-
tionalism over necessary economic and political change.
44. The most significant event in the last six months was the parliamentary 
session of mid-December which marked a start on streamlining the administration. 
The changes include the reduction of the number of Deputy prime ministers from 
5 to 2 (dealing only with economic affairs) and the merger of the separate internal 
and foreign trade ministries into a single ministry.
45. hungary’s economy came back in the second half of 1987 from over three 
years of relative stagnation, but is still not performing well. There is a hard-currency 
debt of over $17 billion – the highest per capita debt in eastern europe. The simul-
taneous introduction of personal income tax and value added tax together with 
steep price rises at the beginning of the year has been criticised in many quarters, 
most especially by the trade unions. in addition to this, the closure of some loss-mak-
ing enterprises with inevitable unemployment, especially in certain areas of heavy 
industry such as the North east, has created a climate of apprehension. hungarians 
were faced for the first time in many years with shortages as a wave of panic-buying 
occurred at the end of the year. The party/Government calculation is that hunga-
rians can take a great deal more economic pain, and that they have too much at stake 
to take to the streets. polling, however, shows a growing alienation that, unchecked, 
could threaten the status quo. The trade off has been a renewed stress on the priority 
of political reform.
46. The ideological debate continues, particularly over the extension of de-
mocracy to the political as well as the economic field. so far there has been little 
progress in this, despite a gradual increase in the role of parliament. Attempts are 
being made to redefine the leading role of the party; this concerns a reduction in the 
involvement of the party from direct detailed administration.
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47. The party conference to be held in may 1988 is clearly intended to be an 
event of significance, both for policy and the future leadership. however, rumours 
of Kadar’s departure from office at the conference, together with fears of radical 
change seem to have caused disquiet in the party and recent signs indicate that the 
scope and significance of the conference could be limited. The succession to Kadar 
continues to be the subject of constant discussion.
48. since he became prime minister, Grosz has improved his own image by his 
energy, frankness and high profile. it remains to be seen whether popular discon-
tent, arising from the austerity measures, can be used against Grosz by the more 
conservative elements in the party, or those Kadarist elements anxious for the con-
tinuation of the consensus on which hungary’s past stability was based, or even by 
opportunist political rivals such as Berecz, the equally youthful and energetic ideo-
logical chief.
49. Grosz has, however, been getting the limelight normally reserved for party 
chiefs as he courts dialogue with the “non-hostile” factions of the opposition, and 
tries to align himself with liberal elements in the party. he is probably the more 
outspoken public figure in eastern europe, and has managed to soften his hardline 
image while administering a highly unpalatable package of austerity measures.
Vii. cZechosloVAKiA iN the post-husAK erA
50. czechoslovak domestic policy, characterized by the conservatism of president 
husak, who had ruled the country since 1969, underwent a long-awaited change in 
December 1987, when husak relinquished – with due ceremony – his post of party 
General secretary and was succeeded by milos Jakes, eleven years younger than 
husak but, like him, one of the group which eliminated Dubcek in 1969 and has 
since directed the country’s “normalization”.
51. This changeover – partly accounted for by husak’s age (75) and delicate 
health – also marks the first instance since Gorbachev assumed power in moscow of 
the replacement of an east european leader who was a contemporary of Brezhnev. 
The party central committee’s choice of Jakes is undoubtedly intended to strike a 
balance between the soviet leader’s desire to promote a change, generation-and 
style-wise, in eastern leaders, and the conservative reaction of a party born of the 
normalisation process, which is reluctant to see what it has achieved (gradual im-
provement of the czechoslovaks’ standard of living in return for their renunciation 
of the ideas of the prague spring27) implicitly challenged by new soviet policies. 
27  “prague spring”: a czechoslovak attempt to reform the economy and democratize the state and 
the communist party, to create a “socialism with a human face” in January–August 1968. The in-
tervention of soviet, polish, hungarian and Bulgarian troops put an end to these efforts.
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And, as though to underline that there has been no break with the past, husak re-
tains his seat in the politburo.
52. it is true that Jakes offers all the guarantees of continuity and resolve need-
ed to ensure a smooth transition devoid of political adventurism, for it was he who, 
in 1969 and 1970, purged the czechoslovak party of all its “Dubcekist” elements by 
devising and carrying out the party “card exchange” operation. Thus, the soviet un-
ion and the czechoslovak communists need have no fear that certain “prague 
spring” ideas, or even leaders, could come into vogue again on the pretext of mod-
ernisation. There seems to be every prospect that, in this respect, Jakes will not devi-
ate from the conservative line taken by husak. even though in January 1988 Dub-
cek was able, for the first time since 1969, to grant an interview to italian journal-
ists28 from “l’unita”,29 in which he drew attention to the similarity between soviet 
“perestroika” and the “prague spring”, the czechoslovak communist party took 
care to reaffirm in clear terms that it was “out of the question” for the “opportunis-
tic” leaders of 1968 to return to public life.
53. few changes have been noted in the authorities’ reaction to dissidence 
(charter 7730 and committee for the unjustly persecuted – “VoNs”31), which 
combines strict ideological vigilance with moderate repressive measures, designed 
not to blacken czechoslovakia’s public image abroad. The policy is thus one of pre-
vention, involving detention for short periods, house arrest or even occupational 
changes, and is applied as soon as dissidents32 try to exert pressure as a political op-
position force. This new line has replaced the arrests and imprisonments prevalent 
in the late 1970s. A noteworthy feature is that the authorities no longer try to pre-
vent meetings between prominent dissidents and western notabilities during the 
28  in 1988 Dubček was allowed to travel to italy in order to receive an honorary doctorate at the 
university of Bologna. During his stay he was interviewed by L’Unità. This was his first public 
appearance since 1970.
29  L’Unità: the official organ of the italian communist party between 1924 and 1991.
30  charter 77 was the political declaration of the opposition originally signed by more than 200 
persons, mainly from the intelligentsia, addressed to the government in prague. The document 
objected to the violation of human rights in czechoslovakia defined by the uN and the helsinki 
Declaration, which had been accepted at the conference on security and co-operation in europe 
(1973–1975) in helsinki.
31  committee for the Defense of the unjustly prosecuted (VoNs): as a committee established in 
April 27, 1978 by the persons signing the charter ’77, the goal of which was to trace the cases of 
persons prosecuted by the state in different forms (unfair jurisdiction, harassment by the police, 
etc.). The members of the committee worked for financial support, legal representation, or other 
forms of relief.
32  The term “dissident” in the document should be interpreted as it was used in the soviet union. it 
was used from the death of stalin to the fall of the communist regimes. in official communications 
it originally served to label those who exerted criticism on the activity and authority of the party. 
later the word became the part of the self-identification of those who were unsatisfied with the 
communist regime, and they began to call themselves dissidents.
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latter’s visits to prague. however, there are still twenty or so prisoners of conscience 
and, in particular, people sentenced for religious “proselytism”.
54. in the economic sphere, Jakes and his associates are faced with the need to 
modernise czechoslovak industry – now obsolescent – to meet the new soviet re-
quirements for larger supplies of good-quality products from the east european 
states. czechoslovakia’s eighth five-Year plan (1986-1990) has, moreover, allocated 
extensive resources to sectors (electrotechnology, robotics, general mechanical engi-
neering, biotechnology) corresponding to soviet desired priorities. At the same 
time, however, prague remains concerned not to penalise the consumers or sacrifice 
other traditional sectors.
55. The economic reform is being cautiously implemented. The resolution 
passed by the December plenum is a blue-print for gradual change and it indicates 
that the reform is an open-ended process. The system proposed is some way from 
the market model – but, it is claimed, there will be room for competition within the 
new system. The next three years are to be treated as preparatory years and full im-
plementation of the new economic system is to begin in 1991. The first step was in 
fact taken with its application to the catering sector from 1st January 1988. A price 
reform is to come into effect from 1st January 1989 and other elements including a 
revised (and more stringent) credit policy from 1988–1990. The plenum also 
passed a resolution on cadres which re-emphasises the growing importance this sub-
ject has acquired in recent years. whether the two resolutions will in the long run 
produce the results hoped for, is open to question, but changes in middle ranking 
personnel have been taking place quite steadily over the past year.
Viii. the turKish muslim miNoritY iN BulGAriA:  
receNt DeVelopmeNts
56. No change has been observed in the implementation of the forcible assimila-
tion policy to which the turkish minority in Bulgaria33 has been subjected since 
late 1984. All bans and restrictions imposed on ethnic turks with respect to their 
national, cultural and religious identity continue. lately, the issue has been taken up 
in two important reports of an international character. in his report submitted to 
the 44th session of the uN commission on human rights,34 Dr. ribeiro, special 
33  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties fix-
ing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” com-
posed of various ethnic groups.]
34  The united Nations’ committee for human rights (uNchr) was a committee operating be-
tween 1946 and 2006 within the uN. it operated under the uN’s economic and social council 
(ecosoc). it was the most important forum for defending, securing, and promoting human 
rights.
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rapporteur on religious intolerance,35 underlined the difficulties the turkish mi-
nority in Bulgaria faces and called for bilateral negotiations for securing respect for 
its religious rights and freedoms.
57. The islamic contact Group, which submitted its report on the plight of 
muslims in Bulgaria to the seventeenth islamic conference of foreign ministers36 
(Amman, 2lst–25th march 1988), came to the conclusion that muslims in Bulgaria 
had been subjected to official pressure and coercion in changing their islamic names 
into slavic ones; that they are denied the right to follow their religion freely; that 
muslims in that country, the majority of whom are of turkish origin, are forbidden 
to use their own language and to protect their cultural heritage; that, taking account 
of the various bilateral and international instruments to which Bulgaria is a party, 
the violation of their rights cannot be regarded as an internal matter of Bulgaria. 
The contact Group also elaborated a set of recommendations with a view to saving 
the muslims in Bulgaria from the total destruction of their identity.
58. The signing of the protocol of 23rd february 1988 between turkey and 
Bulgaria has been a positive development opening the way to negotiations for nor-
malizing bilateral relations. in this negotiation process, turkey intends to focus par-
ticularly on the plight of ethnic turks in Bulgaria. international pressure on Bul-
garia has been instrumental in forcing the Bulgarian Government to engage in ne-
gotiations with turkey, and it is therefore important that this pressure continue.
iX. the soViet uNioN AND its eAst europeAN pArtNers:  
is perestroiKA chANGiNG the relAtioNship?
59. it is still too early to draw firm conclusions about the impact of soviet reform 
policy on the relations between the ussr and its east european allies. in particular 
it is not yet clear whether it has given these countries more room for manoeuvre. it 
seems however to have had an encouraging effect on pro-reform elements in eastern 
europe. some doubt has been cast on the continuing validity of the “Brezhnev doc-
35  The General Assembly of the united Nations accepted the declaration on the abolition of intoler-
ance and discrimination of any kind based on religion or belief in 1981. in order to promote its 
declared goals, like the development of freedom to practice religion as a general human right, the 
uNchr created the position of “special rapporteur on religion intolerance.” his task was to 
identify the problems that hinder the realization religious freedom and propose solutions to over-
come them. The first “special rapporteur” was the portuguese Angelo d’Almeida ribeiro between 
1986 and 1993.
36  The organization of the islamic conference was established on 25 september 1969 in rabat, 
morocco. The main goal of the organization is to strengthen solidarity between islamic states. The 
islamic summit conference is the highest organ of the organization, which convenes every three 
years with the participation of the rulers, presidents, and prime ministers of the member states. 
The islamic conference of foreign ministers convenes each year and studies the progress in the 
execution of decisions made at the summit.
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trine”.37 But it must be assumed that the soviet union would be prepared to use 
force as a last resort in eastern europe to preserve a regime in danger of collapse, 
though it obviously aims to prevent such a situation arising. in practice Gorbachev’s 
intentions have not been put to the test. he has shown tolerance to regimes whose 
coolness to perestroika is manifest. clearly, however, relations with like-minded re-
gimes such as hungary and poland are likely to be better than with the more con-
servative regimes, like the GDr (which enjoyed easier relations in the past) and 
romania (which did not).
60. The trend towards improving consultation and cohesion in the warsaw pact 
in the foreign relations and defence field has been maintained. member countries have 
for instance been kept informed of the outcome of the shultz-shevardnadze talks,38 
and Gorbachev himself, as on previous occasions, briefed warsaw pact leaders on 
11th December in east Berlin immediately after the washington summit.39
61. New mechanisms are being put to considerable use, although their signifi-
cance is not yet entirely clear, e.g. the pact information group and the special com-
mittee to co-ordinate arms control policy. many of the apparent east european 
manifestations of “independence” in foreign policy may actually be the result of a 
soviet effort to push other leaders more to the forefront of warsaw pact diplomacy, 
and one function of the new pact bodies is to co-ordinate such moves.
62. economic matters are currently receiving particular emphasis in soviet 
contacts with east european countries; cmeA reform is a key Gorbachev concern. 
The main event was the 43rd extraordinary cmeA council session held in mos-
cow in october and attended by prime ministers. it once again demonstrated east 
european resistance to regional economic integration; romanian opposition was 
to be expected, but the firm GDr objections were more unusual.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(88)14 
(April 27, 1988).
37  The Brezhnev doctrine: one of the basic principles or geopolitical theories of the soviet union in 
foreign policy, which delimited the boundaries of the sovereignty of socialist countries in order to 
keep the soviet alliance system intact. it was adopted in practice from the 1960s to the end of the 
1980s. The communist parties of the allied countries had limited sovereignty: countries were not 
permitted to leave the warsaw pact, and the primacy of the interests of communist parties could 
not be questioned. According to the doctrine, the soviet union as the strongest socialist country 
had the right to defend socialism in those countries, at the same time declaring these friendly states 
as its own sphere of influence. This meant that intervention in these friendly states is not aggres-
sion but self-defense.
38  on November 23, 1987 shultz us and shevardnadze soviet ministers of foreign affairs entered 
into talks. They discussed the preparations for the washington summit (planned to take place 
between December 7–10, 1987), including the agreement on the elimination of intermediate 
range missiles.
39  see footnote 4.
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coNseil De l’AtlANtiQue NorD
North AtlANtic couNcil
NAto coNfiDeNtiAl
oriGiNAl: eNGlish/freNch corriGeNDum to DocumeNt 
c-m(88)14
10th may 1988
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe 
octoBer 1987 – mArch 1988
corrigendum to c-m(88)14, dated 27th April 1988
Paragraph 12
second sentence: “... the foreign ministers’ meeting in Belgrade in February ...”.
Insert the following paragraphs after paragraph 31
“expressions of nationalism, which have been frequent for over a year (riots at 
Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan at the end of 1986 following the dismissal of the Kazakh 
first secretary, who was replaced by a russian, and demonstrations in moldavia and 
Yakutiya) have been gathering pace in the past six months: demands by tartars un-
justly deported during the last war40 to return to crimea (in August 1987, late 1987 
and march 1988); protest demonstrations in the Baltic republics on the anniversa-
ries of their short-lived independence41 (early 1988).
Nationalist issues which, from the outset, have been an underlying feature of 
soviet history, have thus come sharply and acutely to the forefront again since the 
introduction of the new soviet leadership’s reform policy, the cadre policy, with the 
reshuffles it entails, and the new approach to economic problems, which jeopardiz-
40  in wwii the whole crimean tatar population of crimea fell victim to the soviet policy. Though 
their numbers in the red Army was not low and they even participated in local guerilla actions, 
due to the organization of the tatar legion within the wehrmacht and the cooperation between 
the Germans and the religious leaders of the community the soviet leaders declared the whole 
population to be “Nazi collaborators”. As punishment, all crimean tatars were deported to the 
uzbek ssr and to other special settlements in the soviet union. Their repatriation began only in 
the 1980s.
41  estonia, latvia, and lithuania gained their independence after wwi. After having declared their 
freedom and independence in 1918 they waged war against the German and soviet troops. By 
1920 the soviets acknowledged their independence. But on August 23, 1939 the molotov–rib-
bentrop pact incorporated the region into the soviet sphere of influence and due to the increasing 
pressure they “willingly” joined the soviet union.
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es certain vested interests. The “glasnost” policy, coupled with the proclaimed desire 
to encourage the “democratization of soviet society”, has created small pockets of 
freedom (growth of groups and associations, demonstrations allowed within cer-
tain limits, greater openness of the media, etc.) which now make it easier to voice 
nationalist demands and mobilise individuals more effectively; they also lend great-
er resonance to these demands, thereby encouraging the emergence of other move-
ments of the same type”.
NAto, 1110 Brussels.
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CONSEIL DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH DOCUMENT
10th November 1988 
c-m(88)47
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
mArch 1988 – octoBer 1988
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach the report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern eu-
rope” submitted to me by the chairman of the expert working Group, which met 
at NAto headquarters from 19th to 21st october 1988.
2. This report engages only the responsibility of the experts who participated 
in the working Group.
3. it will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 22nd November 
1988.
(signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto, 1110 Brussels.
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe 
Note by the chairman of the expert working Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
united states met at NAto headquarters from 19th to 21st october 1988 to pre-
pare the attached report.
2. This report covers the period from 26th march 1988 to 21st october 
1988.
(signed) D. i. miller
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coNteNts42
item subject paragraph Nos
i. General trends and outlook 1–16
ii. political and constitutional reform in the soviet union 17–22
iii. “unofficial” groups and people’s fronts42 23–28
iV. Gorbachev and the military 29–33
V. The KGB and perestroika 34–38
Vi. poland: The future of the Jaruzelski regime 39–47
Vii. Albania: new trends in foreign policy: A change of style or direction? 48–52
Viii. Nationality problems in eastern europe 53–61
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. The soviet party conference in June set in train a programme of political, con-
stitutional and legal reforms, many of which are to be in place by the middle of next 
year. The extraordinary meetings of the central committee on 30th september and 
the supreme soviet on 1st october further strengthened Gorbachev’s personal au-
thority and shifted the balance in the politburo significantly in his favour. he may 
not, however, have achieved all that he intended. There are apparent anomalies in 
the new leadership structure which suggest unfinished business, and possibly that 
Gorbachev compromised at some points.
2. National grievances and frustrations have led to a continuing crisis in the 
transcaucasus.43 in the Baltic states, the soviet leadership is hoping that the more 
extreme demands expressed in certain areas can be defused through greater eco-
nomic autonomy, giving offical [official] status to the local language, the resurrec-
tion of national symbols, and the airing of sensitive historical issues. Gorbachev 
seems to be encouraging these developments, but he is probably aware of the threat 
nationalism could pose to his reform programme if it gets out of control. his prob-
42  The peoples’ front of the Baltic member states, originally established to support the reforms of 
Gorbachev, soon turned into a collecting point and instrument of forces supporting indepen-
dence.
43  see footnote 2.
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lem is one of managing rising expectations without jeopardising the future of his 
policies. so far the authorities have taken care to contain nationalist aspirations in 
other regions, e.g. the western ukraine and Belorussia.
3. A new sense of urgency to achieve visible improvement in living standards 
in order to win popular support for reform became evident following the 19th par-
ty conference. The economic reform programme, while experiencing quite serious 
difficulties, took another step forward with the adoption in may of the law on 
co-operatives; the progressive tax arrangements on earnings in co-operatives, how-
ever, were prohibitively tough and may now be reduced. lease-contracting has been 
introduced in agriculture and industry. But industrial reforms are making little ob-
vious progress and decentralisation of economic management is running into seri-
ous problems. No decision has yet been taken on the question of price reform.
4. in foreign policy, the main soviet objective continues to be a search for 
external stability in which to allow reform to proceed at home. A major step in this 
direction was taken with the signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan in April 
and the subsequent beginning of soviet troop withdrawals.44 moscow signalled 
that this should serve as a model for the resolution of other regional conflicts, and it 
has played an important role in urging its clients to adopt more flexible positions in 
the conflicts in southern Africa and cambodia. At Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev reiter-
ated the soviet union’s interest in Asia and the pacific region and prospects for a 
sino-soviet summit are now much firmer. At the same time, the soviets have con-
tinued to strengthen their economic and political involvement with international 
organizations, notably the uN, the ec and GAtt.45
5. By launching further peace proposals, Gorbachev has continued to re-
duce western public perception of the soviet threat. moscow’s arms control focus 
shows a shift in emphasis, at least temporarily, from nuclear to conventional for-
ces, and from bilateral us–soviet negotiations to even more complex multila teral 
european talks.
6. The nature of the political relationship between the soviet union and its 
east european partners remains a live issue. The 20th anniversary in August of the 
soviet-led intervention in czechoslovakia again served to focus attention on the 
so-called “Brezhnev doctrine”.46 while some soviet commentators have expressly 
44  The conference on Afghanistan took place in Geneva on April 14, 1988 with the participation of 
the usA, Afghanistan, pakistan, and the ussr. The treaty was signed after six years of negotiation 
with uN mediation. According to the agreement, all soviet units had to leave Afghanistan by 
february 15, 1989. The fulfillment of the agreement was initiated by the soviet party on may 15, 
1988.
45  GAtt: the General Agreement on tariffs and trade was signed on october 30, 1947 by 23 coun-
tries in Geneva. The aim of the organization was to promote international trade by removing or 
diminishing tariffs and quotas.
46  see footnote 37.
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condemned the 1968 intervention, there has been no change in the official position 
and soviet armed intervention for political reasons in its allies’ affairs can still not 
be excluded.
7. in the general framework of increased economic difficulties for the civil 
population and of varying responsiveness in different countries to the reforms de-
sired by Gorbachev, the predominant trend in eastern europe is a growing process 
of diversification. moscow’s more flexible attitude has also made it easier for the 
east european countries to build relations with western europe, and especially the 
ec,47 which is increasingly perceived as an economic focal point and as a political 
entity in its own right.
8. Hungary is the country where progress is most evident, both in the renewal 
of the leadership and in terms of debate within and outside the party on the need 
for political reform. The appointment of a non-party member – Bruno straub – as 
president of the republic48 was a symbolic event. Nonetheless, the boldness of cer-
tain ideas voiced in Budapest, such as that of “party plurality”, could elicit opposi-
tion, either locally or from moscow. These discussions are being pursued against a 
background of greater economic problems for the hungarian people.
9. in Poland, despite the airing of reformist ideas, the situation remains diffi-
cult, after two waves of spontaneous strikes which again brought to the fore the is-
sue of trade union pluralism – something which General Jaruzelski’s regime had, in 
fact, been trying to prevent since 1981. The “round table” which should have be-
gun in mid-october might discuss this matter. however, its precise composition 
and agenda still have to be worked out at preparatory meetings. Divergencies within 
the opposition (between hardliners and advocates of a more pragmatic approach) 
are now clearly apparent. The church is both a mediator and a party to the negoti-
ations. The authorities’ weakness is manifest; moreover, the entire messner govern-
ment tendered its resignation to parliament – the first time this has happended 
[happened] in communist poland. so far, the new prime minister, rakowski, has 
been unable to form the broadly-based government which he promised.
10. in Czechoslovakia, the succession by Jakes as party General secretary is a 
sign that the process of political change will be slow. in particular, there has still 
been no historical reappraisal of the events of the prague spring49 and its suppres-
sion and the long-serving prime minister, strougal, who openly complained that 
the years since 1968 had been lost in terms of reform, was excluded from the new 
government in october.
47  see footnote 6.
48  on June 29, 1988 Brunó straub was elected as the last chairman of the presidential council of the 
people’s republic of hungary. he remained in this position until the dissolution of the council 
on october 23, 1989.
49  see footnote 27.
65
DocumeNt 2
11. opposition to soviet-type reforms remains firm in the GDR, although dis-
content, particularly among young people, is growing. with inevitable leadership 
change in the offing, some form of restructuring becomes increasingly likely – 
though probably not before honecker’s retirement.
12. in Bulgaria, Zhivkov continues to drag his feet on the nomination of his 
successor and, in particular, his support for Gorbachev’s ideas on reform and eco-
nomic restructuring seems mainly verbal. The resignation of Aleksandrov in July 
removed another potential successor to Zhivkov, who remains firmly in control.
13. Despite two rounds of turkish–Bulgarian talks following the signing of 
the Belgrade protocol,50 no improvement has been observed in the situation of the 
turkish minority in Bulgaria.51 The forced assimilation policy to which ethnic 
turks in Bulgaria have been subjected since late 1984 continues to be the most seri-
ous and flagrant violation of human rights in Nswp countries as it aims at the 
complete eradication of the national, cultural and religious identity of a large mi-
nority representing over 10% of the total population of Bulgaria.
14. in Romania, the situation is deadlocked, nor has there been any slackening of 
ceausescu’s grip on the country. The romanian leader rejects outright the reforms 
advocated by Gorbachev and argues that in view of his long term of office and the 
successes allegedly achieved under his leadership, he has no reason to change course. 
The renewal of the rural “systematization” policy, begun in the 1970s, and since imple-
mented only to a limited extent, is compounding romania’s international isolation. 
Another problem, the treatment of the hungarian minority in transylvania, is im-
pairing relations with Budapest. The August meeting in Arad between ceausescu and 
Grosz failed to produce a solution.52 it is noteworthy that on the romanian National 
Day,53 the address was, for the first time, given by mrs. ceausescu.
* * *
15. in Yugoslavia, serbian nationalist demonstrations grew during the summer and 
autumn, spurred on by the leader of the serbian league of communists, milosevic. 
50  During the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Balkan states in Belgrade (february 24–26, 
1988), the Bulgarian and the turkish minister of foreign Affairs signed an agreement to settle the 
legal questions concerning the human rights of the Bulgarian muslims, including mutual free visits 
for the members of separated families.
51  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties fix-
ing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” com-
posed of various ethnic groups.]
52  on August 28, 1988 a work meeting took place in Arad between Károly Grósz, General secretary 
of the cc of the hungarian socialist workers’ party (msZmp), and Nicolae ceaușescu, General 
secretary of the cc of the romanian communist party, president of the presidium of the state 
council of romania.
53  The national holiday of romania mentioned here is December 1: the union of transylvania with 
old romania was declared on December 1, 1918 in the romanian assembly at Alba iulia.
66
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
These events are causing concern in the other republics (especially croatia and slo-
venia) and, if they persist, could jeopardize the cohesion of the Yugoslav federal 
system.
16. Albania remains calm and is gradually moving from the hoxha to the 
ramiz Alia era. The Albanian leaders feel the need to broaden their country’s eco-
nomic relations in europe and, to this end, are prepared to find a compromise ar-
rangement to get round the constitutional ban on the acceptance of foreign credits.
ii. politicAl AND coNstitutioNAl reform  
iN the soViet uNioN
17. The 19th party conference (28th June – 1st July) and the central committee 
plenum at the end of July set the stage for what could be a comprehensive restruc-
turing of party and state organs, a process that Gorbachev has concluded must 
precede the next stage of economic reform. A series of elections over the coming 
months, with clearly-stated deadlines, are to provide the foundation for a struc-
ture in which the soviets (councils) take on real life and the party withdraws from 
day-to-day management of the economy. uncertain at this point is whether such 
institutional changes will lead to a genuine reallocation of power in the ussr or 
whether bureaucratic inertia and conservative opposition will succeed in crip-
pling the effort.
18. The reforms projected for the party have the greatest potential for chang-
ing the balance of power within the soviet system. By the end of 1988, the party 
apparatus is to be shrunk substantially and a number of departments dealing with 
economic management abolished. party organizations at all levels will go through a 
round of reports and election meetings. Dead wood is to be cleared out of the ma-
chinery in the process and replaced with dedicated supporters of reform.
19. The state structure will undergo a similar process of change. in outline, a new 
congress of people’s Deputies will be created, with 1,500 members elected by univer-
sal suffrage plus 750 members elected by “social organizations”, such as the party, trade 
unions, and the Komsomol.54 This new body, meeting annually to conduct the major 
business of the country, will in turn elect a smaller supreme soviet, which will remain 
in almost constant session to conduct day-to-day legislative affairs.
20. heading this structure will be a chairman of the supreme soviet (i.e. pres-
ident), with as yet unspecified powers. Gorbachev’s report to the conference indi-
cated that this office would be very powerful; neither the party conference nor the 
July plenum spelled out the role of the president, however. in another innovation, 
54  The Komsomol or in its full name All-union leninist Young communist league was the state 
youth organization of the soviet union, the youth section of the cpsu (1918–1991).
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the party chief at each level, in most areas, is to stand for election as the head of the 
soviet at the corresponding level, up to and including the supreme soviet.
21. The genesis and purpose of this latter step are not entirely clear.
22. it seems to contradict the general aim of separating the powers of the party 
and the state. But the intention appears two-fold: at the national level it has ena-
bled Gorbachev to exercise further power by adding a state position to his General 
secretaryship, and at the local level, party leaders will be subjected to a degree of 
public scrutiny. This serves Gorbachev’s intention of driving out of office the old 
guard that has resisted reform; it also reflects his belief that the public is more anx-
ious for perestroika than is much of the party.
23. At this point, it is impossible to say whether the projected institutional 
changes will lead to a genuine restructuring of political life. if actually implemented, 
they will increase the reformers’ leverage for carrying out their plans, but whether 
that will make a substantial difference in how politics are practised at the local level 
is still questionable. meanwhile, the leadership has excluded any move towards a 
multi-party system in the soviet union.
iii. “uNofficiAl” Groups AND people’s froNts
24. on the other hand, unofficial groups have proliferated in bewildering number 
and variety; some sources estimate their nationwide total at 30,000 or more. many 
represent themselves as non-political and devoted to environmental, literary, histor-
ical, religious, or nationality interests – but virtually all engage in some form of po-
litical debate and discussion. During his visit to latvia and lithuania in August, 
Yakovlev twice claimed that more than 4,000 organizations specifically supported 
restructuring.
25. Those with specific political orientations range, in the soviet political con-
text, over a wide spectrum from the russian nationalist and anti-semitic “pamyat”55 
to western-style democrats and liberal socialists. The most pronounced recent 
trend has been for like-minded groups to coalesce into associations and for the asso-
ciations to stage conferences. contacts and a common outlook are further strength-
ened through distribution of audio-cassettes of group discussions and lectures by 
prominent members.
26.  in the Baltic states, many of these groups have now come under the um-
brella of the people’s fronts which held inaugural congresses in october. They were 
first organized ostensibly in support of perestroika but are now far more concerned 
55  pamyat’: russian expression, meaning “remembrance”. This organization defined itself as a popu-
lar-National-patriotic-orthodox movement. The expressed goal of the association was the preser-
vation of the russian culture. The organization was also considered by some to be anti-semitic and 
chauvinist.
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with advocating specific national rights. They have raised overtly the issue of greater 
economic, cultural and political autonomy within the soviet union and have re-
ceived widespread support from the local populations, including party members. 
Their institutionalisation has met with acquiescience [acquiescence] from local par-
ty organizations and encouragement from moscow which may see more advantage 
in trying to co-opt Baltic nationalism than suppressing it. But the political status of 
the people’s fronts, so far confined to the Baltic region, has yet to be defined.
27. The authorities’ attitude towards the “unofficial” groups has been much 
less ambiguous. in may, several unofficial groups took the risky step of establishing 
a political “party”, the Democratic union. The organization’s stated objectives were: 
the establishment of a multi-party system; the adoption of a new constitution (be-
cause the existing one underwrote the leading role of the cpsu); the creation of 
independent trade unions and a free press; and the withdrawal of soviet troops 
from eastern europe, the western ukraine and the Baltic states, described as terri-
tories occupied by the soviet union. subsequently, branches of the Democratic un-
ion were set up in leningrad and saratov. indeed, the Democratic union’s open 
challenge to the regime in organizing protest demonstrations may have provoked 
the latter to act against activities it might have tolerated had they been lower pro-
filed.
28. in a pravda interview (2nd september), the KGB former chairman warned 
that western intelligence services and subversive centres “are endeavouring to stim-
ulate the organization in our country of illegal, semi-legal and even legal formations 
which would operate at their bidding”, seeking to turn them “on to the path of di-
rect struggle against the soviet state and social system”. it is clear, however, from the 
views of the individuals and groups which he had particularly in mind, that the va-
riety of home-grown grievances and frustrations is entirely sufficient to prompt the 
activities of the more politicised groups: it is hardly surprising that they have sought 
to exploit glasnost and restructuring to their advantage.
29. The future of these organizations is problematic. New regulations were en-
acted without prior discussion in July, laying down procedures for carrying out 
demonstrations (codifying “temporary” regulations previously passed in a number 
of areas) and heavy penalties decreed for infringements. police anti-riot squads were 
established in moscow in November 1987 and have made their presence felt. A new 
law on informal associations is evidently being drafted. As with other developments 
in the soviet union today, its precise terms will ultimately depend on the balance of 
forces at the highest political level.
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iV. GorBAcheV AND the militArY
30. many aspects of perestroika must have been unwelcome, even painful for the 
military hierarchy. Nonetheless, they publicly support its long-term goals which 
they must see as being to their advantage at least in terms of increasing efficiency.
31. As far as the media and the public are concerned the armed forces are no 
longer a sacred cow. There has been much criticism in the press of corruption, waste 
and inefficiency in the armed forces. There are reports of impending slimming of the 
general staff in line with the general reductions in the central bureaucracy. “Democ-
ratisation” is also a puzzling concept for the army and difficult to reconcile with 
discipline and unity of command.
A number of Gorbachev’s policies could be seen as threatening military in-
terests:
– as regards arms control, soviet agreement to asymmetrical cuts in the iNf 
agreement56 may have caused concern; acceptance of intrusive verification cuts 
across traditional ideas of military secrecy;
– “new thinking”,57 with concepts such as “reasonable sufficiency” and even 
more so, “non-offensive defence”, has not been easily swallowed by the military who 
prefer the former emphasis on parity and the ability to crush any aggressor. There 
has been some divergence in tone and in some cases substance between civilian ex-
perts on defence affairs and soviet generals. in a speech at the end of July, shevard-
nadze was critical of past military policies and implied that they should be more 
open and accountable and subordinated to foreign policy interests. even more sig-
nificantly, he recognised a multi-polar world in which the soviet union should no 
longer work on the premise that it must be as strong militarily as any conceivable 
coalition of adversaries;
– the new priorities could threaten the defence budget, while the economic 
reform in itself prejudices the priority which the military and the defence industry 
have always enjoyed under the existing fully-centralised system. The military leader-
ship realises the need for a sound economic base which would bring future long-
term technological progress, but many may still prefer the certainties of the old sys-
tem;
– to some extent, the military may see the withdrawal from Afghanistan as re-
lieving them of a painful burden but it must also be seen as, if not a defeat, at any 
rate a military failure.
56  see footnote 4.
57  Gorbachev published his work under the title of perestroika: New Thinking for our country and 
the world in 1987 (harper & row, New York, 1987), where he expressed his reformist thoughts 
in detail.
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32. one might therefore expect some degree of friction between the party 
leadership and Gorbachev himself and the military, but there is still no evidence of 
this. There is a very strong tradition of party control over the military and of mili-
tary obedience to the party. The Defence minister, General Yazov, was hand-picked 
by Gorbachev over the heads of about several senior officers and probably therefore 
feels to some extent indebted to Gorbachev. he is publicly supportive of perestroika 
in the armed forces. The prominent role played in disarmament negotiations by the 
chief of the General staff, marshal Akhromeev, gives the impression of consulta-
tion with and military agreement to soviet disarmament policies. his generally 
high profile role also has the advantage of giving an appearance of direct military 
involvement and support for the party’s policies.
33. Nonetheless, the military’s morale may have suffered most as a result of 
their reduced role in security decision-making. The divergence in tone in articles on 
foreign policy and ideological issues in the military and civilian press may be as 
much a case of division of labour or professional bias as evidence of differences be-
tween the political and military leadership. But the acquiescence of the military 
cannot be totally taken for granted. The new head of the air defence forces, General 
tretyak, in an interview in moscow News58 in february 1988 seemed to fire a warn-
ing shot in the direction of the politburo when he stated that the sharp reduction in 
the armed forces which Khrushchev carried out in the 1950s had been “a severe 
blow to the defence capacity of the soviet union and its official personnel”. Despite 
occasional sniping of this kind, however, the loyalty of the military to the present 
political leadership appears not to be in doubt.
V. the KGB AND perestroiKA
34. The KGB has been the only soviet institution little affected by glasnost and 
hardly at all by perestroika. recently however, the soviet press has become bolder in 
publishing occasional criticisms of the activities of the KGB and questioning its role 
in soviet society. The KGB itself has responded by seeking to improve its public 
image and create the impression of greater openness and active participation in the 
process of democratisation. The interview in pravda of 2nd september with cheb-
rikov, then head of the KGB, should be seen principally in this context, rather than 
as an intervention in the recent arguments in the leadership over foreign and do-
58  The Moscow News was a soviet russian paper, with an original title of moskovskie Novosti. it was 
published between 1930 and 2014, except for a hiatus in 1949–1956. it was an organ of the cc 
of the cpsu published in foreign languages, and it was operated for foreign experts working in 
the soviet union in the interwar period. After 1945 it was one of the main journals of soviet 
propaganda published in foreign languages. After 1980 it was available also in russian. During 
perestroika it became the most popular publication in the soviet union.
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mestic policies, although chebrikov’s familiar hard-line views (whether institution-
al or personal) emerge clearly enough from the interview.
35. There are a variety of reasons for the evident decision by the KGB leader-
ship to adopt a higher public profile of late:
– the need to restore the image of the KGB which has been tarnished by the 
flood of revelations about secret police terror under stalin; and by cautious but in-
creasingly critical and irreverent comments about its more recent and current activ-
ities, as well as the ultra-secrecy with which it is surrounded;
– the need to respond to discreet but growing pressure in the context of the 
political reform discussion for the KGB to be brought under public control and 
constrained by legal and constitutional safeguards;
– the need to counter a certain “loss of vigilance” as the enemy image of the 
west begins to crumble under the pressures of glasnost and “new thinking”; and 
to issue public warnings that there are limits to democratisation and that excesses 
will be firmly dealt with. 
36. The KGB leadership seeks to convey the impression that it is taking a nor-
mal, open and active part in the political reform process. The propaganda weekly 
Argumenty i Fakty has since April 1988 been publishing a regular communiqué 
from the KGB (an unprecedented practice) under the rubric “The KGB informs 
and comments”, featuring the battle against corruption and foreign subversion.
37. The same concern was reflected by an unusual interview, in the Kiev news-
paper Radyanskaya Ukraina of 9th August, with the head of the ukrainian KGB, 
major-General Golushko. The General rejected attempts by “foreign adversaries” to 
present the history of the KGB as “an unbroken chain of repression and unlawful 
acts in order to discredit these organs in the eyes of the people”, and claimed that the 
KGB were just as interested as anyone else in the “cleansing” of society. chebrikov’s 
pravda interview was generally on similar lines. he said that much importance was 
being attached to new thinking by KGB personnel and to renouncing stereotypes. 
he also claimed that much was being done to ensure that every security agent strict-
ly observed the spirit and letter of soviet laws. to this end a new law on state securi-
ty in the ussr was being prepared.
38. such legislation would help to give a clearer legal and constitutional status 
to the KGB (traditionally an instrument of the party) but would not necessarily 
reduce its powers or change the nature of its domestic activities. its activities abroad 
are still not alluded to, let alone called in question. Apart from the change in its 
chairmanship at the beginning of october, the KGB (unlike the mVD59 and to 
some extent the army) has not been subjected to any significant reorganization or 
purge of its leading cadres or serious public criticism as an institution. it has admit-
59  The soviet ministry of internal Affairs. Among its tasks is the struggle against economic crimes. 
see the list of abbreviations.
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tedly been on a much shorter leash under Gorbachev so far as the activities of dissi-
dents are concerned, with many fewer arrests taking place. press attacks on excessive 
secrecy, irksome security controls, the difficulty of travelling abroad and visiting 
frontier areas, psychiatric abuse together with official quasi-toleration of public 
demonstrations (nearly 50 during the past 6 months in moscow) may have led to 
some adjustment of its modus operandi. it is significant in itself that the KGB is 
having to adapt to a new political situation by seeking to polish its image and at least 
to pay lip service to the principles of “democratisation”, glasnost and political re-
form.
Vi. polAND: the future of the JAruZelsKi reGime
39. The situation in poland is now very fluid and it is difficult to predict the future. 
The Jaruzelski regime has survived two serious outbreaks of strikes and has shown 
that, in terms of law and order, it is capable of handling them. The new prime min-
ister has not yet succeeded in forming the kind of broadly-based government that he 
promised. 
40. The immediate future must depend on the workers; it is widely predicted 
that there may be yet further strikes. The leaders of both waves of strikes in April–
may and August were, significantly, largely from the post-solidarity generation. The 
latter are, it appears, chiefly motivated by the lack of economic prospects. And there 
is little or nothing the authorities can do to lessen their grievances or alleviate their 
frustration.
41. The opposition influence on the younger generation has been small. it is 
too soon to see whether new bonds may have been forged during the most recent 
outbreak of strikes, when solidarity showed, as it had failed to do in may, that it was 
capable of taking over the organization and co-ordination of strikes in its strong-
holds if not elsewhere. The opposition intellectuals and the most prominent leaders 
of solidarity are aware that they cannot offer the workers economic prosperity; and 
that by becoming involved in discussions with the authorities on political reform, 
which means little to most workers at present, they risk moving even further away 
from them, loosening still further the worker/intellectual bond which began with 
the creation of Kor in 197660 and was a major factor in solidarity’s success.
60  owing to the drastic increase in consumption prices in June 1976, a massive wave of strikes spread 
across in poland, which was followed by brutal repressions by the authorities. on september 4, 
fourteen well-known intellectuals of the opposition established the workers’ Defense committee, 
known as Kor after its polish abbreviation. it was a decisive step to establish the alliance of work-
ers and intellectuals. Kor offered help to those (and their families) who were suffering from pun-
ishment. This primarily meant that all these repressions were publicized. see the list of abbrevia-
tions.
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42. it is difficult to assess to what extent there is hostility in the party and bu-
reaucracy towards Jaruzelski and his associates. open criticism is not to be found 
either in public or, according to party members, private party meetings, though at-
tacks on the government and economic policy at the september party plenum may 
have included Jaruzelski, who headed the government until 1985.
43. resistance behind the scenes to economic reform continues. The party 
centre has apparently been unable, or unwilling, to control the bureaucracy, which 
is considered anti-reform, at least until the appointment of Baka as party secretary 
for the economy in succession to wozniak. Baka has a reputation as an able reform-
er and a strong character, but he lacks a power base and it is not yet apparent wheth-
er he will be any more successful.
44. even if there is no more significant industrial unrest, the future of reforms 
is uncertain. firstly, a thorough implementation of reform would involve measures 
such as a reduction in subsidies both on consumer goods and to enterprises, closure 
of factories, closer relation of work to pay, and, in the longer term, unemployment. 
The authorities may now try to avoid further steep price rises; recent criticism of 
economic policy has focused on prices and incomes. secondly, the consensus among 
polish and western economists is that the economy will take many years to pick up 
from its present state. The principal reasons for this include poland’s large hard cur-
rency debt, poor prospects for further credits, the extent of depredation of most of 
poland’s plant and machinery and the need for a major restructuring and moderni-
sation of industry. it is unlikely that polish society is prepared to wait this long for 
an appreciable difference in the standard of living. well beforehand, a backlash 
could occur, favouring recentralisation over reform.
45.  it is difficult to tell how far the slow progress of the authorities’ programme 
of political reform has been due to caution by the leadership, and how far to resist-
ance behind the scenes. But the latter certainly exists.
46. The party itself has recovered from the solidarity period, but its future is 
uncertain. many of the middle-ranking and senior members are of poor calibre and 
conservative in outlook. Apart from some intellectuals and economists, the skilled 
worker members are the only major group in the party likely to give genuine sup-
port to economic reform, as the only possible way in which their condition, and the 
performance of their factory, is likely to be bettered. moreover the party has been 
unable to recruit many young members; and has certainly not attracted the abler 
part of the younger generation. it also suffers from a dearth of ideas. The initiative 
for reform has come from outside the party, which has been unable to regain the 
offensive.
47. one important factor is what happens to Gorbachev and his perestroika. if 
he is seen to fail, the polish course of reform would probably be turned back. The 
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implications for Jaruzelski’s own position would be serious because of his close rela-
tionship with Gorbachev, as well as his identification with reform policies.
Vii. AlBANiA: New treNDs iN foreiGN policY:  
A chANGe of stYle or DirectioN?
48. The most significant change in Albanian policy has been in its attitude to Balkan 
co-operation. tirana tends to steer clear of multilateral initiatives and has stood aloof 
from all Balkan co-operation initiatives since 1961. Albania, however, attended the 
Yugoslav-sponsored conference of Balkan foreign ministers in february 1988, and 
was also represented at the follow-up meeting in June of high-ranking representatives 
from Balkan foreign ministries, which was held in Bulgaria. But the Albanians are 
proving selective when taking up invitations to lower-level Balkan co-operation meet-
ings, attending those concerning certain areas while ignoring others.
49. Albania’s relations with its Balkan neighbours have generally improved. This 
reflects one of Albania’s main foreign policy preoccupations – Yugoslavia, in particu-
lar the position of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. relations between the two countries 
have in the past been volatile, and deteriorated again in 1981 after further disturbanc-
es in Kosovo among the Albanian community.61 As a result Albania turned to its 
neighbouring countries to offset potential tension. in August 1987, Greece formally 
renounced the state of war still in existence between the two countries.62 relations 
with Greece have continued to improve. The Greek foreign minister visited Albania 
in November 1987 and unofficially in July 1988, while the Albanian foreign minister 
visited Athens in April 1988 and signed a border-trade agreement. There are also plans 
for the Greek prime minister to visit Albania, the first by a non-communist head of 
government. turkish–Albanian relations have also improved recently, as was shown 
by the visit of the turkish foreign minister in August. one outcome of this was an 
invitation to the Albanian prime minister to visit turkey. This would be the first visit 
by an Albanian communist head of government to a non-communist state. The Alba-
nian foreign minister is set to make a return visit to turkey later in 1988, which will 
consolidate advances in relations between the two countries.
61  Albanians were acknowledged as national minorities in Yugoslavia under communist leadership. 
in 1946 Kosovo became an autonomous area, then an autonomous province. As the political at-
mosphere became more free, they wanted to broaden their rights. Thus in 1968 demonstrations 
began in numerous cities and for the first time the Albanians proposed the transformation of 
Kosovo autonomous province into a federated republic. in march–April the protests began anew 
and the radicalized participants even declared secession from Yugoslavia. Therefore on April 2, 
1981 a state of emergency was implemented in Kosovo and federal forces had to intervene to re-
store public order.
62  According to Greek law Albania and Greece were de iure in a state of war beginning in october 
1940, when the italian troops occupying Albania attacked Greece.
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50. Another motivation behind Albania’s foreign policy seems to be econom-
ic, and this is underlined by the recent improvements in relations with economical-
ly strong countries. An agreement on economic co-operation with the federal re-
public of Germany was signed in June and the Albanian foreign minister went to 
Bonn in september. Albania also received the Japanese Deputy foreign minister in 
August who signed a trade agreement. A swiss parliamentary delegation paid a 
“friendly official visit” in July. There has also been a further improvement in the 
formal status of relations between Albania and the Nswp countries.
51. This desire to widen trading and economic contacts may have internal re-
percussions in Albania. trade is limited to a balanced exchange of goods due to the 
ban on raising foreign credits and on concessions to foreign countries and compa-
nies. This ban may well be threatened if the Albanian leaders realise the constraints 
this places on the economy. furthermore, this desire to widen contacts might en-
courage Albania to approach international economic bodies. There appears, howev-
er, to be little evidence of any of this at present.
52. The marked shift in attitude to Balkan co-operation does suggest a more 
pragmatic application of Albanian foreign policy. it would be premature, however, 
to interpret this and other signs as an indication of a fundamental change in the 
basic principles of Albanian foreign policy as pursued since the late 1970s. from all 
appearances it seems that Albania is neither turning to the west nor returning to 
the warsaw pact, but is attempting to preserve a balance between the two. As such 
this is not a new direction in foreign policy, for it demonstrates the Albanian desire 
to maintain independence while opening up to the rest of the world. At most the 
only difference appears to be the display of a new style in pursuit of this aim.
Viii. NAtioNAlitY proBlems iN eAsterN europe
53. Nationality problems in eastern europe are of long standing. hostilities are 
deep and, even if the regimes were more frank about the situation, it would not be 
easy to establish the truth of the various claims about discrimination. in addition, 
many of the complaints – restrictions on travel and so forth – apply, in most coun-
tries, as much to the dominant nationality as to the minorities. recently minorities 
in Bulgaria and romania have been the subject of genuine discrimination. The 
problem of Albanians in the Kosovo province in Yugoslavia has existed for many 
years and tensions there have recently increased.
turkish–Bulgarian talks and the turkish minority issue
54. shortly after the signing of the turkish–Bulgarian protocol on 23rd february 
1988, the seventeenth islamic conference63 of foreign ministers (Amman, 21st–25th 
63  see footnote 36.
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march 1988) adopted a strong resolution on the plight of the turkish muslim minority 
in Bulgaria64 wherein it endorsed the report of the oic contact group, deplored the 
repression against this minority and appealed to the Bulgarian government to observe 
its obligations arising from bilateral and international instruments. it further decided 
to mandate the oic contact group to monitor the situation of muslims in Bulgaria and 
to report to the conference annually. This resolution came as a heavy blow to the Bul-
garian government which now argues that since the question is being discussed with 
turkey other countries should refrain from raising it in their bilateral contacts with 
Bulgaria or in the international fora. The Bulgarian reality being what it is, the contin-
ued interest and support of the international community is in fact indispensable for 
successfully conducting the turkish–Bulgarian talks, the second round of which was 
held in July according to an agenda agreed upon at the first meeting in may.
55. At the second round of talks, the Bulgarians seemed to continue to main-
tain their basic positions with regard to the fundamental issue of the turkish mi-
nority. in all the draft documents on various aspects of turkish–Bulgarian normal-
isation which the turkish side presented to the Bulgarians at the July meeting, the 
fate of ethnic turks in Bulgaria was the main concern; whereas the Bulgarian drafts 
on the same issues in fact have little bearing on the present state of relations between 
the two countries. it became evident that with regard to the basic issue the Bulgari-
ans intend to reduce the process started in Belgrade65 to the resolution of a limited 
number of family reunification cases whereas the turkish side endeavours to im-
prove the conditions of the entire turkish minority.
56. As to the resumption of economic co-operation between the two coun-
tries, the document adopted at the end of the July meeting merely notes that there 
exist a number of possibilities for developing and diversifying relations in the fields 
under review. The turkish side made it clear that no progress in these fields could be 
achieved unless a satisfactory solution could be found to the fundamental issue.
57. No date has been set for a third round of talks, the convening of which 
might well depend on the degree of flexibility the Bulgarian side might wish to 
display on the question of the turkish minority.
The consequences of romanian “systematization”
58. The issue of minorities in romania has received much international attention 
since early 1988 because of the emergence of the romanian authorities’ plan for rural 
“systematization”. This involves the elimination of 7,000–8,000 of the country’s 13,000 
villages by the end of the century, and the rehousing of the inhabitants in centres, in 
blocks of flats. interest has focused on the effect this would have on the hungarian and 
64  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties fix-
ing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” com-
posed of various ethnic groups.]
65  see footnote 50.
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German minorities though this affects the population in general. hungarian authori-
ties, and romanian hungarians who have left the country, claim that at least part of the 
purpose of this plan is to eliminate the hungarian minority. relations between hunga-
ry and romania have deteriorated rapidly in 1988 because of this issue. After 50,000 
people marched to the romanian embassy in Budapest in June, the romanians closed 
the hungarian consulate in cluj and the hungarian cultural centre in Bucharest. The 
Arad meeting between prime minister Grosz and president ceausescu on 28th August 
did not seem to produce much result. According to hungarian estimates, between 
10,000 and 15,000 romanian citizens, most of them of hungarian origin, have now 
fled to hungary to escape economic hardship and assimilation, many of them in 1988. 
Both official and unofficial programmes to help them are under way.
59. The German minority is also affected by “systematization”. its case has re-
ceived less international attention, partly because it lacks an equivalent of the hun-
garians’ connection with hungary, but from the beginning it has received close at-
tention from the federal German government. This population has already dimin-
ished because of emigration.
60. it is clear that “systematization” is to be applied nationwide. Yet it has pro-
vided a focus for discontent among the minorities, however little they are able to 
express it within romanian borders, and has drawn international attention to the 
human rights record of the romanian authorities. “systematisation” and the treat-
ment of minorities have caused the first public disagreement in recent years between 
two warsaw pact countries, and have become a subject for debate in international 
fora, notably the csce.
resurgence of serb nationalism
61. The tension in serbia over the Kosovo has increased with the emergence in 
1987 of slobodan milosevic as the head of the serbian league of communists. he 
has encouraged serbian nationalism and tried to use the current process of constitu-
tional reform to strengthen his republic’s control over its two Autonomous prov-
inces. Though he has not succeeded in the Kosovo, the leadership in Vojvodina was 
brought down following a massive demonstration by serbs from Vojvodina and 
elsewhere. The actions of the serbian leadership have increased the threat that the 
Kosovo problem poses to the federation. Anxiety has been expressed in some other 
republics over serbia’s intentions, including its alleged attempts, as the largest na-
tion in Yugoslavia, to dominate the federation.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(88)47 (No-
vember 10, 1988).
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c-m(89)13
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
octoBer 1988–April 1989
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach the report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern eu-
rope” submitted to me by the chairman of the expert working Group, which met 
at NAto headquarters from 5th to 7th April 1989.
2. This report engages only the responsibility of the experts who participated 
in the working Group.
3. it will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 17th may 1989.
(signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto, 
1110 Brussels
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
Note by the chairman of the expert working Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
united states met at NAto headquarters from 5th to 7th April 1989 to prepare 
the attached report.
2. This document covers the period 22nd october 1988 to 7th Apri1 1989.
(signed) D. i. miller
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coNteNts
item subject paragraph Nos
i. General trends and outlook 1–15
ii. situation in the ussr following the elections of 26th march 1989 16–21
iii. soviet public opinion: does Gorbachev have a problem? 22–25
iV. how do the new central committee commissions operate? 26–30
V. Gorbachev and the military (ii) 31–38
Vi. poland: government/opposition round table 39–43
Vii. relations between the German Democratic republic and the soviet union 44–47 
Viii. hungary: towards a political pluralism? 48–56
iX. The treatment of minorities and religion in some east european countries 57–68 
X. Yugoslavia: a new government 69–74
i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. The soviet union is currently beset by a number of strains. economic reforms 
have run into the sands and the absence of any improvement in living standards has 
added to the general pessimism. Nationality problems have intensified. renewed 
unrest in the caucasus and the persistent emphasis on autonomy in the Baltic re-
publics have been accompanied by a series of nationalist demands in a number of 
other areas, including the ukraine.
2. But soviet society is coming out of its apathy and the recent elections have 
provided the first lessons in a certain form of democracy. even if the process of 
“democratisation” is still very constrained, these elections are without precedent in 
over 70 years.
3. The early returns showed a strong advance by the reformists. radical sup-
porters of perestroika carried the day; in the Baltic republics, nationalists and party 
officials in favour of some measure of autonomy obtained good results. in moscow, 
eltsin won the city’s national constituency by a large majority. in leningrad and in 
Kiev, conservative party candidates were convincingly trounced. These results may 
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not be a sign of radical political change, but they clearly strengthen Gorbachev in 
his purpose.
4. on the other hand, there is a continuing and basic uncertainty over the 
capacity of the single party to take on board the concept of pluralism, as well as fear 
that developments could at some stage go too fast either in the ussr or in the east 
european countries with inevitable consequences for the policies set in motion by 
Gorbachev. Doubts are also growing stronger, as expectations raised by four years of 
reforms are disappointed. it is these frustrations which could constitute Gorbachev’s 
greatest challenge.
5. The stated aim of Gorbachev’s 7th December united Nations speech was 
to establish a cooperative international climate and to move beyond the era of east–
west confrontation. This reflects the current objective in soviet foreign policy of 
reducing external pressures to enable maximum resources to be devoted to increas-
ingly pressing economic problems at home, while seeking to increase soviet influ-
ence abroad through more flexible political and diplomatic methods. The aim of 
further eroding western perceptions of a soviet military and political threat re-
ceived a boost from Gorbachev’s announcement of significant unilateral cuts in so-
viet military strength and defence spending and procurement (to be accompanied 
by reductions in [Nwsp] armed forces and defence budgets), as well as from soviet 
agreement at the Vienna csce follow-up meeting to far-reaching human rights 
undertakings.66
6. in his advocacy of the “deideologisation” of relations between states, (while 
not disavowing ideological competition between the two systems), Gorbachev 
again sought to reassure western opinion, as in his reiteration of soviet commit-
ment to “freedom of choice” of political system, thereby possibly rejecting the 
“Brezhnev doctrine”67 by implication. The soviet military withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan, and the constructive soviet role in facilitating an agreement on  Namibia/
Angola,68 together with progress towards a solution of the cambodia problem69 
66  The 35 states participating in the csce (conference on security and cooperation in europe) 
follow up meeting at Vienna accepted two closing documents on January 15, 1989. Basket 3 deal-
ing with human rights, for example, proposed that signing countries should not limit the free 
movement of their citizens. The representative of the soviet union declared that the laws of the 
ussr would be modified in accordance with the new regulations.
67  see footnote 37.
68  on December 22, 1988 the representatives of the republic of south Africa, cuba, and Angola 
signed an agreement in New York in which south Africa resigned from exercising control over 
Namibia and refrained from supporting uNitA, while cuba agreed to withdraw its troops from 
Angola. The withdrawal of the cuban forces began on January 9, 1989. The prehistory of these 
events goes back to the declaration of Angola’s independence from portugal in 1975, when the 
protagonists of independence began to fight one another. soon the soviet union, cuba, and 
south Africa became involved in the civil war.
69  in the course of the war between Vietnam and the Khmer rouge in December 1978, the Vietnam-
ese forces occupied cambodia, putting an end to the rule of terror of the Khmer rouge. As a result 
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(sufficient to permit the convening of a sino–soviet summit in may70), further 
enhanced the soviet union’s international standing.
7. Diversity is becoming the norm in eastern europe, as warsaw pact mem-
bers take at face value Gorbachev’s declarations about each country’s right to deter-
mine internal policies on the basis of its own interests. There is also a tendency to-
wards public criticism of one pact member by another, in particular the dispute be-
tween hungary and romania over the hungarian minority in transylvania.
8. The unilateral soviet troop cuts in eastern europe announced on 7 De-
cember do not appear to have been worked out in detail beforehand with the pact. 
There may have been resistance to any unilateral move from prague, but one strong 
supporter of cuts – Budapest – got less than it wanted, and will probably continue 
pushing for a further soviet draw-down in hungary.
9. liberalisation is affecting domestic policies in several warsaw pact coun-
tries as Gorbachev’s reform programme stimulates a proliferation of views including 
outright opposition, and inhibits the use of traditional coercion. even conservative 
resistance to change adds to the diversification evident within the warsaw pact re-
gion.
10. reform has gone furthest in Hungary. with mounting economic prob-
lems, declining living standards, and worker dissatisfaction, the country seems to be 
edging towards a multiparty political system, pushed by reformers in and outside 
the establishment. The leadership retains control for the moment by pulling its 
hardliners along for the sake of avoiding a split in the party, while hoping to buy 
popular tolerance of the austerity measures entailed in economic reform.
11. in Poland, the regime appears to have had enough room for manoeuvre to 
reach accommodation with solidarity, and the round table seems to have provided 
the formula. The agreements of 5th April on political reform, including a measure 
of free elections to parliament, could be of great significance for poland’s future.71 
But an economic reform package has yet to be worked out and reconciling the pub-
lic to more austerity will be difficult. The popular mood remains sceptical, with the 
possibility of unrest recurring. There are splits within both the leadership and the 
opposition, which could be exploited by extremists on both sides to undermine the 
April agreements.
12. The other warsaw pact countries are at best reluctant reformers. Bulgaria 
is moving slowly on the economic front, and Czechoslovakia more slowly: neither 
of the Vietnamese occupation, the people’s republic of Kampuchea (prK) was established in 
1979. owing to the pressure of the international community, Vietnamese forces left the country in 
september 1989.
70  on may 15–18, 1989 Gorbachev paid a visit to china.
71  on April 5, 1989 in poland the negotiations, which had begun on february 6, 1989, ended with 
an agreement between the government and the opposition. The final agreement set the agenda and 
schedule of the political transformation.
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has shown tolerance of dissent. The GDR and Romania resist both perestroika and 
glasnost, claiming no change is needed. reform opponents, especially in east Ber-
lin, are attacking advocates of perestroika and attempting to restrict its spread. The 
GDr has banned soviet publications questioning the role of the German commu-
nist party before 1933.
13. The process of dialogue initiated by the turkish–Bulgarian protocol signed 
in Belgrade in february 198872 has failed to produce any improvement in the situa-
tion of the turkish minority73). in fact, Bulgaria continues relentlessly to pursue its 
policy of persecution of the turkish minority and denying its very existence. The 
forced assimilation campaign, which aims at annihilating the ethnic, cultural and 
religious identity of a minority estimated at around 1.5 million74 continues to be 
the most serious and flagrant violation of human rights in non-soviet warsaw pact 
countries.
14. in Yugoslavia, implementation of reforms within the federation is seriously 
impeded by burgeoning nationalism as well as a recurrence of unrest in the Kosovo. 
These have recently tended to overshadow any discussions on needed changes in the 
economy. The appointment of Ante markovic, an economist clearly committed to 
the market economy, as Yugoslav’s new federal premier could help to get the eco-
nomic reform moving.
15. Albania has only begun some small degree of economic reform. still, the 
slow but steady opening to the outside world has been further marked by Albania 
hosting in January a meeting of high-level officials from Balkan foreign ministries, 
and a second meeting of Balkan foreign ministers is scheduled to take place in ti-
rana next year. There has been a further upgrading of relations with selected west 
european countries.
ii. situAtioN iN the ussr followiNG the electioNs  
of 26th mArch 1989
16. The current situation in the ussr is one of strains and stresses. economic re-
forms have become bogged down. A new awareness of the difficulties (budget defi-
cit, inflation) has led to the postponement of essential reforms (particularly price 
reform) and the absence of any improvement in living standards has added to the 
general pessimism. The nationality problems have intensified. New disturbances in 
the caucasus and the growing insistence on autonomy in the Baltic republics have 
72  see footnote 50.
73  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the accurate legal terminology used in the in-
ternational treaties fixing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem 
minorities” composed of various ethnic groups.]
74  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to underline that other western estimates put the number 
of the moslem group in question at about one million.]
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been accompanied by a rash of nationalist demands in a number of areas (and par-
ticularly in the ukraine).
17. The essential point, however, is that soviet society (like other communist 
societies before it) is entering a period of major transition. it is shaking off its apathy 
and breaking out of its monolithic confines as witness the growth of discussion; the 
affirmation of some measure of pluralism; the catalyzing role played by professor 
sakharov in the emergence of a liberal reformist movement; the creation of a num-
ber of bodies some of which (pamyat75) are beginning to influence national policy; 
and the first stirrings of a more critical approach to lenin.
18. with the recent elections, soviet society has had its first introduction to a 
certain form of democracy. even though the democratic process is still being kept with-
in narrow limits, as shown by the screening of candidates and the fact that one third of 
all seats (750 out of 2,250) were earmarked for “social organizations”, including 100 for 
the cpsu central committee, these elections are without precedent in more than 70 
years. essential points were the use of secret ballot, the presence of more than one can-
didate in three quarters of the constituencies, a particularly lively campaign, unprece-
dented popular interest and a bold intellectual debate on the single party system.
19. early results, though fragmentary, point to a strong advance by the reform-
ists. radical supporters of perestroika (89% of the moscow electorate voted for Bo-
ris eltsin) carried the day; in the Baltic republics, nationalists and party officials in 
favour of some measure of autonomy achieved good results everywhere. in lenin-
grad and Kiev, on the other hand, conservative party members (including soloviev, 
a candidate member of the politburo) were convincingly trounced. certain mem-
bers of the military high command standing as candidates were beaten by their sub-
ordinates. These results may not be indicative of radical political change (the high-
est parliamentary assembly will not be the recently-elected congress of people’s 
Deputies but a new supreme soviet with a complex system of representation; fur-
ther elections at republican and local level will be held in the autumn). Nonetheless, 
they can only be seen as an endorsement of Gorbachev’s policies.
20. The reforms put in train by Gorbachev are long-term (at least one generation, 
if not two); there will be inevitable stops and starts and even temporary back-pedalling. 
it seems quite clear however, that soviet society has emerged from its lethargy and, as in 
other european socialist countries, new voices are being heard. in addition, the pattern 
of political reforms and the consolidation of Gorbachev’s powers are continuing as 
forecast. it is expected that the soviet leader will shortly be confirmed in his position as 
state president with extended powers and his legitimacy will then no longer be provid-
ed exclusively by the party. he will find himself more than ever in the position of arbiter 
and will have at his disposal all the means necessary for pursuing his policies.
75  see footnote 55.
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21. Nonetheless, there is a continuing fundamental uncertainty over the abili-
ty of the single party to embrace the concept of pluralism as well as the fear that 
current developments could get out of hand either in the soviet union itself (the 
Baltic states?) or in the east european countries (poland and above all hungary) 
with inevitable consequences for Gorbachev’s endeavours. in addition, doubts are 
beginning to grow as the expectations raised by four years of reform are disappoint-
ed. These frustrations could constitute Gorbachev’s most serious challenge.
iii. soViet puBlic opiNioN:  
Does GorBAcheV hAVe A proBlem?
22. Appealing directly to the population to combat bureaucracy and take up the 
battle for perestroika has long been a hallmark of Gorbachev’s style. it is one thing, 
however, to try and exploit public opinion in a political struggle against “conserva-
tives”. it is another to be personally exposed to direct and heavy criticism from mem-
bers of the public. it was during Gorbachev’s trip to the Krasnoyarsk region in sep-
tember 1988 that he expressed awareness of discontent among workers over living 
conditions. since then there has been a redoubled emphasis on the need to step up 
the production of food and consumer goods and on social issues generally. public 
opinion, or at least popular moods, have freed him to adjust certain policies, e.g. 
some relaxation of the anti-alcohol campaign and placing new restrictions on coop-
eratives. in a speech in minsk, the ideology secretary, medvedev, said that every 
decision these days must take account of public opinion.
23. significantly, Gorbachev has now gone out of his way to court the opinions 
of workers. for the first time, a formal meeting with representatives of the workers 
was arranged in moscow (14 february). it was (partially) televised, unlike the 8 or 
9 meetings Gorbachev had previously held with members of the intelligentsia. The 
potential benefits of economic and political reforms were explained at length by 
Gorbachev who hoped “for the support of the working class” and found it necessary 
to remind listeners that the cpsu was indeed the party of the working class. work-
ers present on that occasion voiced disquiet about the lack of representatives of their 
class selected to stand as candidates in the 26 march elections. for example, only 16 
workers were chosen for moscow’s 27 constituencies.
24. workers have benefited less from Gorbachev’s policies than have intellectu-
als. They are particularly vulnerable in the face of large-scale labour redeployment (if 
not actual unemployment) and rising prices. in the ukraine, Gorbachev was notably 
defensive over the particularly emotive subject of retail price reform. he assured his 
audience that this would only be done after the entire people had been able to discuss 
the issue – and that if the people was opposed to price rises, “they mustn’t be touched”. 
in any event, “as we look at it, for 2 or 3 years this talk must be dropped altogether”.
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25. The programme of reforms is regarded by a large section of the population 
with scepticism while another, following the lead of the intellectuals, is airing its 
views with increasing boldness. The reform process did not start with Gorbachev 
even though he symbolises the movement and his name is associated with it. his 
actions were preceded by the measures already taken by Andropov (particularly 
with regard to the economy and the beginnings of a civil society). even if Gorbachev 
had to step down, reform would have to be pursued in one form or another. At issue 
is the soviet union’s survival as a great power as well as the renewal of its influence 
on eastern europe, where fundamental changes are also taking place. The principal 
soviet leaders need no convincing. it is not a question of whether to reform or not, 
but rather how and how fast. The pursuit of reform will nonetheless create political 
turbulence if only because evolution in soviet society inevitably implies a certain 
distortion of “leninist principles”.
iV. how Do the New ceNtrAl committee  
commissioNs operAte?
26. in order to reduce the powers of the central committee secretariat (as well as 
those of party secretary ligachev), Gorbachev steered through the creation of a 
new organisational structure for the party’s executive arm. At the september 1988 
plenum, six commissions of the central committee concerned with the main di-
rections of domestic and foreign policy were established:
(a) on party construction and cadres policy (G. p. razumovsky);
(b) on ideology (V. A. medvedev);
(c) on Questions of socio-economic policy (N. N. slyunkov);
(d) on Questions of Agricultural policy (e. K. ligachev); this is the only one  
  of the commissions that has a designated Deputy chairman (V. p.   
  Nikonov);
(e) on Questions of international policy (A. N. Yakovlev);
(f ) on Questions of legal policy (V. m. chebrikov).
The politburo was tasked with practical measures to create a new structure of 
the central committee apparatus (and local party committees).
27. The commissions were notionally created in order to involve directly the 
elected members and candidate members of the central committee and members 
of the central revision commission in policy-making (as a move away from their 
role as a rubber stamp for leadership decisions). The commissions are to meet at 
least once every three months. They are required to study problems in the spheres 
they cover and draw up proposals, draft documents and analytical materials for the 
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politburo. They will also draw up conclusions on draft decisions and other docu-
ments submitted for party – or nation-wide discussion. They may consult experts 
and invite them to participate in their work. The commissions report direct to the 
politburo.
28.  By the end of february 1989, four of the six commissions had held their 
first meetings. The composition of the commissions was published at the end of 
November. each has between 20 and 24 members. The majority are republic and 
regional party chiefs, and government officials, with a few enterprise and farm di-
rectors and workers. There are a few members of the scientific and cultural intelli-
gentsia. But there are no economists in the socio-economic commission and no 
lawyers in the legal commission, because these professions are not represented in 
the central committee. only two members of the Agricultural commission are 
directly involved in farming. interestingly, the international commission includes 
V.A. Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, and the first party secretaries of Armenia 
and Azerbaidzhán – presumably they will be less likely to continue their feud in this 
commission than in any of the commissions on domestic policy matters.
29.  There has been a reduction in staff of the central party apparatus by 40–
50% during the reorganisation of the central committee Departments over the past 
few months. The central committee apparatus now has 1,940 staff plus 1,275 tech-
nical support staff. The departments were reduced in number from twenty to nine. 
They are directly subordinate to the new commissions. The nine departments are:
(a) Party Construction and Cadres Policy (G. p. razumovsky);
(b) Ideological (A. s. Kapto);
(c) Socio-Economic (V. i. shimko);
(d) Agrarian (i. i. skiba)
(e) Defence (o. s. Belyakov) (formerly known as the Defence industry 
 Department, this Department is not responsible to a cc commission, 
 but directly to cc secretary, o. D. Baklanov);
(f ) state-legal (A. s. pavlov);
(g) international (V. m. falin);
(h) General (V. i. Boldin);
(i) Administration of Affairs (N. e. Kruchina);
The last two departments are responsible for administrative services to the po-
litburo and central committee and their heads are both members of the commis-
sion for party construction and cadres policy.
30. in an interview in Pravda on 20 february, A. s. Kapto gave details on the 
structure and role of the ideological Department. he described the department as a 
fundamentally new subdivision of the central committee apparatus, both in its 
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structure and functions, and outlined the tasks of its six sub-departments. The De-
partment functions under the direct leadership of the ideological commission (of 
which Kapto is a member).
V. GorBAcheV AND the militArY (ii)
31. The “parting of the ways” between Gorbachev and several of his most senior 
military commanders, Akhromeev (7th December) and Kulikov (2nd february) 
being the latest, raises once again the question of party-military relations in the 
ussr and the impact which perestroika is having on the soviet armed forces.
32. Despite his public protestations to the contrary, it seems likely that mar-
shal Akhromeev resigned as chief of the General staff over the unilateral force cuts 
announced by Gorbachev in New York on 7 December. for someone who kept a 
foot so firmly in both the military and political camps throughout the period of 
Gorbachev’s succession, Akhromeev must have felt that he could no longer contin-
ue to equivocate in public over the military’s interests. however, in his new position 
as adviser to Gorbachev, he told the trilateral commission76 that he endorsed the 
soviet unilateral force reductions and suggested that more would be possible as the 
external military threat declined. moreover, he has been explicit in declaring that 
the new emphasis on quality over quantity, approved by the 19th party conference, 
probably meant fewer arms and equipment for the soviet armed forces in future.
33. similarly marshal Kulikov chose to resign in the week after all the non-so-
viet warsaw pact states (not counting romania) had announced their individual 
force reductions and cuts in defence spending – and only five weeks away from the 
opening of the cfe negotiations in Vienna.77 his successor, General lushev, may 
have been chosen for the difficult political/diplomatic task of co-ordinating reduc-
tions and the process of restructuring in the Nswp forces.
34. on unilateral force reductions, General Yazov seems to have acted cau-
tiously during the period of internal discussion in the soviet union and failed to 
comment publicly on the cuts when they were announced by Gorbachev on 7th 
December. There is no doubt however that he is an ardent supporter of perestroika 
as such in the armed forces. Though certain military leaders, including Yazov him-
self, have shown themselves sensitive to glasnost, which in their view goes too far in 
its criticism of the soviet armed forces and their traditions, the soviet military press 
76  trilateral commission: a “non-governmental, policy-oriented forum” founded in 1973 by David 
rockefeller with an aim to promote tighter cooperation between Japan, North America, and 
western europe.
77  on march 6, 1989 east–west negotiations began in Vienna on the disarmament of conventional 
armed forces in europe (cfe) between sixteen NAto and seven warsaw pact countries. NAto 
proposed that the joint forces of the two alliances not exceed 40,000 tanks, 33,000 artillery pieces, 
and 56,000 armoured combat vehicles.
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has during the period under review given increasing publicity to controversial as-
pects of military life not previously discussed in public.
35. Yazov’s position appears to have been strengthened by the promotion of 
his close associates, General moiseev as chief of the General staff (over the heads of 
many senior colleagues), and General lobov as chief of staff of the warsaw pact 
forces. Though there have been rumours predicting Yazov’s eventual replacement by 
a civilian Defence minister, there is no evidence of political differences between 
himself and Gorbachev which might lead to such an outcome in the near future.
36. in his first major public statements in february, moiseev called for “princi-
pled” but “flexible” General staff work in support of arms control talks. moiseev said 
that “radical changes” were underway in military theory, that a streamlining of the 
General staff was in the offing, and that there would be a reorganisation and reduc-
tion in the number of military districts. citing costs as well the continuing external 
threat, he rejected ideas under discussion in the soviet press for a 50 percent unilat-
eral troop cut and for switching over to either a territorial militia or a professional 
army, but said other “sensible” views would be carefully examined. General Yazov has 
also dismissed, and in stronger terms, the idea of volunteer forces.
37.  moiseev made clear his intent to inject vigour and creativity into the work 
of the General staff in the new era of reduced defence budgets. implying continuity 
with Akhromeev rather than any new change of direction, moiseev described the 
“new stage” in military affairs as beginning in 1985/86, i.e. after the transfer of og-
arkov from the General staff in september 1984 and his replacement by Akhromeev.
38. At this moment, it is not possible to judge whether the military as a whole 
accept, and with how much equanimity, the changes being thrust on them. promi-
nent figures such as General tretyak (who a year ago openly criticised unilateral 
force reductions and their negative effects on soviet society), Akhromeev and Ku-
likov have evidently not done so. But current military policies appear to have gained 
the acceptance of the senior military leadership and Gorbachev seems to have 
convinced doubters that none of the recent moves will impair the security of the 
soviet state, nor endanger the morale of the soviet armed forces as troop cuts are 
implemented and other economies are made.
Vi. polAND: GoVerNmeNt/oppositioN rouND tABle
39. The round table negotiations between Government and opposition representa-
tives, begun on 6th february and initially scheduled to last 6 weeks, ended on 5th 
April after producing a number of concrete agreements. They also left a certain 
number of grey areas. however, the outcome initially appeared to be positive: ac-
cording to one of the opposition negotiators, a “gradual march towards democracy” 
has begun in poland.
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40. points of agreement cover:
– Trade union pluralism. Agreement was achieved on the relegalisation of sol-
idarity at national and regional level as well as in the enterprises (in which the dif-
ferent trade unions that exist will be required to form a single delegation in negoti-
ations with the management). The principle of independent agricultural trade un-
ions and the re-legalising of the independent student trade union (NZs) were also 
agreed. in addition, about 20,000 workers dismissed because of their membership 
of solidarity will apparently be re-instated.
– Political reforms. Agreement was reached on the creation of an “office of pres-
ident”, which would no longer have collegiate status but which would be entrusted to 
General Jaruzelski and endowed with extended powers. There was also an agreement 
on the creation of a senate whose 100 members would be freely elected. The sejm78 is 
to be reorganised following elections based on a prior allocation of seats (60% for the 
pZpr and its coalition partners; 5% for official catholic groups; and 35% for inde-
pendents). measures designed to give the courts greater independence vis-a-vis the 
government were also adopted and the right of association extended.
41. There are continuing uncertainties and differences: they relate for the most 
part to:
– the extent of the powers devolving on the new head of state and the manner 
in which he is to be elected: the opposition has agreed that in the first instance he 
should be elected by the sejm and the senate, but insisted that in future election 
must be by direct universal suffrage.
– The Senate: agreement has yet to be reached on its composition and its pow-
ers (the opposition is pressing for proportional representation for each of the 49 
voivodships, and the government for two senators for each voivodship).
– The Sejm: according to the opposition, the unequal distribution of seats ac-
cepted for the forthcoming elections in June must not be repeated in subsequent 
selections which should be entirely free. This is of crucial importance.
42. These results would not have been possible without the genuine desire for 
compromise shown by both the government and the opposition. A number of 
meetings between the interior minister General Kiszczak and lech walesa helped 
narrow the gap between positions which were sometimes far apart. it is clear, how-
ever, that the logic behind the positions of the two sides is quite different:
– walesa, and the opposition which has identified with him, set their sights on 
an agreement with the régime and in so doing have recognized the legitimacy of 
that régime, their purpose being to save the country from catastrophe and to initiate 
a process which in the long term could bring them fresh gains;
78  see footnote 23.
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– the pZpr leadership is intent for the present on consolidating its legitimacy, 
its subsequent aim being to preserve the party’s central role.
43. The conclusion of the round table discussions represent an important mile-
stone for poland and the positive results achieved will need to be taken into account 
by western governments.
Not to be overlooked however are:
– the little interest shown by the general public in the talks while these were in 
progress. This lack of interest could give way to unrest should living standards con-
tinue to deteriorate;
– the criticism of walesa voiced by extremist students (violent demonstrations 
in cracow on 23rd and 24th february; anti-soviet slogans) and by a workers oppo-
sition grouping within his own movement;
– attempts by the offical [official] trade unions (opZZ), which played a gener-
ally obstructive role during the talks, to press hard on the issue of wage indexing 
(thus making any agreement between the government and the imf79 more difficult 
to achieve) and continuing efforts by conservative members of the pZpr to play 
down the round table results.
As in 1980, following the signature of the Gdansk agreements,80 a great deal 
will depend on the implementation of what has been agreed in principle. The lack 
of an economic package in the April 1989 agreements points to the most crucial 
obstacle to lasting political reforms in poland.
Vii. relAtioNs BetweeN the GermAN DemocrAtic  
repuBlic AND the soViet uNioN
44. The GDr and the soviet union maintain their formal alliance without reserva-
tion. This is based just as much on common basic convictions as on interdepend-
ence in the eastern security system and mutual economic cooperation. however, as 
part of the process of differentiation in the warsaw pact and in the cmeA, the 
GDr has increasingly emphasised its own identity in recent years. But in spite of all 
its flag-waving, the GDr regards as indispensable the fundamental consensus and 
the “firm fraternal alliance” with the soviet union.
45. Agreement with the soviet union is closest in the field of foreign policy, es-
pecially with respect to security and arms control policy. in spite of the GDr’s contin-
uing strong commitment, there are, however, signs that it has not been able to main-
79  see footnote 9.
80  on August 31, 1980 the strike committee in Gdańsk signed an agreement with the representatives 
of the polish government. it permitted the activity of “self-directing trade unions” and, the operat-
ing strike committees were allowed to function as cores of the new trade unions. The modification 
of censorship had also been promised, but on December 13, 1981 the polish state council de-
clared the state of emergency and the introduction of martial law.
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tain its former position as the soviet union’s strongest partner in undiminished form. 
Developments in the east–west dialogue – in which the GDr used to play a consid-
erable role – now threaten to bypass it, because other members of the wp, such as 
poland, hungary and the soviet union itself, pursue a flexible foreign policy more 
credibly and more consistently since it is in line with their domestic policies.
46. As far as the development of socialism – and in this context glasnost and 
the evaluation of the past – are concerned, the GDr continues to make no secret of 
its divergent views. paying little attention to soviet sensitivities, it makes use of its 
elbow-room by emphasizing soviet deficiencies on the one hand and its own 
achievements on the other. At the same time, it reacts with irritation to the effects 
of soviet policies of perestroika and glasnost on its own population.
47. The areas of friction in GDr/soviet relations are compounded by the un-
settled German question. The intensification of relations between the soviet union 
and the federal republic of Germany has in the recent past added fuel to an already 
existing mistrust between the GDr and the soviet union over this question. on 
the one hand, the GDr has to pay greater attention than the soviet union and all 
other wp/cmeA countries to the preservation of fundamental communist posi-
tions to which it owes its distinction from the federal republic of Germany. on the 
other hand, it watches with concern the new flexibility with which the soviet un-
ion is increasing its cooperation with the federal republic of Germany. As a result 
of its rigidity, the GDr does not respond openly and constructively to Gorbachev’s 
new thinking.81 The alarm felt by the GDr is reflected, among other things, in its 
allegation that the west, and especially the federal republic of Germany, seeks to 
drive a wedge between the soviet union and the GDr by constantly referring to 
the divergencies between them over political and economic reforms.
Viii. huNGArY: towArDs A politicAl plurAlism?
48. hungary faces dramatic political and economic changes which by next year 
could lead to a measure of genuine power-sharing between the ruling party (hswp) 
and new political groupings. The transition is already under way; key to its success 
is avoidance of an economic collapse and/or social unrest triggered by declining 
living standards. Also required is a face-saving means of allowing the hswp to 
“manage” divestiture of its hegemonic role.
49. last fall, the government and the parliament accepted top party reformer 
pozsgay’s “democratic package”, together with a timetable. its centerpiece is a new 
constitution that should provide the framework for a new political model, to be 
fully operational by 1995. in the intervening years, the hswp would by agreement 
81  see footnote 57.
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by allowed to be primus inter pares in a transitional coalition. The communists’ pre-
sumed objective is to share as little power as necessary and as much responsibility as 
possible during the turbulent period ahead.
50. The macroeconomic adjustment programme initiated last year with imf 
support has already resulted in serious austerity. Although the leadership is in many 
ways divided, it is united in the view that state subsidies to white elephants (i.e. the 
many oversized enterprises sustained through subsidies siphoned from the few prof-
itable ones and western credit) must end if an economic turnaround over restruc-
turing and declining real incomes threatens to spill over into the streets and leads to 
open confrontation. Thus, for different reasons, the pragmatic General secretary 
Grosz and radical reformer pozsgay concur that major political concessions are in-
evitable if society is to accept an economic burden that is steadily becoming heavier.
51. Grosz relinquished the premiership in November 1988 to devote full at-
tention to the party, whose conservatives were increasingly alarmed at decisions be-
ing forced by a pro-reform rank and file, intellectuals in and out of the establish-
ment, and the public at large. Adding to the pressure, parliament showed signs of 
independence and a bent toward pluralism.
52. matters within the hswp were drifting toward a stalemate when pozsgay 
on January 28 disputed the regime’s 30-year characterization of the october 1956 
revolution as a “counterrevolution”. he forced the party to come to terms with the 
issue of 1956 as an indispensable step toward genuine compromise with the popu-
lation. initially interpreting pozsgay’s comments as a challenge to his authority, 
Grosz called an extraordinary central committee plenum to settle the score but 
then realised pozsgay would be a greater threat outside the politburo and the party 
than within it.
53. At the same time, Grosz brought the central committee round to what 
no ruling communist party has done before: endorse the move to a multiparty sys-
tem as a necessary price for social peace and, possibly, the party’s own survival.
54. much depends on whether Grosz can steer an increasingly disoriented party 
toward participating in governance without the privileges to which it has been accus-
tomed for four decades. he has visited prague, east Berlin, Belgrade and moscow (24 
march) as part of a mission to reconcile still existing differences over 1956 and to ex-
plain how he intends to lead the hswp through the coming political battles.
55. moscow apparently is prepared to give hungary considerable room to ma-
noeuvre, provided its membership in cemA and the warsaw pact are not affected. 
At this point a multitude of new political movements, some of them potential rivals 
of the hswp – the hungarian Democratic forum, the “old” smallholders party, 
the social Democratic party, the federation of free Democrats, Nyers’ New march 
front, the new youth movement (fiDesZ), and the people’s party seem prepared 
to oblige and are anxious to keep the transition orderly and gradual.
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56. As a backdrop to the internal realignment, partial soviet troop withdraw-
als are due to begin in April, with the process to be completed in two years. The 
timing may well have been intended to give the emerging political protagonists in-
centive not to press for too much too fast. moscow seems to view hungary as a 
testing ground for closing the book on world war ii, in a way that leaves the ussr 
with new and less burdensome equities. stability, a guaranteed place for commu-
nists in the emerging political system, and continued membership of the warsaw 
pact is evidently the current soviet price for hungary’s shedding the stalinist legacy.
iX. the treAtmeNt of miNorities AND reliGioN  
iN some eAst europeAN couNtries
I. POLAND
57. The importance of religion and the catholic church in the historical develop-
ment of poland, its present political situation and its influence over the daily life of 
its inhabitants is higher than in any other socialist country, and a comparison with 
other european countries would be difficult to make.
58. its role as the genuine guardian of national identity and moral and spiritual 
values has given the church its unrivalled position as the only universally accepted 
institution in the country. The period during which “solidarity” was banned has 
shown this once again. even the pZpr with all the governmental machinery at its 
disposal has not been able to diminish the church’s strong alternative force. on the 
contrary, the party has come to accept the influence of the church and, in a recent 
decision adopted by the central committee, has even concluded that “the religious 
convictions of party members are their personal affair”.
59. The strongly national character of polish catholicism leads on the other 
hand to parallels between the interests of state and church. where government prop-
aganda describes poland’s post-war displacement in a westerly direction as “the return 
of poles to their western territories”, the church speaks of the “return of faith” to these 
areas. while the regime uses polish nationalism as an instrument to win over the pop-
ulation, the church also regards nationalism as an article of faith for poles.
60. however, despite the importance of church mediation and assistance in 
the present process of political transformation, the church’s influence may in the 
long run decline to the extent to which people in poland will be able to put their 
political and social ambitions into practice themselves. This could also happen as a 
result of the self-restraint of the church itself which has never wanted to offer its 
protection and mediation for political purposes, but out of its christian duty to 
achieve reconciliation and to help the oppressed.
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II. The GDR
61. The churches do not play any part in the efforts made by the GDr leadership to 
create an independent national consciousness. relations between state and church 
in the GDr are of a fundamentally different nature from those in poland, for exam-
ple. protestant church leaders have repeatedly stated that, while social engagement 
forms part of active protestantism, this does not mean that the church wants to be 
a political opposition.
62. The government nevertheless thinks that it has to pursue a consistent poli-
cy of limiting the social engagement of the churches. The basic dissension about the 
role of the churches in the state therefore continues. Thus, the censorship of church 
publications tends to be maintained whenever political subjects are touched upon. 
The attack on the Deputy chairman of the conference of protestant church lead-
ers, stolpe, in Neues Deutschland82 of 11th January 1989 follows the same logic, al-
though it was he who had, by using the formula “church in socialism”, always tried 
to find a modus vivendi for church–state relations. The basic attitude of the prot-
estant churches is characterized by their efforts to assist parishioners who are con-
fronting the government. however, major problems result especially from the fact 
that people who want to leave the GDr and dissident groups still use the churches 
as a forum in which to voice their demands, sometimes even without having any 
church allegiance. This places the churches under considerable pressure.
63. The roman catholic church no longer maintains its stance of complete po-
litical abstinence (as it did until the early eighties), but shows great restraint in making 
public political statements. The orthodox church and the smaller christian commu-
nities and free churches are given preferential treatment by the state which is far in 
excess of their relative importance in the GDr. No problems have been known.
64. in the ecumenical field,83 the government has so far not interfered with the 
work, apart from small interventions in the publication of reports and a prayer text.
65. No problems exist for the very small number of Jews in the GDr, who 
were the object of special attention by the leadership on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the anti-Jewish pogroms in Germany on 9th November 1938.84
82  Neues Deutschland: daily paper between 1946 and 1989 in the GDr. The official organ of the 
socialist unity party of Germany.
83  ecumenism (in Greek oikumene = general, universal): ecclesiastic movement to unite all chris-
tian churches. it is characterized by religious tolerance despite the different teachings of the de-
nominations. instead of emphasizing religious differences, the movement focuses on common 
points, confessional similarities, and a search for cooperation.
84  “(reichs)Kristallnacht”, or the November pogroms, was a state-organized wave of violence against 
Jewish communities in the Nazi Germany on November 9–10, 1938. During the riots dozens of 
Jews were killed, hundreds of synagogues and Jewish stores were destroyed, and the police re-
frained from hindering the events. The day was named after the splinters of broken shop windows.
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III. BULGARIA
66. The Bulgarian government keeps a close watch on church activity. Although 
the orthodox church has a relatively privileged status, marriages and baptisms in 
church have come under strict surveillance recently. The Bible is not printed in 
Bulgaria and its importation is prohibited. Armenian christian, Jewish, roman 
catholic and some protestant denominations also exist in Bulgaria. The Armenian 
community of 25,000 and the Jewish community of 5,000 seem to survive. most 
probably, the regime uses them as a window dressing, to display an image of ethnic 
and religious tolerance in Bulgaria. however, Bulgarians of catholic and protestant 
affiliation are under strain. They suffer discrimination, churches are under control, 
their few clergy are very old and are not easily replaceable due to lack of education.
67. As far as the moslem religion is concerned, with the forceful name-chang-
ing operations of the regime starting at the end of 1984, turks faced a brutal official 
policy towards their religious practice as well as their ethnic identity, since the Bul-
garian aim can be characterized as full-scale eradication of turkish traces from the 
country. A very repressive policy is also conducted towards the practice of islam. in 
this respect, fasting, circumcision, observing religious festivities, daily prayers, and 
funerals based on islamic practices are severely prohibited. meanwhile, moslem 
cemeteries have been destroyed, tombstones have been broken, and the dead are 
buried in mixed cemeteries, regardless of religion or sect.
68. As regards the assimilation policy against the ethnic turkish minority,85 
the Belgrade protocol between turkey and Bulgaria86 proved unfruitful after two 
rounds of bilateral talks, and the issue is again going to be taken to the international 
fora by turkey. meanwhile, the ethnic turkish minority in Bulgaria, although un-
der strict police surveillance, is also getting organised and several confirmed reports 
prove that the turks in Bulgaria find allies especially within the independent com-
mittee on human rights. recently, at least sixteen ethnic turkish members of the 
committee have been expelled from Bulgaria. But such penal measures do not seem 
to prevent the expression of discontent among the masses. consequently, this dis-
content and the unprecedented and inflexible human rights policy of the Bulgarian 
regime seems to be a major default of the leadership exposing them to severe inter-
national criticism.
85  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the accurate legal terminology used in the in-
ternational treaties fixing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem 
minorities” composed of various ethnic groups.]
86  see footnote 50.
97
DocumeNt 3
X. YuGoslAViA: A New GoVerNmeNt
69. Almost three months after the resignation of the mikulic government (on 30th 
December 1988), the new Yugoslav prime minister, Ante markovic, appointed a 
cabinet which reflects his desire to improve the effectiveness of the government 
team. The main feature of this cabinet, reduced from 29 members to 19, is the pri-
ority given to professional competence in the choice of ministers. other features are 
the continuation in office of Budimir loncar, the foreign minister, and General 
Kadijevic, the Defense minister, as well as non-compliance for the first time ever 
with the “national key” in the distribution of the portfolios: the main posts have 
gone to representatives of croatia, slovenia and serbia. only one appointment has 
caused any real surprise, that of retired General Gracanin, hitherto president of the 
republic of serbia, as secretary for the interior. General Gracanin is close to the 
serbian party leader, milosevic, arid is a former chief of General staff of the Yugo-
slav people’s Army.
70.  The formation of the new government appears to have slightly raised the 
expectations of the general public which has noted the absence of serious interfer-
ence by the Yugoslav league of communists in the nominations; the new prime 
minister’s determination to compensate for the weakness of other federal bodies by 
strengthening the government; and his declared aims (introduction of a market 
economy, deregulation and self-sufficiency of enterprises).
71. The situation in Yugoslavia remains tense as a result of the disturbances in 
Kosovo. since the introduction on 27th february of “special measures”, large numbers 
of army personnel and federal police have been drafted into the province. The serbian 
leader milosevic scored a further success with the adoption by the Kosovo parliament 
on 23rd march, with only a few dissenting votes, of amendments to the serbian con-
stitution conferring on serbia the powers hitherto exercised by the autonomous re-
gions of Kosovo and Vojvodina in the fields of justice, defence and internal affairs.
72. These developments, combined with the earlier arrest of 44 senior Kosovar 
Albanians, including Azem Vllasi (the former party chief ) and the leaders of the 
trepca87 miners’ strike, were violently opposed by the Albanian population of 
Kosovo which has proclaimed its attachment to the 1974 constitution88 (and thus 
rejected the recent modifications) as well as to “tito’s Yugoslavia” (in which the 
autonomous regions of Vojvodinia [Vojvodina] and Kosovo enjoyed the same pre-
87  trepča: mine and industrial complex 5.6 km northeast of mitrovitsa, in Kosovo. it was one of the 
largest industrial facilities in Yugoslavia.
88  The new constitution of 1974 increased the autonomy of the member states of the federation and, 
granting almost the same rights, increased the autonomy of the two provinces, Vojvodina and 
Kosovo. The country was led by a presidium of eight persons (representing the six member states 
and the two autonomous provinces) and the leader of the league of communists in Yugoslavia 
was also among them.
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rogatives as the republics). for the first time since the serious incidents of 1981,89 
there were fatalities during clashes with the federal security forces (24 demonstra-
tors and two policemen, according to official sources).
73. it seems clear that the federal authorities opted to reject the claims of the 
Kosovo Albanians, thereby playing into the hands of milosevic (with whom slove-
nia and croatia have had to fall into line on the Kosovo issue). The warning by the 
new prime minister, who had hoped to bring the parties face to face with their re-
sponsibilities by stating that “a continuing escalation of the disturbances” would 
reduce “the chances of implementing the reforms”, apparently went unheard.
74. The general political situation in Yugoslavia is still very confused. two possi-
ble scenarios appear to be emerging. in the first, which is the more encouraging, there 
would be a compromise, based on the need to implement economic reforms, between 
serbians, croatians and slovenes, with milosevic relinquishing his aspirations to polit-
ical power at federal level. in the second, these aspirations would be pursued. A growing 
split might then appear between a southern “bloc”, formed by serbia, montenegro and 
some areas of macedonia, and a northern “bloc”, formed by slovenia and croatia.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(89)13 (may 
3, 1989).
89  The mass protests in 1981 demanding the status of a republic resulted in numerous casualties and 
deaths. The constitution of 1974 still considered Kosovo an autonomous region, and for the radi-
cals this was not enough as Kosovo had no constitutional right to secede, unlike the member states 
of the federation. The radical wing of the protesters raised the idea of secession from Yugoslavia in 
1981. on April 2, 1981 state of emergency was introduced in Kosovo and federal forces inter-
vened to restore order.
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i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. The 26 march elections to the congress of people’s Deputies marked a new stage in 
soviet political life and the beginnings of Gorbachev’s effort to transfer power to the 
supreme soviet and to soviets at all levels of national life. The elections also gave nation-
al prominence to a number of radical political figures, revived the political fortunes of 
former moscow party chief Boris eltsin, and introduced the possibility of politicians 
rising to prominence through elections to the soviets. The congress of people’s Deputies 
and the supreme soviet will take some time to set down roots to assure their perma-
nence, but began their work in a way suggesting a determination to fulfil their constitu-
tional mandates to be the supreme legislative, administrative, and oversight bodies in the 
country.
2. Gorbachev was able to strengthen his hand by obtaining the departure of 3 full 
and 2 candidate members from the politburo at the september central committee ple-
num, thus removing dead wood and live conservative elements from the leadership. 
These changes are no doubt a further consolidation of his authority at a time when Gor-
bachev is turning his attention to preparing a radical reform of the party in a year’s time. 
The promotion of Kruychkov [Kryuchkov](KGB) was the most significant move.
3. During the last six months, moscow has faced more nationalist unrest than at 
any time since the death of stalin. The Baltic republics have pressed for radical autono-
101
my, even independence; the Belorussians and ukrainians have pushed for ecologi-
cal and language reforms; the moldavians have adopted a radical language law; the 
Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis have continued their fight over Nagorno-Karab-
akh; the Georgians have been challenged by the Abkhazians and unsettled by mos-
cow’s response; and the uzbeks have fought with the meskhetians. moreover, small 
groups not heard from before and russians in both the rsfsr and outside their 
homeland began to push their respective programmes. The results of the long-await-
ed nationalities plenum in september were anodyne but some of the limits of the 
current flexibility in the nationalities policy were revealed in a resolution against 
confederalisation of the cpsu, secession from the union and tampering with bor-
ders.
4. having permitted long-suppressed forces within society to emerge, the re-
gime began to adjust to the untidy manifestations of a nascent pluralistic society, 
including public participation in the political process, factionalism within the su-
preme soviet, and the appearance of grass roots independent politicians. The au-
thorities also faced the relatively new experience of having their policies subjected, 
albeit tentatively, to legislative oversight.
5. Both leadership and leading economists are deeply worried about the eco-
nomic and social instability resulting from the partial reforms implemented so far, 
and have reacted by easing back on some while postponing others. traditional ad-
ministrative steps have been taken in an effort to restore some balance to the econ-
omy. Gorbachev recognises the need for deeper and effective reform measures but is 
confronted by major obstacles including a huge budget deficit, suppressed inflation 
and a vast ruble overhang, serious food and consumer goods shortages, and lagging 
industrial performance. Next year will be even tougher, as planned cuts in central-
ised investment may bring the economy into recession.
6. There have been no major new developments in soviet defence policy dur-
ing the past six months, with significant military activity generally reflecting imple-
mentation of previously established military policy. The soviets completed the first 
phase of the unilateral reductions in eastern europe. The remaining wp reductions 
are expected to be completed as announced. The soviet position at the cfe negoti-
ations90 continued to reflect the major soviet objective of achieving significant ad-
ditional conventional force reductions. Notwithstanding rumours of a possible mil-
itary coup during the summer, cited at one point by Gorbachev himself, the soviet 
armed forces, while not fully satisfied with all aspects of perestroika, remain firmly 
subordinate to the political leadership. A debate over levels of defence expenditure 
has begun in the supreme soviet.
90  see footnote 77.
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7. in Poland the arrival of a non-communist led government in september91 
was an event of major historical importance. it now seems clear that the bargain 
struck at the round table in April had more dynamic potential than any of the sides 
realised at the time. solidarity’s success at the June elections and the dismal perfor-
mance of the communist party, followed by Jaruzelski’s narrow squeak in the pres-
idential election, underlined the party’s crumbling base of support. solidarity had 
wanted to stay out of a post-election coalition in order to concentrate on building 
up their political strength at grass-roots level, but they found power and responsi-
bility thrust upon them.
8. Though walesa had himself proposed that solidarity should form a gov-
ernment with the previous coalition partners of the pZpr,92 his misgivings after 
the event were probably sincere. The dangers ahead are real and success cannot be 
assured. The immediate threat is that pressures within the coalition (and the dispa-
rate interests represented within it) will prevent the adoption of a policy which 
meets the needs of a situation in which, during the last six months at least, the polish 
economy was simply being allowed to deteriorate. The soviet leadership seems to 
have taken developments in poland calmly enough. Defence and internal security 
matters are still in communist hands. moreover, Jaruzelski now stands firm in the 
new post of president where he will continue to act as guarantor of the constitution-
al order and in effect of poland’s position in the warsaw pact.
9. The 14th Hungarian workers socialist party (communist party) held in 
Budapest on 6th–9th october 1989 was a further historic break. for the first time, 
a communist party in power put an end to its existence on the basis that its histor-
ical experience was over. A new party, the hungarian socialist party, was established 
by an overwhelming majority of delegates (159 votes against and 38 abstentions out 
of a total of 1,274). This party wants “a definitive break with the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and its ideology”. its programme seeks to instal [install] a parliamentary 
type regime and a market economy. The transformation of the hwsp into the hsp 
does not put an end to all ambiguity, however. Nyers, who was elected chairman of 
the hsp, has been able until now to avoid a splintering of the party, but to the det-
riment of a greater transparency desired by the reformers. finally, the cautious atti-
tude of the soviet media to this development, which is depicted more as a “self-re-
form” of the party than as a break, leaves open the question of relations with the 
soviet union and with the cpsu.
91  on August 17, 1989 president Jaruzelski accepted the formation of a coalition cabinet led by 
solidarity, which was formed on August 29 and led by tadeusz mazowiecki.
92  with the Democratic party and the united people’s party.
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10. in Bulgaria, the period under review was dominated by the mass emigra-
tion of ethnic turks.93 Between late may and late August some 317,000 had crossed 
into turkey. The assimilation campaign backfired dramatically, serving instead to 
harden the turks’ opposition. in late may, following the demonstrations which re-
sulted in deaths, the Bulgarian authorities began to expel large numbers of turks. 
subsequently, thousands of ethnic turks took advantage of more liberal passport 
regulations to flee the country.
11. The base of opposition has broadened considerably in Czechoslovakia over 
the past six months. An alliance of sorts between the church, charter 77,94 and 
re-emerging leaders of the prague spring95 has helped to turn passive dislike of the 
regime into a more active commitment for change. The response of the regime to 
this has been very tentative dialogue, coupled with severe repression of what are 
deemed unacceptable activities. The dividing line seems to be any attack on the lead-
ing role of the communist party.
12. Both the political and economic situations in Romania were characterised 
by stagnation, as well as more frequent, albeit still minimal, signs of dissent against 
ceausescu’s absolutism. isolation in foreign affairs increased, with western coun-
tries more vocal against a dismal human rights record, and Bucharest still unable to 
make any progress in the warsaw pact with its anti-reform agenda. perhaps in re-
sponse to the circulation of a protest letter among delegates to the rcp congress 
scheduled for November, ceaucescu [ceausescu] has been indulging in an unusual 
public relations compaign [campaign].
13. The growing exodus from the GDR during the summer across the newly 
opened Austro–hungarian border,96 also through czechoslovakia and poland, has 
reached the level of 80,000 in addition to the 100,000 people estimated to be leav-
ing the GDr this year by the normal established procedures. it remains to be seen 
how this problem, along with mounting pressure for democratic reform by the east 
German population and from within the seD and the so-called “bloc parties”97 is 
dealt with by the new leadership under egon Krenz.
93  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties fix-
ing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” com-
posed of various ethnic groups.]
94  see footnote 30.
95  see footnote 27.
96  on september 10, 1989 the hungarian government allowed GDr citizens staying in hungary to 
leave the country for Austria and abrogated the treaty with the GDr, which had been in force for 
twenty years prohibiting, GDr citizens to leave for the west.
97  After 1945 many parties were formed in the GDr and grouped in the “Antifaschistisch-demokra-
tischer Block” (Antifascist-Democratic Bloc). Thus until 1989 there was a cDu in the GDr too, 
and other parties like the DBD (Democratic farmers’ party of Germany), lDpD (liberal Demo-
cratic party of Germany) and NDpD (National Democratic party of Germany) also existed.
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14. in the Warsaw Pact, the political gulf between orthodox leaderships and 
their reformist allies continued to widen. while pact meetings have focused on ar-
eas of agreement, particularly on disarmament initiatives, agreement in cmeA fora 
continued to be blocked for the most part by basic divergences over integration and 
economic policies.
* * *
15. in Yugoslavia, there is an ever-deepening gulf between the republics and this 
could become more dangerous if the system and central control continue to weak-
en. Notwithstanding the continuation of serious economic difficulties, including 
hyper-inflation, the markovic government remains firmly committed to the intro-
duction of a market economy. some further progress towards the democratisation 
of political life in Yugoslavia has also been made. But the quarrel between serbia 
and slovenia continues and recent developments in the two republics indicate that 
a reconciliation is unlikely. The constitutional commission of the slovenian Nation-
al Assembly adopted amendments to the republic’s constitution, including the 
right to secession. The next major battle ground is likely to be the 14th lcY con-
gress in January 1990.98
16. Albania has exchanged ambassadors with all of the warsaw pact states ex-
cept poland and the ussr. it continues to refuse to re-establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the latter. Albania’s main interest is to expand its economic ties with 
those countries, while keeping at minimum the political relations. During this peri-
od, the GDr was most active. The visit of foreign minister fischer to tirana in 
June resulted in agreements on economic and industrial co-operation.
ii. the New supreme soViet
17. The new supreme soviet was elected by the congress of people’s Deputies on 
26 may; its first session opened on 3 June and lasted, after an extension, until 4 Au-
gust. few well-known reformists are among the 542 members of its two chambers; 
many of them were resoundingly defeated in the election, in which what one liberal 
called the “aggressively passive majority” showed its strength of numbers. eltsin’s 
initial failure to secure election caused particular problems. The supreme soviet 
contains few “survivors” from its predecessor. its composition is quite different in-
cluding no more than three politburo members (Gorbachev, lukyanov, the Vice 
president, and Vorotnikov, chairman of the rsfsr supreme soviet). few party or 
government apparatchiks are in it, but there are at least 130 members of the aca-
demic and cultural intelligentsia.
98  on January 22, 1990 milan Kučan, leader of the slovenian party delegation, left the congress of 
the league of communists of Yugoslavia.
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18. The supreme soviet has already proved itself to be a lively body which 
takes its paper rights and duties both seriously and literally. Deputies undertook 
prolonged and intensive questioning of proposed ministers and succeeded in reject-
ing nine, two of whom were withdrawn after being challenged in the commissions. 
This development caused no little concern to Gorbachev and ryzhkov who had to 
exert considerable influence to push through some nominations, notably Defence 
minister Yazov. ryzhkov himself was subjected to intense questioning about, inter 
alia, his mistakes in managing the economy, poverty, and environmental disasters, 
before being approved as chairman of the council of ministers.
19. for a “novice” parliament the supreme soviet surpassed most expectations 
at its first session. extensively televised, though not live because the popularity of 
the full daytime coverage of the congress proceedings reportedly caused a 20% 
downturn in economic productivity, it has helped to further the “politicization” of 
the soviet population and to involve them in the process of changing their society. 
it has also brought into the public eye and into politics a new class of political activ-
ists hitherto excluded from the running of the country, ranging from members of 
the academic and artistic intelligentsia and lawyers to factory directors and workers.
20. An ambitious programme of legislation has been agreed for the agenda of 
the autumn session, starting with the drafting of a new constitution and covering 
economic reform, human rights, nationalities and many other issues. some aspects 
of this reform programme may however be retarded by the supreme soviet’s inabil-
ity to move rapidly through the agenda. Nationalities problems are likely to contin-
ue to feature prominently in the forthcoming session which will consider the feder-
al system, economic devolution to republics, the position of the smaller ethnic 
groups without their own national territory, and the question of enhancing the sta-
tus of the russian republic (rsfsr) which is scheduled to have its own Academy 
of sciences (and it may also acquire its own party organisation in the form of a Buro 
or secretariat).
21. Gorbachev’s political reforms have created an active parliament, in which 
although a majority of the Deputies are party members, a variety of interest groups 
are already active. in particular an inter-regional group of deputies was set up, with 
400 or so members, including a number of members of the moscow group of radical 
Deputies and representatives from the Baltic republics. it has five co-chairmen in-
cluding eltsin and sakharov and claims 90 supreme soviet Deputies among its 
members. At a central committee meeting on 18 July, ryzhkov expressed some 
disquiet at the way the party seems to have been marginalised in the political and 
legislative processes; he has good reason to be concerned about the extent to which 
future government policies will be carefully scrutinised and perhaps challenged by 
the supreme soviet. one of the first items to be discussed in the next session is an 
emergency programme to restore economic and financial health – this could have a 
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rough ride. The leading role of the party will come into question when policies or 
legislation, hitherto initiated exclusively by the party, are amended or rejected by 
the supreme soviet (as has happened on one or two important issues already).
iii. the cpsu – DecliNe of its power AND AuthoritY?
22. During the years of perestroika, the influence and authority of the party, as well 
as its historical prestige, particularly at regional and local level but also at the centre, 
have steadily declined. As the reform process progressed the party was increasingly 
left behind, having failed to find a role in the new circumstances despite repeated 
urgings by Gorbachev.
23. The clearest sign of the crisis was the defeat of a large number of senior 
party officials in the elections in march to the congress of people’s Deputies. At the 
central committee plenum on 25 April, many speeches expressed the bitter humil-
iation felt in the party and the resentment that glasnost had allowed its image and 
performance to be defamed. some local party officials held that mistaken policies 
and inadequate leadership from the centre were responsible for their unpopularity, 
and that local party organisations had simply taken the brunt of the population’s 
dissatisfaction with a situation over which they have no control, or for their prede-
cessors’ shortcomings.
24. in the past two to three months criticism of Gorbachev’s policies and, by 
direct implication, the leadership itself, has become more vocal. possibly encour-
aged by outspoken criticism at the congress which was aimed at previous taboo is-
sues such as the performance of the leadership and the methods of the KGB, and by 
eltsin’s frequent public denunciation of Gorbachev’s policies, party officials have 
themselves written articles for the press in which Gorbachev is directly attacked. 
The articles appeared, as they did last year, just as Gorbachev left for his summer 
holiday. however, as the september plenum showed, Gorbachev was sufficiently 
master of the political situation not only to impose on the central committee his 
agenda and timing for the next party congress, but to remove deadwood and live 
conservative elements (such as chebrikov) from within the politburo and to pro-
mote his close ally in the KGB (Kryuchkov).
25. The shift of power to the supreme soviet presents a dilemma for the party. 
The fundamental issue is how the party, discredited in the main by corruption, com-
placency, undeserved privileges, and its failure to respond to the people’s needs can 
retain its leading role in society in the new conditions of glasnost and pluralism of 
opinion, and in which an active and permanent “parliament” (and increasingly 
powerful soviets and workers’ collectives) are able to discuss and vote on govern-
ment appointments and legislation, without fear of retribution. Democratic cen-
tralism is rarely mentioned nowadays though it in principle still exists; but the cor-
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rupt and inefficient nomenklatura system is now openly and increasingly criticised. 
local party appointments will increasingly be subject to confirmation through the 
ballot box in elections to soviets, though Gorbachev conceded on 18 July that par-
ty secretaries need not in all cases also chair the local soviet – thereby diminishing 
the party’s influence. factory and farm directors are now supposed to be elected by 
their work forces.
26. The party has been instructed to function differently. it must no longer 
manage the economy, but provide political leadership. it should therefore be pro-
moting the implementation of reforms, but since many of these by implication 
threaten its very role in society, it is unlikely to do so.
27. Gorbachev has asserted that the party should remain the vanguard of soci-
ety. he maintains that the one-party system must be preserved and that pluralism of 
opinion can be effectively achieved within it. The official line is that only the cpsu 
can hold society together and push through the reforms needed. party ideologist 
medvedev has however conceded that discussion of a multiparty system will have to 
take place, and that Article 6 of the constitution, on the leading role of the party, 
whose abolition has been openly called for, will need to be reviewed. A constitu-
tional commission, headed by Gorbachev, was set up under the congress of peo-
ple’s Deputies.
28. Against this background, Gorbachev faces a difficult if not impossible task 
of galvanising and restoring the authority of a party which daily sees the political 
initiative slipping away from it to bodies elected by popular mandate. his task is 
made doubly difficult by the fact that it is he who has set this process in train, and 
has himself benefited from it through his assumption of the new executive-style 
presidency. Gorbachev perceived that the party was an obstacle to reform and delib-
erately set out to weaken or by-pass its influence. he succeeded too well and the 
party is now demoralised.
iV. NAtioNAlities
29. National unrest, in the Baltic republics and elsewhere, has now reached levels 
unseen since the stalin era. But there is no consistent pattern to this upsurge. De-
spite impressions abroad, the entire periphery is not involved, indeed, more than 
90% of the demonstrators come from nationalities accounting for fewer than 10% 
of the ussr’s population. furthermore, goals differ sharply. The non-russians are 
split on virtually everything except language issues, from the question of independ-
ence to the meaning of economic autonomy. except for the Balts, virtually no na-
tional group as a whole is pressing for independence. in the Baltic republics, there 
has been no communal violence. however, in the caucasus and some areas of cen-
108
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
tral Asia, there have been repeated breakdowns in public order resulting in consid-
erable loss of life, and, in Armenia, an economic blockade.
30. The impact of this upsurge on the system and Gorbachev personally should 
not be exaggerated. The overwhelmingly russian leadership is united in its determi-
nation to maintain the territorial integrity of the ussr and will take a very hard 
line against any challenge on this point. some disagreements do exist, however, on 
two subordinate issues: the proper balance between the rights of the 30 million 
russians who live outside the rsfsr and the new rights and power for non-rus-
sians; and the extent to which any policy adopted for one region will impact on all 
others. Divisions on these questions vary from issue to issue rather than crystallising 
into factions.
31. The extent of leadership agreement was reflected in the “theses” which 
were adopted at the nationalities plenum in september. Just as the nationality prob-
lem itself, they seemed far more radical than they actually were. Virtually all are 
proposals for discussion rather than policies to be implemented; they will not end 
either the problem or the debate but rather usher in a new round of ethnic politics, 
in the legislature and on the streets. But to the extent they reflect moscow’s current 
thinking, the regime has clearly signalled its intention to reassert central control 
over increasingly fractious republics.
32. with rare exceptions, what is to be given to the non-russian republics with 
one hand will apparently be taken away by the other. Thus, the republics are to re-
tain control over all areas not delegated to the federal government, but the list of 
responsibilities reserved for the center is so broad moscow can still meddle in virtu-
ally everything. republics are to own local resources and develop and implement 
their own ideas on autonomy, but moscow intends to retain the right to define un-
ion-wide rules for the use of those resources and the main lines of economic devel-
opment. And moscow also expects to be able to veto republic actions even while 
according republics the right to protest central decisions.
33. on the other hand, the russian republic (rsfsr) evidently will gain 
many institutions it has traditionally lacked – including its own Academy of scienc-
es and some form of republic party organisation. And significantly expanded rights 
may be accorded to autonomous units below the union republic level and to groups 
currently lacking any state bodies enabling them to organise to defend their cultural 
and linguistic rights (e.g. the polish minority in lithuania which is now pressing for 
autonomy).
34. traditionally, when the party’s central committee spoke, the country lis-
tened, but in this case, the debate is likely to continue and expand. Nothing, howev-
er, has yet been said by moscow on the one issue that might help clarify the terms of 
the debate, i.e. the line between permissible means of political protest that will be 
protected and impermissible actions that will be stopped. As a result, nationalists 
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will continue to test the limits, while conservatives object to all forms of local asser-
tiveness and question more vigorously the policies that have allowed it.
V. receNt DeVelopmeNts iN the BAltic stAtes
35. tension between moscow and the Baltic states has intensified steadily. Among 
the numerous particular causes were clashes over constitutional and legal issues and 
the threat that republican communist party organisations (in lithuania and lat-
via) might withdraw from the cpsu, thereby setting a dangerous precedent. The 
unitary communist party, a leninist concept, has provided the most important 
ingredient in the cement which ultimately has kept the soviet union (technically a 
federation of 15 sovereign soviet socialist states) together. The Baltic cps, faced 
with the threat of defeat in the forthcoming local elections, have increasingly been 
forced to play the nationalist card. in any event, many local party members are na-
tionalist-minded and help to boost the ranks of the people’s fronts99 which, in all 
three republics, have increasingly inscribed separatism on the agenda. The attitude 
of the moscow authorities towards them has thus become distinctly negative. The 
military press, in the meantime, kept up a constant flow of shocked reports at devel-
opments, many of them aimed at locally-based servicemen and military facilities.
36. in estonia, a draft law on elections to local soviets, published in June, laid 
down residence requirements for voters and candidates which would, among other 
things, have had the effect of disenfranchising many locally-based servicemen. This 
draft proved to be a final straw for the large, but increasingly insecure, russian mi-
nority in the republic. strikes began on a relatively small scale organised by the two 
bodies identified with russian interests, the intermovement and Joint council of 
labour collectives. (similar bodies exist in the other two republics and new ones 
are being formed, such as the union for the Defence of soviet power in lithuania.) 
The estonian supreme soviet decided in July to postpone for two weeks a decision 
on adopting the law and the strikes were called off. however, when the law was duly 
adopted in August, the strikes resumed with a vengeance: at their peak they in-
volved 80,000 people from more than 50 enterprises. An inept and itself legally 
dubious attempt was made by the estonian authorities to declare the strikes illegal. 
on 16 August, the presidium of the ussr supreme soviet ruled aspects of the 
electoral law to be unconstitutional and estonia was given until 1 october to amend 
it, which it actually did on 5 october by reducing the residence requirement from 
five to two years. in the meantime, the lithuanian supreme soviet had also adopted 
an electoral law with no such residence requirements. There were strong suspicions 
99  see footnote 42.
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in estonia that the strikes (in which several defence-related plants were involved) 
had been directed from moscow.
37. on 27 July, the ussr supreme soviet gave the green light to all three Bal-
tic republics to introduce republican self-financing on 1 January 1990, a year earlier 
than originally envisaged. it also approved in principle radical estonian and lithu-
anian plans for economic autonomy. The practical effect of these decisions remained 
unclear, however: the details of the autonomy plans have yet to be agreed. The de-
bate in the supreme soviet revealed that sharp divisions went all the way to the top 
soviet leadership about how far the Balts should be permitted to go. presumably the 
hope of Gorbachev and his closest colleagues was that the satisfaction of Baltic pres-
sure for economic sovereignty would take at least some of the steam out of the drive 
for political independence.
38. in the same spirit Gorbachev permitted – after strong Baltic pressure – the 
establishment of a commission of the congress of people’s Deputies to examine the 
1939 Nazi–soviet Non-Agression pact. (The cpsu central committee also estab-
lished a similar commission but there has been no publicity about its workings.) 
The preliminary findings of the congress commission stated that the secret Addi-
tional protocol to the pact was genuine – in itself a significant breakthrough, since 
for years the soviet authorities had muddied the waters on the issue of authenticity 
while others, including historians, had even suggested that it was a western forgery. 
There had been clear indications for some time previously that public opinion was 
being prepared for a change of line on the genuineness issue. Nevertheless strenuous 
official efforts were also made to “delink” the Nazi–soviet territorial deal from the 
“revolutionary” events of 1940 which led to the incorporation of the Baltic states in 
the soviet union.
39. The untenable view that the Baltic peoples joined the soviet union of 
their own free will was expressed by A. N. Yakovlev, chairman of the congress 
commission in August and subsequently by Gorbachev himself at the september 
cc plenum on nationalities. A commission of the lithuanian supreme soviet, 
established to study the Nazi–soviet treaties of 1939–1941 and their conse-
quences, reported in August that they predetermined the loss of lithuanian sov-
ereignty and independence and that the declaration of lithuania’s entry into the 
ussr by the lithuanian government in July 1940 and the subsequent ussr law 
on accepting the lithuanian ssr into the ussr were illegal. These findings cut 
directly across the increasingly desperate efforts in moscow to maintain that the 
incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940 had been legal. on 21 July, for example, 
Pravda had republished the texts of the declarations issued by the lithuanian and 
estonian government of the day asking to become part of the ussr-documents 
whose language reeked of diktat.
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40. The people’s fronts had decided to commemorate the anniversary of the 
Nazi–soviet pact on 23 August with a human chain linking all three Baltic capitals. 
The event passed off without incident: more than a million people were estimated 
to have taken part. however moscow’s increasing apprehension about separatist 
and nationalist tendencies was beginning to find high-level, if belated, expression. 
on 15 August, Pravda had devoted a leading article to the Baltic situation which 
criticised not only the “frankly anti-soviet groupings” and those agitating for seces-
sion but also the local communist parties, stating that some of their organisations 
“have basically abandoned the political struggle” while some members showed con-
fusion and a tendency towards appeasement. Pravda warned that confrontation 
and political unprincipledness was a “path to major disaster”. The appeals also con-
tained in the statement were, however, likely to fall on increasingly deaf ears. The 
inducement of fleshing out the sovereignty of the union republics with “real eco-
nomic, social, legal and political content” – albeit within the framework of the so-
viet union – probably came too late to stem popular Baltic appetites for a complete 
break.
41. A more powerfully worded and authoritative warning, this time by the 
cc, cpsu, was duly published in the soviet press on 27 August. Although the 
statement appealed specifically to the Baltic peoples and individual sections of their 
populations, as well as to all the peoples living in the area, it was striking that the 
only direct reference to the powerful people’s fronts was a negative one (to their 
role in organising the 23 August demonstration). four days previously Pravda had 
in fact denounced the lithuanian people’s front (sajudis) for playing a double 
game. speculation about whether Gorbachev had been party to this document, is-
sued while he was on holiday, was cut short by soviet spokesmen who associated the 
entire soviet party leadership with it.
42. The reaction of the Baltic communist parties and their leaders to the state-
ment balanced conciliation with a re-affirmation of the intention to seek greater 
sovereignty. The estonian party leader, Valjas, condemned demands to achieve se-
cession “under present conditions”. The response of many Balts and of the people’s 
fronts themselves was, predictably, much more negative, sharply denouncing the 
threats implicit in the statement. Gorbachev also evidently indicated that his own 
patience with the Balts was running out. on 2 october, a statement has been issued 
by 40 of the 52 people’s Deputies from lithuania protesting against the cpsu dec-
laration on the Baltic republics. The lithuanian party leader, Brazauskas, was twice 
rung up by Gorbachev who emphasised, according to an interview given subse-
quently by Brazauskas, that: “No republic will leave the soviet union, but within 
the federation the republics can have everything”.
43. it is not easy to predict the future course of events, which will depend to a 
large extent on the overall political situation in the ussr. Differences among Balts 
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tend to be over not whether, but how to achieve independence. speaking of seces-
sion at a lithuanian cc plenum in June, Brazauskas stated: “The opinion exists 
that there are two ways to do that. one that the knot which has become so entan-
gled in these last 50 years should be cut off with one stroke, and the other way is to 
undo this knot”. several sajudis leaders have discussed the possibility of a unilateral 
declaration of independence following the republican election in the spring of 
1990. if this were to happen, moscow would be confronted with a dilemma over 
how to deal with such a situation. one possible scenario would be for intervention, 
but only as a measure of last resort.
Vi. the politicAl AND ecoNomic situAtioN iN polAND
44. since the signature of the polish round-table accords, events have moved even 
more quickly than they had in the preceding six months. The elections of 4 and 18 
June were a referendum on communism, the population roundly rejecting the re-
gime and its antecedents. solidarity’s landslide victory and the humiliation of virtu-
ally all those on the ill-conceived “national list” were only the prelude to the eventu-
al inability of the temporary prime minister, General Kiszczak, to form a govern-
ment.
45. The unprecedented and unexpected exercise of influence by the former 
“satellite parties” – the united peasants party and the Democratic party – gave sol-
idarity the votes it required to form its own coalition government. That the behav-
iour of these parties derived from lech walesa’s own proposal and lack of discipline 
within the old coalition did not alter the result. Throughout this period the new-
ly-configured polish parliament behaved as though it regarded itself as it was always 
described in official publications, i.e. as the “supreme organ of state authority”, a la-
bel which it has not lived up to.
46. The current government of prime minister tadeusz mazowiecki reflects a 
necessary blend of all elements of the current political equation. The polish united 
workers party retains the posts necessary for stability in poland’s international rela-
tionships – i.e. internal security and defence – as well as transport and foreign trade, 
while solidarity has taken the lion’s share of economic portfolios in the conviction 
that they must be the ones to force economic reform forward. The upp (agricul-
ture) and Dp (communications) have been given portfolios which may allow them 
to establish credibility with the electorate.
47. The communist party is demoralised and confused. while some members 
are determined to reform the party and attempt to become a legitimate force in 
poland, others are angry and resentful about the consequences of the reform process 
which has deprived them of their privileges, left them diminished in power and in 
some ways side-lined. Their control over the military and police, plus the nomen-
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klatura, however, affords them far greater power than their numbers in cabinet im-
ply. more than legislation will be needed to break up the monopoly of power which 
has controlled all activity till now; indeed there are few ways to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of institutions which have never been accountable nor subject to 
the budgetary discipline. in other words, the nomenklatura system remains a force 
with which to be reckoned.
48. As for solidarity, it must now prove itself wrong, having maintained for 
months that it was not yet ready to lead a government. lacking party discipline and 
a clear programme, solidarity must transform itself from the voice of opposition as 
a trade union to the actual role of political leadership.
49. meanwhile economic troubles continue. of all economic indicators, infla-
tion is the most visible (60 percent from January to June, but currently running into 
hyperinflation), and despite the agreement on indexation of wages to prices, wage 
demands have increased. price hikes anticipated during the summer led to hoarding 
by consumers and empty shelves. July saw a general wage and price freeze in an at-
tempt to stabilise the situation, but August began with de-regulation of much of the 
food industry and subsequent increases. As usual, farmers held back their livestock 
in anticipation of increased procurement prices, which led to further shortage of 
meat. with supplies getting still shorter and farmers holding out for yet higher pric-
es, price hikes on food items became largely academic because shelves remained 
empty. The polish leaders are looking to the west for short-term food aid to tide 
them over the present period of uncertainty.
50. The polish government are banking on the people’s readiness to accept eco-
nomic hardships as the new power structure settles into place. They are in fact 
counting on the population’s resignation to a continuation of an economy of short-
ages. Austerity measures imposed by mazowiecki may be more acceptable to poles 
than if they had been imposed by Kiszczak. The corollary is that the poles now pin 
unrealistic hopes for results on solidarity that they would never have expected from 
the puwp. They expect mazowiecki to show results within an as yet undetermined 
time period, even if, for the moment he is being allowed some margin. ironically, his 
temporary collapse while presenting his cabinet to the sejm not only generated 
public sympathy but underlined to poles the fragility of the system now in place.
Vii. huNGArY: DeAth of the hswp – Birth of the hsp
An historical break and clearly stated reformist intentions
51. established on 1st November 1956 by imre Nagy and Janos Kadar at the 
height of the events in hungary on the ruins of the stalinist communist party 
(hungarian workers’ party), the hungarian socialist workers’ party (hswp) 
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hardly survived Janos Kadar, who was removed from its leadership in may 1988, 
retired in may 1989, and died shortly afterwards.
52. torn between the more orthodox aspirations of the new General secretary 
Grosz and of Berecz, member of the politburo, and the reformist ideology of the 
other leaders such as Nyers and pozsgay, who were sidelined from the politburo in 
1974 by Kadar and who returned with renewed strength in may 1988, the hswp 
moved from crisis to crisis and on the edge of a split. its weakening was marked by 
the discussions on a multiparty system (still rejected by Grosz in November 1988 
and accepted in march 1989); the rehabilitation of imre Nagy (the hswp was not 
admitted to the funeral ceremony in June 1989); and the re-evaluation of the events 
of 1956 (no longer a “counter-revolution” but a “popular uprising” according to 
pozsgay). its members (there were still between 600,000 and 700,000 of them) were 
leaving the party in greater numbers each month.
53. At the end of June 1989, the reformers (who on 12th April had obliged 
Berecz to step down from the politburo) imposed on Grosz a four-member leader-
ship – Nyers became chairman of the hswp, led by him together with Grosz, 
pozsgay and Nemeth, the prime minister.
54. finally, after the poor showings of the party candidates at the four by-elec-
tions held during the summer, an extraordinary congress of the hswp was con-
vened on 6th october. eighty per cent of the delegates elected to attend were par-
ticipating in a party congress for the first time. white collar workers were in the 
majority, as opposed to 20% of blue collar workers. The hswp dissolved itself and 
transformed itself into a new party, “the hungarian socialist party” (hsp). its pro-
gramme – mainly the work of pozsgay and of his reformist allies – was approved 
unanimously without any real discussion. its main elements were the following:
– The break with marxism-leninism – “the party sets itself apart from all 
forms of stalinism and neo-stalinism. it is embarking on a road to reform and has 
taken the first steps toward democratic socalism”.
– The establishment of an institutional system for democratic socialism, i.e. a 
nation of democratic law founded on a broad national consensus, the introduction 
of the institutions of direct democracy (referendum and petition), the balanced 
sharing of power among various groups and organizations, a freely elected parlia-
ment to which the Government would be answerable, an elected president of the 
republic responsible for maintaining the balance between the centres of power, a 
multi-party system, independence of local government and of the judiciary.
– The institution of a market economy and of a mixed system of ownership 
–“the fundamental requirement for economic renewal is the reform of ownership. 
There will then coexist “state ownership, providing public services”, “communal 
ownership, organized in the form of co-operatives”, ownership “by social institu-
tions and by self-governing bodies” and, lastly, “private property – one of the indis-
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pensable forces for promoting growth”. The hsp commits itself to “providing con-
stitutional guarantees of equality of opportunity among the various forms of own-
ership”, to creating a “predictable financial system that is stable and flexible”, and to 
making the forint convertible.
– The new hungarian socialist party is both a “socialist party of the left that 
preaches the synthesis of basic socialist and communist values”, a “party of the peo-
ple”, a “party of reform which is concentrating its efforts on the peaceful transition 
to democracy”, a “party of the nation which brings together support for hungarian 
interests and those of the national ethnic minorities with international solidarity, 
and which defends hungarians abroad”, a “democratic party which rejects demo-
cratic centralism”.
55. in addition to a president (Nyers) – whose election was an easy matter 
(88%) – a “steering committee” of 23 members (which replaces the politburo of the 
former hswp) was elected with greater difficulty by the congress. A small major-
ity (13) won out in favour of the reformers.
56. several deadlines have been set on the domestic political front. members of 
the former hswp had to make known in writing their membership in the hsp be-
fore the end of october, but the deadline was extended. on 25th November 1989, 
elections were scheduled to take place for the president of the republic, though it is 
not yet clear whether these will be by direct suffrage or by parliament: a referendum 
may be held on the issue.100 pozsgay, a reformer, a former member of the politburo, 
who would have been the hswp’s candidate for this election, will be the hsp candi-
date. in the spring of 1990, free elections are to be held for the new parliament.
The remaining ambiguities and rivalries
57. The founding congress of the hsp was the work of Nyers. This former 
social democrat, the father of hungarian economic reform,101 who joined the 
communist party at the time of the post-war party merger and who was removed 
from the politburo by Kadar in 1974, managed the 14th hswp congress by elim-
inating extremist tendencies and by endeavouring to strengthen the reformist na-
ture of the party. he forged the compromise among the six founding “platforms” of 
the hsp and endeavoured to avoid any split, contrary to the view of other reformers 
who, like pozsgay, would have preferred a cleaner break with the communists.
58. certain rivalries remain. The ultra reformists are joining the hsp but have 
been sidetracked by the “steering committee”; the “federation of reformists” (20% of 
the congress) brings together pozsgay’s allies who want a clear separation between 
100  in the referendum on November 26, 1989 a small majority of participants said “yes” to the ques-
tion “should the parliamentary elections precede the presidential elections?”
101  rezső Nyers as the secretary for economic policy of the cc of the hungarian socialist workers’ 
party in 1962–1974 was one of the elaborators of the economic reform package called New 
economic mechanism, introduced in 1968.
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conservatives and reformers; the democratic-popular platform (5%) brings together 
the reformist marxists attached to unity and not hostile to Nyers; the “renewal of the 
hswp” (1%) around Grosz and Berecz came out against the hsp and in favour of 
maintaining the hswp; the “Janos Kadar society” remains loyal to “traditional” 
marxist-leninist values and appears to be heading towards the creation of a new hun-
garian communist party. (Kadar’s widow has dissociated herself from the Group.)
59. The founding congress of the hsp recorded in basic documents the radi-
cal changes begun by the former hswp (multiparty system; correction of the his-
torical record; the market economy, human rights) and also marked the break with 
the party-state. in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, however, the 
crucial question is also posed of the new party’s credibility with the hungarian elec-
torate. what success will the hsp have with its members? how many former mem-
bers of the hwsp will rejoin its ranks? what will be the reaction of the hungarian 
nomenklatura? will the new members be adequate in number to give hungarians 
the feeling that they are dealing with a new party? or will the impression persist of 
its being a modern garb for an old and rejected reality?
60. The gamble undertaken by many reformist leaders of the former hswp, and 
by pozsgay in particular, is clear. They intend to gain a certain popularity by bringing 
about and managing far-reaching reforms. A revision of the constitution, voted on 
18th october, established a multiparty system. They hope in this way to come out 
ahead (30%-35% of the votes) in the forthcoming free elections. will they succeed? 
will the people be tempted to react to this failure of communism with a resurgence of 
nationalism (which in hungary took on extreme forms in the past)? what will be the 
relationship between the hsp and the soviet party and the soviet union? The soviet 
press reflects a certain perplexity and emphasises the “change in the nature” of the 
hungarian party and the ambiguities of its action. what will be the reaction of the 
hungarian opposition – splintered as it is – toward the new hsp? will it seek to 
identify the hsp – for electoral reasons – with the former hwsp? or will it, on the 
contrary, see in the hsp a possible partner for a future government coalition?
Viii. BulGAriA: motiVes for the forceD emiGrAtioN
61. The period under review was dominated by the mass emigration of ethnic 
turks.102 Between late may and late August some 317,000 had crossed into turkey. 
The exodus seems to have been prompted initially by the harsh reaction of the Bul-
garian authorities to the action in early may of a number of ethnic turkish civil 
rights groups in campaigning for the restoration of ethnic and cultural rights.
102  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties 
fixing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities” com-
posed of various ethnic groups.]
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62. The regime has drawn heavily on nationalist rhetoric to justify its actions 
against the 1.5 million-strong turkish minority.103 The assimilation campaign is 
only the latest in a series of efforts to create a homogeneous single-nation state.
But the campaign backfired dramatically, serving instead to harden the turks’ 
opposition. marches and hunger strikes took place in the predominantly turkish 
minority areas of North-eastern and southern Bulgaria throughout may.
Demonstrations were put down by force which according to the Bulgarian au-
thorities resulted in 7 people being killed and 28 being injured. The actual death toll 
was probably considerably higher.
63. in late may the authorities began to expel large numbers of turks, some of 
whom were human rights activists and had taken part in the demonstrations, either 
direct to turkey or to transit countries (eg Austria). following Zhivkov’s call to tur-
key to open its borders to all “Bulgarian moslems” who wanted to emigrate, thou-
sands of ethnic turks took advantage of more liberal passport regulations an-
nounced in early may to apply for exit visas. The extraordinary exit procedures, 
which draw on provisions of the newly adopted passport law scheduled to go into 
effect on 1 september, served two purposes for the authorities: propagandistically, 
sofia may now claim that it is fulfilling its csce obligations; and politically, the 
assimilation campaign got a new lease of life – all those who consider themselves 
turks will go to turkey, while those who choose to remain will ipso facto have cho-
sen assimilation.
64. The massive population outflow to turkey has shown the authorities, how-
ever, that their policy of assimilation was rejected by the majority of the turkish 
community in Bulgaria and not only by a handful of activists. it was primarily an 
error in the assessment of the situation by the Bulgarians which led to the exodus of 
more than 310,000 Bulgarians of turkish origin. taken up short by the turkish re-
ply, Bulgaria had no choice but to allow a substantial number of its nationals to 
leave. moreover, the involuntary nature of this exodus is one further demonstration 
of the displeasure of the Bulgarian authorities. until those leaving the country ar-
rived at the border, the Bulgarian authorities did everything in their power to make 
their lives difficult through harassment and repressive measures. it was therefore an 
exodus which was repugnant to the Bulgarian authorities. The outflow was sharply 
reduced in late August when turkey re-introduced a visa requirement, but many 
ethnic turks are continuing to apply to leave. The decision of the turkish govern-
ment was based on the premise that the early signing of an emigration agreement 
with Bulgaria which will both conform to international norms and safeguard the 
property and social rights of the refugees would be possible.
103  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to underline that other western estimates put the number 
of the moslem group in question at about one million.]
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iX. the chANGiNG fAce of politicAl oppositioN  
iN cZechosloVAKiA
65. The base of opposition has broadened considerably in czechoslovakia over the 
past six months. An alliance of sorts between the church, charter 77, and re-emerg-
ing leaders of the prague spring has helped to turn passive dislike of the regime into 
a more active commitment for change. A politicised youth is channelling its energy 
into special interest issues such as the ecology or military service. A new civil socie-
ty, made up of underground publishing, art exhibits, and independent church 
groups, has taken root in that grey zone between open dissent and officialdom. 
however, this opposition is not evolving along lines typical of any other warsaw 
pact country. There is no sign that increasingly bold and widespread dissent is grow-
ing into a mass political movement on the scale of solidarity. in spite of shortages on 
the domestic market, the standard of living is not badly depressed and not so unsat-
isfactory as to bring about the social conditions from which solidarity grew. czech-
oslovak opposition is a blend of elements shaped by long-term historical and social 
trends.
66. charter 77 with at present roughly 1500 subscribers (there are no mem-
bers of, but only subscribers to the so-called “church”) and the “committee for the 
Defence of persecuted innocents” (VoNs),104 of which a few dozen committed 
“chartists” are members, used to be the only opposition groupings worth mention-
ing. since 1987, however, almost 30 additional groups of dissidents have joined 
them. some are “offsprings” of charter 77, but most of them have been set up inde-
pendently of it. The so-called “Jazz section” of the czechoslovak musicians Associ-
ation with its about 5000 members has existed since 1970, it is true, but only since 
1987 has it developed an opposition character, especially by publishing “independ-
ent” literature. in the last year however, the number of “organized” opposition 
members has markedly increased. Now, charter initiatives are receiving a new im-
petus in the form of support from the church and former leaders of the prague 
spring as well as support and advice on the international level from certain former 
polish dissidents who are now official representatives of solidarity. This public con-
cordance of views is greatly enhanced through the use of radio free europe (rfe), 
which the regime stopped jamming late last year.
67. The catholic church has increasingly taken on an active role in support of 
reform. cardinal tomasek publicly condemned the regime’s harsh crackdown on 
demonstrations last January. This came after a petition with 600,000 signatures was 
handed over to the government demanding greater religious freedom. A new-found 
rapprochement of views was demonstrated symbolically by the cardinal’s meetings 
104  see footnote 31.
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with charter 77 spokesmen and Alexander Dubcek, during the week of the cardi-
nal’s ninetieth birthday celebrations last June.
68. The “re-awakening” of the 1968 reform communists has broadened the 
base of opposition. together with other personalities such as Vaclav havel, Dubcek 
is still a well-remembered figure in czechoslovakia. he has helped turn passive sup-
port for change to active commitment among the intelligentsia and formerly purged 
communists. The creation of an opposition group consisting of 1968 reformers 
(“obroda”), with branches throughout czechoslovakia has been an important step 
in opening up an alternative unofficial channel for political action. The past six 
months has witnessed a surprising series of meetings between representatives of the 
purges communists and senior figures of the communist party secretariat. The sec-
retariat has asked for and received proposals for economic and political reform. The 
regime has seemingly concluded that the reform communists might be suitable in-
terlocutors for dialogue, a dialogue Gorbachev is insisting upon in czechoslovakia.
69. The opposition has opened into, and increasingly become confounded 
with, activity in the grey zone between uncompromising dissent and official struc-
tures. Not only independent youth groups, but church activists, samizdat publish-
ing, and the rebirth of the jazz section under the new name of “Art forum” fall into 
this category. so do many members of the Academy of sciences, artists and actors 
who have decided to speak up for reform by signing the latest opposition petition 
(“A few sentences”). At last count, about 30,000 had signed since July, the country’s 
most successful politically oriented petition since the 1960s.
70. The response of the regime to this broadening of opposition has been very 
tentative dialogue, coupled with severe repression of what are deemed unacceptable 
activities. The dividing line seems to be any attack on the leading role of the com-
munist party. repression and sometimes jail sentences are handed out to those who 
promote this in samizdat, petitions, or demonstrations. The regime has come down 
hard on those who use rfe to attack the leading role of the party, or rely on rfe to 
promote petitions or demonstrations. Gross violations of human rights by the re-
gime will thus continue for the foreseeable future, despite its attempt at controlled 
dialogue.
* * *
X. YuGoslAViA: iNter-repuBlicAN riVAlries
71. The efforts of premier Ante marković to synthesise serb-style centralism and 
slovene-style liberalism in pursuit of market reforms are being seriously hampered 
by the economy’s hyper-inflation and serbian president milošević’s bid for ascend-
ancy. The inflation rate is expected to exceed 1500 percent before the end of the 
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year. workers’ strikes, protests by farmers, and widespread consumer discontent are 
putting immense pressure on the government to focus on the symptoms, and not on 
the underlying structural problems. There is an ever-deepening gulf between the 
republics and this could become more dangerous if the system and central control 
continue to weaken.
72. milošević has taken advantage of the disarray in Belgrade to promote his 
own programmes for economic and political reform. earlier this year he reached 
what many thought was his apogee, engineering the enactment of amendments to 
serbia’s constitution which codified the pro-serbian coups d’état in its autonomous 
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.105
73. The quarrel between serbia and slovenia continues and recent develop-
ments in the two republics indicate that a reconciliation is unlikely. milošević for 
his part is trying to impose both his own vision of a united, fundamentally authori-
tarian party, and also serbian dominance on the rest of the federation. The slovenes 
continue to promote their concept of a loose, pluralistic confederation. The lcY 
plenum on 17 may on the Kosovo showed how bitter the serb/slovene division had 
become by then. A subsequent exchange of letters between the two presidencies 
exacerbated the quarrel.
74. slovenia is dissatisfied with its position in the Yugoslav federation. The un-
derlying issue is its relationship with serbia. Although both favour significant eco-
nomic, political, and social reforms, they differ over how to implement them. Ku-
can, president of the slovenian league of communists, has several times suggested 
that if relations within the federation do not improve, then slovenia would have no 
choice but to secede from Yugoslavia. in fact, the constitutional commission of 
the slovenian National Assembly has adopted amendments to the republic’s con-
105  having obtained the leadership of the league of communists of Yugoslavia, milošević declared 
the “antibureaucratic revolution” in 1988. As a part of this movement, as many as tens of thou-
sands of nationalists, transported by bus and train to the scene, demanded the resignation of the 
leadership in Kosovo and Vojvodina. mass demonstrations were held in Novi sad on october 5, 
1988, later called the “Yoghurt revolution” because the demonstrators were throwing boxes of 
yoghurt. on January 10–11, 1989 the “antibureaucratic revolution” reached montenegro too. 
The regional leaders were replaced by milošević’s comrades. Then he asked for permission from 
the federal council of Yugoslavia to end the strike of miners in Kosovo. under this pretext the 
leaders of the communist party (of Albanian origin) in Kosovo were imprisoned and accused of 
counter-revolutionary activity. At the same time the serbian leadership elaborated a proposal to 
suppress the regional autonomy of Kosovo province. on march 28, 1989 the serbian parliament 
accepted the modifications in the constitution, which were centralizing and restrictive in char-
acter, decreasing regional autonomy. This meant that the right of the autonomous region to raise 
“veto” (objection) against the modification of the constitution of the republic was abolished, and 
some rights concerning the legal and executive power were also suppressed. After the implemen-
tation of these changes in the spring of 1989 the Albanians began to protest, but the serbian 
police was deployed. As the new elections were boycotted by the Albanians, milošević’s support-
ers won. he was elected as the president of serbia in may 1989.
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stitution; the most controversial being a clause claiming the right to secession. The 
slovene decision provoked violent controversy at federal and inter-republican lev-
el but unless the slovenes try to implement the right to secede, no real risk of an 
armed forces intervention seems likely. moreover, given slovenia’s important eco-
nomic and political role in Yugoslavia, and its dependency on natural resources in 
serbia, macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia, it seems unlikely that it would break away.
75. The new burst of serb nationalist activism emboldened milošević’s oppo-
nents in croatia and Bosnia. on 8 July, serbs from montenegro and serbia streamed 
into Knin in croatia to augment local serbs in a demonstration at the dedication of 
a serbian monastery. This show of force by pro-milošević forces on croatian terri-
tory rocked the leadership of that republic and led them to join the slovenes in 
protesting attempts at “Great serb homogenization”. Bosnian leaders, fearful of the 
potential of mass action from their own substantial serb minority, joined in. At the 
July 30–31 nationalities plenum, serbs and milošević were the targets of an in-
creased amount of invective, including from the army. macedonia, which has gener-
ally been in milošević’s camp, also took offense at serb attempts to repeal laws fore-
stalling claims by serbs who settled in macedonia in 1920–40 to return to areas 
from which they were forced out during world war ii.
76. The next major battleground for inter-republican disputes is likely to be 
the 14th lcY congress now postponed until January 1990. As a compromise to 
slovenia, the congress will be organised as a regular congress but termed an “ex-
traordinary” one. This reduces the tactical advantages which might otherwise have 
accrued to serbia.
Xi. AlBANiA’s relAtioNs with the cmeA couNtries
77. in september, czechoslovakia and Albania upgraded their diplomatic relations 
to Ambassadorial level. poland remains the only Nswp country which has not yet 
returned its ambassador to tirana, following the break in 1968.106 Despite these 
developments in the diplomatic field, Albania wishes to keep at a minimum its po-
litical relations with warsaw pact countries; it continues to avoid party to party 
contacts with them. however, Albania is willing to expand its economic ties with 
those countries in order to improve its industrial infrastructure without any hard 
currency requirements. on the other hand, there is no indication of a softening of 
Albania’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with the ussr.
78. most notable in Albania’s relations with the other countries of eastern eu-
rope was the visit in June by oskar fischer, the GDr foreign minister. This marked 
the highest level warsaw pact visit since Albania’s 1961 split from moscow. while 
106  on september 12, 1968 Albania abrogated the warsaw pact.
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fischer was in Albania agreements on economic and industrial co-operation were 
signed and also on health. The two countries are aiming at increasing their trade 
volume up to 200 million marks per year. Bulgaria was perhaps second only to the 
GDr overall activities. Normalisation of relations progressed in full swing. Agree-
ment on scientific, economic and technical co-operation is being implemented. De-
spite its unfavourable economic situation, romania has managed with supplies of 
durables and machinery and offers of know-how in oil exploration along with co-op-
eration in agriculture. czechoslovakia remained the number one trade partner.
79. it therefore seems that the Albanian leaders are endeavouring adroitly to 
take advantage of the courtship by the east european countries to normalise their 
relations. The Albanian leaders are not disposed, however, to give up their deeply 
held anti-sovietism. The improvement in relations with the countries of eastern 
europe also constitutes a measure of safety which allows tirana not to depend sole-
ly for its development on western countries, which would place the country in an 
untenable position, at least from an ideological standpoint.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(89)57 (No-
vember 8, 1989).
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c-m(90)11
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
octoBer 1989 to April 1990
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach a report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern 
 europe” forwarded to me by the chairman of the expert working Group which 
met at NAto headquarters from 9–11 April 1990.
2. i would remind you that the report is the responsibility only of those ex-
perts who participated in the working Group.
3. This report will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 16th 
may.
(signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto 
1110 Brussels
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
Note by the chairman of the expert Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
united states met at NAto headquarters from 9th to 11th April 1990 to prepare 
the attached report.
2. This document covers the period 21st october 1989 to 11th April 1990.
(signed) D. i. miller
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i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. in the ussr, the decline of the party and the inability of the legislative organs 
to provide sufficient leadership created a vacuum that Gorbachev intends to fill with 
a strong presidency. The need for a powerful executive is intensified by the unravel-
ling social and economic situation in the country. Growing crime rates, strikes, and 
ethnic clashes have frayed the social fabric of the country. These problems are aggra-
vated by the unfavourable effect of half-hearted economic reforms. Gorbachev 
hopes that strong presidential powers will enable him to deal with these issues more 
effectively. on the other hand, the outcome of the reform process is likely to be at-
tributed to him more directly in the future.
2. The threat of secession by republics and prolonged interethnic strife are 
two of the most dangerous issues facing Gorbachev at the moment. he probably 
hopes to hold off independence moves with delaying tactics in order to buy enough 
time to allow a consensus on the future shape of the soviet union to emerge. if 
lithuania and the other Baltic republics were nevertheless to insist on independ-
ence and take concrete steps to assert sovereignty, this would probably set in train a 
series of unpredictable events. Gorbachev might come under intense pressure to use 
whatever force was necessary to preserve the union.
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3. 1989 saw economic stagnation, growing shortages, the spread of rationing 
to additional urban centers, widespread coal strikes and other work stoppagges 
[stoppages], and a progressive deterioration of the transportation network that 
weakened an already inadequate distribution system. Negative GNp growth is like-
ly in 1990, given current conservative policies and disruptions to economic activity.
4. economic reform has been hobbled by continued and inconclusive debate 
over fundamental issues such as the role of private property in a socialist state as well 
as by an unwillingness to confront the politically charged question of prices and 
subsidies. The government has already decided to speed up the reform programme 
presented by ryzhkov to the congress of people’s Deputies in December, which 
concentrated on stabilisation and economic recovery, with reforms of prices and 
state orders significantly curtailed. This programme would not have eliminated ex-
cess demand in the consumer market, nor put the economy on the path of sustained 
growth and increasing efficiency. meanwhile, the introduction of a package of radi-
cal market-oriented reforms has been deferred.
5. in Poland, the new government led by mazowiecki has succeeded in estab-
lishing its credibility both at home and abroad over the last six months. The initial 
results of the economic austerity programme which began on 1 January brought 
some encouragement. however, public patience will not be limitless with unem-
ployment likely to rise by one million in 1990. The government has kept the initia-
tive in the area of political reform with the intention of fundamentally changing the 
political system. The local elections in may will restore representative government 
to regional and local levels, eliminating the lingering influence of the nomenklatura. 
General elections planned for 1992/93 may be brought forward to the end of this 
year or early 1991 and accompanied by a presidential election. in its foreign policy, 
poland is turning increasingly towards the west, while redefining its relationship 
with the soviet union.
6. in Czechoslovakia, the collapse of communist rule was rapid. for the imme-
diate future attention is centred on preparation both for free elections (8 June) and 
for moving towards a market economy with the introduction of private ownership 
and foreign capital. The outcome of the elections is likely to be a coalition govern-
ment along the lines of electoral alliances. The czech–slovak relationship and the 
problem of ethnic minorities will require delicate handling. in the foreign affairs 
field, the basic theme is the need to open up to the rest of the world and to overcome 
the division of europe.
7. in Hungary, the transition to parliamentary democracy passed a milestone 
with its two-round, free parliamentary elections. The center-right hungarian Dem-
ocratic forum won a substantial victory over its nearest rival, the liberal Alliance of 
free Democrats. The hungarian socialist party (the former communist party) 
fared badly. An austerity programme was introduced in December, but hungary 
126
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
faces difficult years ahead, with reduced living standards and unemployment bound 
to rise. The hungarians stress the need for foreign economic support to underpin 
the new democracy and a market economy. in their foreign relations, there is no 
doubt that they will increasingly turn towards the west.
8. in Romania, the December revolution of 1989 finally overthrew ceauses-
cu’s dictatorship. however the new government’s members have virtually all come 
from the ranks of the former regime. elements of the old bureaucracy remained in-
tact. The formation of the provisional council of National unity has defused some 
contentious issues, but has not redressed the basic imbalance between the National 
salvation front and the welter of new parties. it is hoped that the elections on 20 
may may provide the stability that the political situation needs. even so romania 
will need a leader who will not appear compromised by the old regime and who will 
have the ability to maintain objectivity during fierce political debate. romania has 
set out to improve its foreign relations and has reaffirmed its international commit-
ments, including that to the csce.
9. in Bulgaria, the reformist group that forced out todor Zhivkov in Novem-
ber 1989, aimed to save the communist party from the fate of those of poland, hun-
gary and east Germany. The new leadership has declared its intention to build a 
law-based democratic state, meeting the highest international standards. The party’s 
leading role has been removed from the constitution; multi-party elections will 
take place in June; the party is engaged in regular round tables with the opposition. 
in the field of human rights, civil and religious rights of the turkish minority have 
been officially restored,107 but practices are still far from reflecting the new laws and 
regulations. in the absence of a more cohesive and effective opposition, the Bsp 
(formerly the Bcp) still seems likely to emerge as the biggest single party from the 
elections.
10. Yugoslavia continues in its efforts to conduct economic reforms and intro-
duce potentially far-reaching political changes. with the bulk of the federal Gov-
ernment’s economic reform in place, early in 1990 markovic introduced constitu-
tional amendments to institute secret, democratic multi-party elections. political 
parties are springing up. many of them are based on one republic and are strongly 
nationalist. in slovenia and croatia center-right or right-wing coalitions and parties 
are likely to emerge.
11. in Albania, reports of demonstrations and general unrest in January were 
not confirmed. At the 9th plenum of the party on 22–23 January, ramiz Alia put 
forward a number of economic reforms and called for further decentralisation. Al-
bania has shown further interest in widening its external relations. Despite these 
developments, rapid changes within the country are not to be expected.
107  [The Greek expert deemed it necessary to note that the term used in the international treaties 
fixing the Bulgarian obligations on the matter and reflecting reality is “moslem minorities”.]
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ii. soViet uNioN: the New presiDeNcY
12. on 15 march, Gorbachev was elected to the new post of president of the ussr. 
The move marks a fundamental shift in the power structure of the soviet union, 
along with the party’s relinquishment of its constitutionally enshrined leading role.
13. last october, Gorbachev was arguing that an executive presidency would 
detract from the authority of the soviets. But by December or January, he had 
changed his mind – something for which politburo member Yakovlev is claiming 
credit. having done so, Gorbachev moved fast. he launched the proposal for an 
executive presidency at the central committee plenum on 5 february, and a week 
later pressed for an emergency session of the congress of people’s Deputies to pass 
the necessary constitutional amendments. when on 14 february the supreme so-
viet declined to summon the congress without sight of the proposed legislation, 
Gorbachev produced a draft, gave the supreme soviet one day to debate it and one 
week for committees to consider it, and secured agreement to the start of the con-
gress on 12 march, just two weeks later than he had originally intended.
14. it is not known for sure what caused Gorbachev to change his mind, or 
why he acted in such haste. he and his supporters have offered two main lines of 
argument. The first was that a strong presidency was urgently needed in order deci-
sively to defend and advance perestroika in the face of growing economic crisis, po-
litical instability, crime, ethnic and nationalist unrest. Gorbachev’s frustration over 
delays in introducing a state of emergency in Baku in January reportedly contribut-
ed to his decision. signs in January of “people power” in the slav heartland, perhaps 
conjuring spectres of an east european-style “revolution from below”, may also have 
acted as a spur.
15. But these considerations were probably secondary to the other line of argu-
ment: namely, that in transferring political power to elected state institutions, a 
stronger executive was needed to avoid a power vacuum as the party began to lose 
its authority. for Gorbachev personally, this must have been at least as urgent as the 
need to gain control of the country’s accumulating crises. well in advance of the 
28th party congress (now due to begin on 2 July), he needed a new power base that 
would distance him from the consequences of any split within the cpsu or its 
collapse or conversion into a parliamentary party within a multi-party system.
16. Because of the haste, the atmosphere of emergency and the rough manner 
in which Gorbachev forced through the legislation, strong fears were aroused that 
the presidency was being given excessive powers. Although many radicals supported 
the principle of a constitutional presidency, they were particularly concerned that 
the president in his first term was not going to be elected by popular vote. repre-
sentatives of republics were inclined to argue that the presidency should not be in-
stituted until the relationship between the union and the republics had been sorted 
128
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
out. They were alarmed at the president’s powers to introduce states of emergency. 
This worry caused the lithuanians to rush through their declaration of independ-
ence on 11 march. however, the vote in the congress of people’s Deputies on 13 
march was overwhelmingly in favour of the principle of the presidency, partly no 
doubt because some concessions to the concerns of radicals and nationalists were on 
offer. Drafting changes were made more difficult by Gorbachev’s procedural trick in 
having the draft legislation first voted into the constitution, thus requiring two 
thirds rather than simple majorities to amend it.
17. The president undoubtedly has considerable powers. But in the soviet con-
text, one of the most important features of the new legislation is that the powers of, 
and constraints on, the country’s leader are defined for the first time. No formal 
powers at all were vested in the party’s General secretary. hence the efforts of suc-
cessive General secretaries to accumulate powers – and in stalin’s case, dictatorial 
ones. The legislation also imposes a clear limit on the leader’s tenure and provides 
for an orderly succession, from now on through a process of universal suffrage.
18. The new president must operate within a constitutional system of checks 
and balances that assigns considerable powers to the legislature and to a form of 
constitutional court (the committee for supervision of the constitution). for ex-
ample, the president cannot dissolve the congress of people’s Deputies; and can 
dissolve the supreme soviet only if its two chambers fall out irreconcilably between 
themselves. he cannot prevent either body from meeting in regular or extraordi-
nary session. like the us president, his veto on legislation can be overridden by a 
two thirds majority in each of the supreme soviet’s two chambers. he depends on 
majority votes of the supreme soviet and/or congress for his appointment of the 
chairman of the council of ministers, the council of ministers and individual 
Government ministers. equally, he cannot dismiss the chairman of the council of 
ministers, or its members without the legislature’s approval. he has no formal say 
over the composition of the committee for supervision of the constitution. he 
cannot declare war unless the country is attacked and cannot introduce martial law, 
a state of emergency or presidential rule union-wide without the subsequent ap-
proval of the supreme soviet.
19. more intangibly, the president has to work within the framework of su-
preme soviet legislation. his decrees must be “on the basis of and in execution of 
the soviet constitution and laws”. while the supreme soviet has no formal powers 
to annul his decrees, it can by majority vote get the committee for supervision of 
the constitution to rule on their constitutionality or legality. it can also legislate in 
a contrary sense (at which point the presidential decree would by implication lose 
its validity); while the congress can at any time by a two thirds majority amend the 
constitution, including the president’s powers.
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20. The president can be removed for violation of the constitution or laws, in 
the light of the findings of the committee for supervision of the constitution, by a 
two thirds majority of the congress. This provision could prove to be quite a catch-
all: an unpopular president would need to be scrupulous in being seen to be observ-
ing the constitution. he would also have to bear in mind that for election to a sec-
ond term he requires not only a majority of the total vote but also a victory in a 
majority of republics.
21. The president is to be advised by two completely new bodies. one is the 
federation council, which is to examine nationalities policy, inter-ethnic disputes 
and the co-ordination of the activity of republics. it is chaired by the president, but 
the highest state officials of the 15 union republics sit on it ex officio. Although the 
president can in principle ignore a majority in the federation council, he probably 
could not in practice do so for long without provoking a conflict between the centre 
and the republics. on the second body, the presidential council, only the prime 
minister sits ex officio. The chairman of the ussr supreme soviet has the right to 
participate. other members are appointed by the president, who chairs the coun-
cil. in practice, the council is likely to function as a cabinet and National security 
council, into which the advice of the Government will be channeled.
22. The country will thus be administered by the president and the council of 
ministers (under its chairman). Their instruments are a potentially conflicting mix 
including legislation (in supposedly creative tension with the supreme soviet), 
presidential decree, and resolutions and orders of the council of ministers. The in-
tention is that the centre’s decisions will be implemented by the republican Govern-
ments and local authorities. it is presumably hoped that compliance will be facilitat-
ed by the presence of the top republican leaders in the federation council, by the 
provision for joint meetings of the federation and presidential councils, by the 
mechanism whereby republican constitutions and legislation are to be aligned with 
those of the centre, and by the participation of representatives of all the republics 
and lesser territories in the legislature.
23. The soviet presidency includes elements borrowed from the french and 
us constitutions (and in the case of presidential rule, the indian). The powers as-
signed to the soviet president do not appear excessive and on paper there are ade-
quate checks and balances. But as soviet opponents of the presidency have pointed 
out, the danger is that given the lack of democratic tradition or “political culture” in 
the soviet union, and against the background of growing economic difficulties and 
political unrest, old habits could prevail and the limits and controls fail to function. 
Nonetheless the introduction of the presidency represents a major step towards the 
separation of party and state and the establishment, for the first time in soviet his-
tory, of a legal, constitutional basis for political power. The shift of policy and deci-
sion making to the president and his advisory bodies should deprive the politburo 
130
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
of the political power it has hitherto wielded. Although new laws aimed at guaran-
teeing the independence of the judiciary have been enacted, their implementation 
in practice has not yet been fully tested. The relation between the judiciary and the 
presidency is yet to be clearly established.
24. The presidency will make Gorbachev’s position secure and his policies in-
dependent of the apparatus and the highest organs of the party (although it was the 
party central committee which nominated him for the presidency). it is more 
doubtful if presidential power will be politically effective and contribute signifi-
cantly towards solving the soviet union’s current problems. for all the formal pow-
ers Gorbachev has received, it is by no means certain that he will have the greater 
authority necessary to settle conflicts or impose unpopular economic measures. he 
has no popular mandate (and received only a narrow majority from the congress 
itself ) and with the party’s authority in sharp decline he lacks sufficient political 
base or legitimacy. he will moreover now bear direct personal responsibility for 
policy failings, especially in the economy and is thus likely to become increasingly 
the target for popular discontent. There is no new local structure of power to imple-
ment his policies and some of the republics (including the supreme soviet of the 
rsfsr) could vote themselves the power to ignore presidential decrees or elect 
their own presidents with powers conflicting with those of the ussr president 
(three republics, Kazakhstan, Georgia and moldavia have already indicated an in-
tention to elect presidents). Gorbachev could hold all the formal levels of power but 
find that little happens when he pulls them, unless he is prepared to resort to emer-
gency powers and use force.
iii. the cpsu: whAt leADiNG role?
25. The draft cpsu platform for the 28th congress, published in the soviet press on 
13 february, contains unambiguous formulations on the abandonment of the party’s 
constitutional leading role and its monopoly of political power. The revised version of 
Article 6 of the constitution adopted at the extraordinary Third congress of people’s 
Deputies on 14 march drops the reference to the cpsu’s role as the “leading and di-
recting force of soviet society and the nucleus of the political system”; it now states 
that the cpsu and “other political parties” participate in formulating the policy of 
the soviet state and the administration of public affairs. The reference to the party’s 
leading role has also been removed from the preamble to the constitution, while Ar-
ticle 51 now refers to the right of soviet citizens to form political parties. The funda-
mental revision of Article 6 not only signals the transfer of real political power from 
the party to elective state institutions; it also logically implies the withdrawal of the 
party from its ubiquitous controlling presence within all public and state organisa-
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tions, the eventual withering away of the nomenklatura system and the end of the role 
of marxism-leninism as the state ideology.
26. The institution of the ussr presidency provides a mechanism for the 
transfer of political decision-making power from the party to the state at the top 
level. The president will be directly accountable to the electorate and to the con-
gress of people’s Deputies, not to the politburo (to be renamed presidium and con-
fined to cpsu affairs). The former Article 6 not only referred to the leading role of 
the party and its determination of foreign and domestic policy, but also described it 
as the “nucleus of the political system and of state and public organisations”. There 
are party committees in every ministry, factory, state farm, scientific and education-
al establishment and newspaper, to say nothing of the Armed forces, the KGB and 
the mVD. if the party is really to abandon its “privileged status” and “political mo-
nopolism”, it follows logically that the party should withdraw its organisations from 
state and public institutions and disentangle itself from the state and economic ad-
ministration at every level. similarly the whole system of party control over the 
Armed forces should fall away. however, the head of the political Administration 
of the Armed forces has warned against any attempt to disband political organs, 
while conceding that their function could be changed in the direction of providing 
political education.
27. The unravelling of the party from the fabric of the system which is the log-
ical consequence of abandoning Article 6 will have enormous and very painful im-
plications for the cpsu. it is doubtful if many in the party have fully digested those 
implications and will be willing to accept them. But with the party in retreat there 
will be strong radical pressure to follow through.
28.  There is no language in the draft cpsu platform or in the amended con-
stitution restricting new parties to those which profess socialism or support the ex-
isting socialist system, although Yakovlev has implied that new parties would have 
to stand “on the platform of the socialist choice”. in the event the only caveat in the 
platform is: “the formation and activity of organisations and movements which ex-
pound violence and inter-ethnic strife and pursue extremist and unconstitutional 
aims should be prohibited by law”. The amended constitution (Article 7) prohibits 
parties which advocate forcibly changing the constitutional system and the integrity 
of the socialist state, undermining its security or stirring up social, ethnic or reli-
gious strife.
29. The central committee plenum has accepted the most contentious as-
pect of party reform defining the relationship of the cpsu to the state and soci-
ety and its monopoly of political power; but the draft platform is much more 
cautious on the other major aspect – the democratisation of the party itself, nota-
bly democratic centralism and the ban on fractions. The draft admits the need for 
“rethinking the principle of democratic centralism” and calls for the party rules 
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to guarantee pluralism of opinions, freedom of criticism, various approaches and 
platforms... the minority’s right to uphold its views”. But it also states that the re-
newal of the principle of democratic centralism should “ensure democratic unity 
of party ranks and prevent the formation of fractions with their own internal or-
ganisation and discipline”. it appears that on these issues the views of ligachev 
prevailed. he declared in his speech at the plenum that although the principle of 
democratic centralism needed to be reconsidered, he “opposed the party’s trans-
formation into an amorphous organisation or a political club”. eltsin, the only 
central committee member to vote against the draft platform, explained that he 
had done so because the draft failed to include radical provisions which he had 
proposed, notably on lifting the ban on fractions and abolishing the principle of 
democratic centralism. At the march plenum, Gorbachev took a distinctly cau-
tious line on party reform. he referred to the cpsu as “the ruling party”, rejected 
the idea of changing its name, converting it into a parliamentary-type party or 
organising it strictly on a territorial basis. he appeared to rule out permitting 
fractions in the party and he bowed to the views of those who wish to retain the 
term “democratic centralism” in the party rules.
30. The ban on formal fractions is the key issue of internal party reform. only 
by permitting fractions can the cpsu develop real political activity within its own 
ranks so as to compete with other political movements. to preserve its spurious 
unity at the price of compromise with the conservatives, would condemn the party 
to be sidelined in due course. indeed the platform appears to admit this in acknowl-
edging that if it does not change, the party is “threatened with being driven to the 
sidelines of political life”. it is true that legalised fractions would eventually lead to a 
split in the party; but at least that might permit a reformist wing to preserve consid-
erable power while claiming the cpsu inheritance (and material resources).
iV. the BAltic stAtes
31. re-assertion of the pre-1940 independence of the Baltic states is high on the po-
litical agenda of each of them and, in consequence, current relations with moscow are 
very much in a state of flux. Gorbachev’s offer of greatly-increased autonomy within a 
much looser federation and a new treaty of union are no longer regarded as attractive 
enough to most Balts; even a proportion of the non-native inhabitants of the region 
are evidently prepared to back separatist aspirations. Baltic resolve has inevitably been 
strengthened by the perception – backed by public statements from members of the 
soviet leadership – that force would not be used and the acceptance in principle that 
secession is possible. Nevertheless military movements and the introduction of eco-
nomic sanctions featured in moscow’s war of nerves following lithuania’s refusal to 
renounce its reaffirmation of independence on 11 march.
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32. under the pressure of events in the Baltic states and elsewhere in the sovi-
et union, Gorbachev has been forced to accept a differentiated system of federal 
ties. A machinery for secession has been established for the union republics and 
adopted by the supreme soviet on 3 April. however, the new legislation will not 
satisfy separatists because of its built-in delaying elements: in order for the secession 
vote to be valid, at least two-thirds of the citizens permanently resident in the re-
public have to take part and two-thirds of the voters have to support secession; the 
result is referred to the ussr supreme soviet and congress of people’s Deputies 
who will take a preliminary decision; a transitional period of 5 years is established 
for the resolution of security, financial and other issues; any final decision is to be 
confirmed by resolution of the congress of people’s Deputies.
33. Apart from the legal issues, there are others which will prove difficult to 
resolve, both locally (the problem of anxious minorities) and between moscow and 
the Baltic states. in the latter category, territorial, economic and military issues will 
predominate. shortly before lithuania’s attempt to reassert independence, Gor-
bachev raised the issue of some border areas which it had originally been planned to 
leave in Belorussia. Gorbachev also pointed out that there had never been a formal 
recognition that the port of Klaipeda and the surrounding area had been handed 
back to lithuania (there had been a prehistory of lithuanian–German difficulties 
over this region).108 estonians and latvians will doubtless have views on those bor-
der regions of their territory, mainly inhabited by russians, which were included in 
the rsfsr in 1944. There have been calls for autonomy in areas of compact polish 
settlement in lithuania and russian settlement in estonia. Another important ter-
ritorial issue concerns the Kaliningrad region of the rsfsr109 which contains an 
important naval base and is cut off from the rest of the soviet union by lithuania. 
There have already been indications of nervousness on the part of its largely russian 
population. The soviet military is concerned about access to its base.
34. Gorbachev and others have tried to frighten the lithuanians with talk 
about economic obligations to the ussr and the prospect of paying off at least a 
proportion of its alleged indebtedness in hard currency. even after regional self-man-
agement for the three Baltic republics came into effect at the beginning of 1990, 
most of their industry continued to be run from moscow. The process of disengag-
108  Klaipėda (in German: memel) is a port in lithuania. it was the capital of the historical memelland 
and in 1807–1808 the capital of prussia too. until the peace treaty of Versailles the town and its 
environs were part of Germany, then after the 1923 revolt in the interwar period it became an au-
tonomous region with a German majority within lithuania. Nazi Germany gained it back in march 
1939 through an ultimatum, and finally the area was attached to the soviet union after wwii.
109  The Kaliningrad region was occupied in the thirteenth century by the teutonic order, then 
became part of prussia in the seventeenth century. its capital was called Königsberg until 1946 as 
the administrative center of east prussia, inhabited by Germans. in 1945 the northern part 
(15,100 km²) was attached to the soviet union, within the russian sfsr.
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ing from the soviet system will obviously have to be done over a lengthy period. At 
present little output is exported to the west. The major Baltic concern is obviously 
over supplies of fuel and the price to be paid for it. There is a heavy dependence on 
supplies of energy and raw materials from the rsfsr.
35. Naturally the Baltic states are preparing economic counter-claims. At the 
end of last year, for example, the estonian people’s front110 and the estonian Govern-
ment’s planning committee set out to analyse economic and political relations be-
tween estonia and the ussr since the 1920s. Among the economic subjects to be 
explored were: the expropriation of property in 1940–41; estonia’s share in wartime 
damage reparations; murder, deportation and enforced emigration with the resulting 
deterioration in socio-economic potential etc. Baltic leaders will certainly wish to 
avoid a complete break with the soviet market while for its part the soviet union will 
continue to want access to Baltic industries (more than 150 articles are said to be man-
ufactured only in lithuania, for example) and food deliveries from the Baltic repub-
lics to industrial areas in the rsfsr.
36. The Baltic area is regarded as a key one for defence, as Gorbachev has himself 
pointed out more than once. Balts see locally based servicemen as an occupation force. 
There are increasing problems over conscription, with refusals to serve in the soviet 
forces or desertions from them, with failures to prosecute by the Baltic authorities. 
This has prompted the soviet Army to arrest some of the deserters in lithuania with-
in moscow’s general campaign of intimidation. lativia and estonia have passed legis-
lation providing for alternatives to military service. The Balts may be prepared to ne-
gotiate the lease of bases. They would obviously not wish to see concentrations of 
ground forces, but the region’s chief value to the soviet military is for air defence.
37. one cannot predict with accuracy the course of events as laws enacted by 
the Baltic states increasingly clash with all-union legislation. The Baltic peoples are 
resolutely committed to the pursuit of independence, at as fast a pace as the system 
will allow. moscow seems committed to slowing down or derailing those efforts. 
however, all parties likely realise that violent confrontation would set back not only 
the course of reform in the soviet union, but could have wider implications for the 
future of east–west relations.
V. polAND
38. The new government led by mazowiecki has succeeded in establishing its cred-
ibility both at home and abroad over the last six months. The government has initi-
ated extensive economic and political reform. it opted for radical policies of stabili-
zation and liberalization which reflect the liberal convictions of the team around 
110  see footnote 42.
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the minister of finance, Balcerowicz, and are intended to control inflation and 
transform the economy in the shortest possible time. The pace and extent of eco-
nomic reform are likely to be subjected to increasing criticism both from opposition 
parties and from within solidarity if results are not forthcoming quickly.
39. initial results of the economic programme which began on 1 January 1990 
brought some encouragement: the currency was stabilized and restrictions on the 
amount of currency which may be exchanged have been eased; public support for 
the government has remained unshaken despite a drop in real wages in January of 
about 40 per cent; inflation has begun to slow; in february the imf111 gave strong 
approval to the programme which was a pre-condition for debt rescheduling. how-
ever, it is far from certain that the government will be able to achieve its objective of 
slow growth by the latter half of this year. public patience will not be limitless with 
unemployment likely to rise by an estimated one milion [million] in 1990. under 
the strain of deteriorating living standards, the first inclination of polish workers 
will be to protect themselves and their families by seeking higher wages. Neverthe-
less, the obvious lack of popular identification with the communist regime, com-
bined with widely shared “national” aspirations and a sense that a complete overhaul 
of the despised system is now possible, is serving to increase popular tolerance for 
austerity.
40. solidarity has maintained its unity despite relations between the political 
and union wings being placed under strain. The absence of a credible alternative has 
helped. The old parties are attempting to redefine their roles and new parties have 
still to establish themselves. The communist party (pZpr) dissolved itself on 27 
January, setting up a new party, social Democracy of the polish republic, headed by 
Kwasniewski, a moderate reformer. public support is low and the new party’s stand-
ing has not been helped by the debate over party assets. A splinter group of more 
radical reformers under fiszbach formed a breakaway party, the social Democratic 
union. The most serious immediate challenge to the government’s economic poli-
cies comes from the farmers’ lobbies. The continuing rise in agricultural input prices 
as food prices stabilise is causing discontent. farmers’ lobbies in the sejm are now 
uniting to call for the reintroduction of agricultural subsidies. if farmers withhold 
their produce from the market the government may have to revise its policies.
41. The government has kept the initiative in the area of political reform with 
the intention of fundamentally changing the political system. The depoliticisation 
of the armed forces continues. proposals have been introduced to remove party or-
gans from the work place and from administrative bodies. The legal system and se-
curity services are to be overhauled. The Government has also proposed the aboli-
tion of the office of censor and amendments to the press and publication laws. local 
111  see footnote 9.
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government elections have been brought forward from June to may 1990. These 
elections will restore representative government to regional and local levels, finally 
eliminating the stranglehold of the nomenklatura and building greater popular par-
ticipation in local politics. Although national elections are not due until 1992/93, 
they may be brought forward to the end of this year or early 1991 and accompanied 
by a presidential election. walesa has declared himself as a future presidential candi-
date. A genuine way of democratic change is now well underway in poland. But 
much will depend on the efficient use of political and economic support granted to 
poland by the west.
42. in its foreign policy, poland is turning increasingly towards the west, while 
redefining its relationship with the soviet union. The mazowiecki government has 
profoundly changed poland’s attitude towards Germany. it supports German unifi-
cation and is in favour of NAto membership of a unified Germany. foreign min-
ister skubiszewski has spoken of a “community of interest” between poland and 
Germany which would be dependent on the definitive recognition by a unified Ger-
many of poland’s western border. Good relations have been established with the 
new regimes in hungary and czechoslovakia and prospects for co-operation are 
reasonably good. mazowiecki has reiterated assurances that poland would honour 
its commitments towards the warsaw treaty organisation though the government 
has also indicated that poland hopes to redefine those commitments and “restruc-
ture” the warsaw pact and economic relations within cmeA.
Vi. cZechosloVAKiA
43. The collapse of communist rule in czechoslovakia was rapid. malaise had been 
growing in czechoslovakia throughout 1989 with increasing signs of opposition 
from the dissidents, the public, the cultural and intellectual establishments and 
from within the party itself. The influence of external events – the collapse of com-
munist authority in poland (followed by hungary and the GDr), the bloodshed in 
china in June112 and soviet pressure for radical change – highlighted the conflicts 
in the party. public reaction to the brutal police supression [suppression] of the 
student demonstration on 17 November caused turmoil in the party leadership 
which quickly reversed its policy, thus encouraging an enormous growth in public 
protest. events moved quickly. The party leadership changed twice, with the liberal 
wing rapidly gaining control under first urbanek, then Adamec. This new leader-
ship yielded power in a system of round table negotiations in which the dominating 
112  on June 4, 1989 at tienanmen (heavenly peace) square in Beijing, military forces including 
tanks attacked a protesting crowd of 100,000, mainly composed of students, on the order of the 
chinese communist leaders. estimates spoke of 3600 dead and 60,000 wounded.
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role was taken by civic forum.113 A parallel development took place in slovakia 
involving an organisation called the public Against Violence (pAV)114 and the slo-
vak communist party. By the end of the year the communist party had lost the 
constitutional guarantee of its leading role. Vaclav havel, the dissident writer, who 
was clearly as surprised as the party leadership by the success of the rebellion, was 
elected president of republic. for the immediate future attention is centred on 
preparation both for free elections in June and for moving towards a market econo-
my with the introduction of private ownership and foreign capital. in both the po-
litical and economic fields, civic forum is concerned to maintain the idea of a state 
based on the rule of law. As a consequence it insists on changes in the law as a step 
towards democratisation.
44. After the resignation or removal of communists and a few members of oth-
er parties, the federal Assembly of 350 members now has 138 communists, 152 
independents and over 50 members of other parties. communist representation in 
the czech and slovak legislatures has also been cut. in the federal Government of 
22 there are only 4 communist ministers. while one of these is the minister of Na-
tional Defence, he has the confidence of civic forum. more importantly, security is 
in the hands of a non-communist minister of the interior. The communists are oth-
erwise left with technical ministries (energy, trade, transport) and the decisive voice 
in economic policy belongs to independent ex-communists. in the czech and slo-
vak governments, communists have just under half of the portfolios. The secret po-
lice (stB) has been cut and its internal operations have been curtailed. The party has 
been removed from the army, the police and security forces, from the judiciary and 
from education. local civic forum and pAV organisations are pursuing, with dif-
fering degrees of vigour, the removal of communists from posts of influence in local 
administration, industry and other walks of life.
45. The electoral rules for the June balloting permit a proliferation of parties in 
the new parliament. Delegates will be elected by proportional representation in 
twelve electoral districts, with a five percent threshold needed to gain a seat. parties 
may register with a minimal number of signatures, and red tape has been cut to as-
sure maximum grassroots participation. close to 40 parties, plus the civic forum 
“movement”, have now qualified for the elections. civic forum and pAV are likely 
to poll heavily but a significant number of the electorate will probably vote for can-
didates they trust, irrespective of party allegiance (although communists are unlike-
ly to prove popular). civic forum (and pAV) still see themselves rather as the mid-
113  civic forum was a political movement in the czech parts of czechoslovakia established during 
the “Velvet revolution” in 1989. its goal was to unify the czech opposition and overthrow the 
communist regime. Václav havel was its founding leader.
114  public Against Violence (VpN) was a political movement established on November 19, 1989 in 
Bratislava. it played the role of the civic forum in the czech lands.
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wives of democracy than as formal political parties. Their aim is to help new parties 
establish themselves and to support candidates from among them in the forthcom-
ing elections. civic forum hope that electoral alliances, if not outright mergers, will 
reduce the number of parties and introduce more coherence into the electoral pro-
cess. The outcome of the elections is likely to be a coalition government along the 
lines of electoral alliances, with civic forum having a dominant voice. it is also 
possible that policy will be determined by round table discussions among the larger 
parties in parliament along the lines of the present round table system.
46. one issue ripe for this kind of treatment is economic reform. There are few 
major differences of principle on such matters as introducing market forces, the pri-
vate sector, foreign capital and currency convertibility, but in practice the speed and 
the extent of their introduction is already causing controversy: Vaclav Klaus, the 
radical minister of finance, is an advocate of more rapid change than Valtr Komárek 
the Deputy prime minister chiefly responsible for economic affairs or the prime 
minister, marian calfa. There are also likely to be deep divisions over private enter-
prise with some reformers advocating the privatisation of state enterprises and oth-
ers restricting the private sector, initially at least, to the setting up of new businesses. 
The extent of foreign ownership is also likely to prove controversial. There is general 
agreement that czechoslovakia should not borrow heavily and policy in this area 
will probably be prudent. This has led to the conclusion that czechoslovakia is in 
better shape to move towards a market than the other east european countries. The 
passage to a market economy will not be smooth, however. while many people will 
welcome the chance to set up their own businesses, their reaction is not necessarily 
typical. The reaction of the labour force, once reform begins to hurt, as it inevitably 
will, is also unpredictable.
47. in the political field the czech–slovak relationship and the problem of 
ethnic minorities, particularly the hungarians, will require delicate handling. A 
new constitution to handle these issues will be one of the important tasks of the new 
legislature after the elections. Growing nationalism among the slovaks and the 
heightened awareness of their own identity among the moravians seem likely to 
produce pressure for a greater devolution of powers to the czech and slovak repub-
lics than under the present federal arrangement. The two republics will presumably 
have their own separate constitutions. here again much hard bargaining of the 
round table kind may be necessary.
48. in the foreign affairs field, the basic theme is the need to open up to the 
rest of the world and to overcome the division of europe (which left czechoslo-
vakia on the wrong side of the divide). The new government accepts that this will 
be a long-term process. The aim is to achieve membership of european organisa-
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tions (the ec,115 the council of europe116) and to redefine the relationship with 
the soviet union.
meanwhile havel’s priority has been to put relations with neighbouring coun-
tries on a new footing. The czechoslovaks are reluctant to join any close-knit re-
gional grouping and the old idea of a czechoslovak–polish confederation was re-
jected. But the Bratislava meeting of 9 April reflected czechoslovakia’s interest in 
some form of regional co-operation with poland and hungary. moreover, czecho-
slovakia has recently joined the quadrangular initiative, involving italy, Yugoslavia, 
hungary and Austria.117 havel’s first foreign visit as president was to Germany. re-
lations with Austria have improved considerably. There are still, however, problems 
with hungary – namely the question of hungarian minority rights and of the Dan-
ube Barrage scheme which is under review.
49. The czechoslovaks have pressed the soviet union hard for concessions in 
their relationship. The soviet denunciation of the 1968 invasion118 has helped. The 
czechoslovaks have obtained soviet agreement to withdraw all their troops by 30 
June 1991; the first stage began on 26 february and will be completed by 30 may. 
The czechoslovaks have stated their intention to remain within the warsaw pact 
but they clearly see this as a contribution to an orderly process of negotiating it and 
NAto out of existence. They have revealed considerable impatience with cmeA 
and there were signs that finance minister Klaus at least would like to take czech-
oslovakia out of it. The czechoslovaks are pressing for radical reform of the organi-
sation. They were particularly critical of its exchange rate mechanisms which they 
saw as an impediment to convertibility. The federal government has now decided to 
withdraw from the cmeA agreement adjusting exchange rate co-efficience, switch-
ing to bilateral arrangements. Nevertheless the trade links with the cmeA, particu-
larly with the soviet union, will remain important to czechoslovakia for a long 
time and czechoslovak determination to change the system will not be enough on 
its own to produce radical reform of the organisation.
115  see footnote 6.
116  council of europe: regional international organization established in 1949. its goal was to pro-
tect basic human rights, to settle debated question in negotiations, etc. it accepted the european 
convention on human rights in 1950. meets in strasbourg, france.
117  Quadragonale is an intergovernmental organization of four states: Austria, Yugoslavia, hungary 
and italy established on November 11, 1989 in Budapest. The founders wanted to overcome the 
fractures in the region generated by the cold war by initiating cooperation between these coun-
tries of different political systems and economic structures. see footnote 135.
118  on August 20–1, 1968 the troops of Bulgaria, poland, hungary, and the soviet union, in order 
to hinder the development of the reform process, occupied czechoslovakia.
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Vii. huNGArY
50. hungary’s transition to parliamentary democracy passed a milestone with its 
two-round, free parliamentary elections on 25 march and 8 April, the first 
open-ended contest in over four decades. The center-right hungarian Democratic 
forum won a substantial victory over its nearest rival, the liberal hungarian Alli-
ance for Democrats. The hungarian socialist party (the former communist party) 
fared badly.
51. The elections have taken place against the backdrop of very real economic 
problems. The country has a very high level of debt (at $20bn) and is looking for 
help in servicing it from both the imf and the european community. former 
prime minister Nemeth managed to squeeze an austerity programme through par-
liament in December but hungary faces difficult years ahead, with reduced living 
standards and unemployment bound to rise. The hungarians stress the need for 
western economic support to underpin the new democracy and a market economy. 
The new government may adopt policies aimed at encouraging foreign and domes-
tic private capital. The pace of restructuring and privatisation will have to be decid-
ed among the coalition partners.
52. Before the elections, the respective electoral platforms of the Democratic 
forum and the rival free Democrats were far closer than their rhetoric would have 
suggested. while the free Democrats were pushing for faster economic restructur-
ing, the forum favoured a somewhat slower implementation, a tighter social safe-
ty-net, and more extensive replacement of the nomenklatura, in order to mitigate 
social backlash. from the popular perspective, failure by the new government to 
tackle the nomenklatura issue would threaten the credibility of any economic re-
structuring, at least until ordinary workers also begin to enjoy the benefits of the 
post-communist system.
53. The beleaguered Nemeth government in December introduced a strict li-
censing system to reduce exports to cmeA partners (primarily the ussr), re-
sponding to an imf demand that the surplus on quasi-barter trade be phased out as 
a drain on the economic and a source of inflation. hungary’s cmeA surplus appar-
ently will turn into a deficit over the next few years in any case as cmeA members 
convert to trade at world prices with settlements in convertible currency. in particu-
lar, hungary will lose its preferential terms of trade in exchanging manufactures for 
soviet energy and raws materials.
54. As reform is being implemented in domestic policy, so it is in hungary’s 
foreign relations. There is no doubt that hungary will increasingly turn towards the 
west. An application has already been submitted for membership of the council of 
europe. in the meantime hungary remains a member of both the warsaw pact and 
the cmeA, though the government would clearly like to see both reformed. They 
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have said they want the warsaw pact to evolve into a mainly consultative body. 
There is little doubt that many in hungary would wish to see the country move to-
wards neutrality. An agreement on the withdrawal of soviet troops based in hunga-
ry was signed on 10 march. This envisages all forces being removed by the end of 
June 1991, with 70% having gone by the end of this year.
55. The Government has also been developing its relations with its neighbours. 
co-operation with italy, Austria, czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia has intensified 
within the framework of the Quadrangular initiative. The treatment of the hungar-
ian minority in romania remains a source of concern.
Viii. romANiA
56. The December revolution of 1989 overthrew the twenty-four years of ceaus-
escu’s regime, which had become progressively more repressive and idiosyncratic. 
The uprising appears to have been spontaneous. No organised opposition existed, 
and there was no individual for the population to rally behind. The council of the 
National salvation front (Nsf) was a movement comprising people from all areas 
of society, students, dissidents, former regime members, intellectuals and army of-
ficers. it declared itself “the supreme power of state” until free democratic elections 
could be held and it established a government. it ended the policy of “systemiza-
tion”, legalised abortion, halted rationing of food, heat and electricity and set a pro-
visional date for elections. The communist party has now totally disintegrated even 
though it had 3.8 million members prior to the revolution. historical political par-
ties re-formed and new ones were established – all wanting a share of power in the 
interim government.
57. following large demonstrations at the end of January, the Nsf and the 
political parties agreed to establish a provisional council of National unity 
(pNuc) to replace the Nsf council which would govern until the revised election 
day of 20 may. Although the front dominates the new legislature, more than 40 
newly created or revived parties have three seats each, and two non-front members 
were chosen as vice presidents under president ion iliescu. The formation of the 
pNuc has defused some contentious issues but has not redressed the basic imbal-
ance between the omnipresent salvation front organization and the welter of new 
parties. The opposition, consisting chiefly of the revived National peasant-chris-
tian alliance, National liberal party, and social Democratic party, is weak, disor-
ganized, and led disproportionately by aged activists or repatriated political emi-
gres. in some parts of the countryside, intimidation by salvation front supporters 
has effectively blocked opposition efforts to organize. The front’s control over tele-
vision, radio, and many newspapers inevitably slants coverage away from opposition 
platforms and personalities.
142
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
58. fears that the securitate119 still exists continue. They were transplanted to 
the defence ministry in December, evidently with their structure and functions 
close to intact. Development of a robust democracy seems unlikely so long as the 
new regime appears to be retaining a largely intact secret police. protests by officers 
and rank and file against the top military leadership, as well as against continued 
secret police presence and activity, brought intra-army tensions into the open, and 
also incidentally dimmed prospects for a military takeover of power. The council 
has not begun to tackle the broader issue of the old regime’s legacy in terms of the 
bureaucracy overall. from the beginning, the salvation front sought to avoid dis-
rupting the functions of the government and economy. in many ministries and en-
terprises, only the top two or three levels of management were changed; all other 
cadres remained in place. under ceausescu, corruption was essential to the func-
tioning of government and economic activity. Networks of contacts and patterns of 
behavior developed under ceausescu not only thwart any efforts at reforming the 
economy, but also contribute to the popular perception of a “hijacked revolution”.
59. Both the Nsf council and the pNuc have had problems in gaining the 
trust of the people. The executive bureau of the Nsf was seen to be divided. Dim-
itru mazilu, chairman of the constitutional, Juridical and human rights com-
mission of the Nsf, resigned because of what he saw as the reintroduction of sta-
linist policies. Bickering among the political parties and a lack of clarity about 
their policies undermine the confidence of the people. Demonstrations, for and 
against the provisional government, highlight the current political confusion. 
The pNuc is also open to mob pressure. Defence minister militaru was forced 
to resign on 16 february, and the provisional government’s headquarters were oc-
cupied by a mob two days later. it is hoped that the elections on 20 may will 
provide the stability that the political situation needs. even so, romania will need 
a leader who will not appear compromised by the old regime and who will have 
the ability to maintain objectivity during fierce political debate. At present it is 
not certain whether either iliescu, the president, or petre roman the prime min-
ister could fulfil these conditions. The leaders of the other political parties have 
been too long in the political wilderness. some political parties are flirting with 
the idea of a constitutional monarchy.
60. ethnic minorities have enjoyed greater freedom of expression since the rev-
olution and the interim governments have guaranteed them equal rights as roma-
nian citizens. The hungarian minority continues to call for the return of hungarian 
language schools and universities. They want a certain degree of autonomy, but have 
expressed no desire to see transylvania returned to hungary. Demonstrations have 
occurred within transylvania recently because many feel that the government has 
119  The securitate (in romanian Departamentul securității statului) was the secret service of com-
munist romania.
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gone back on its word concerning equal rights. many hungarians believe the posi-
tion of the ethnic minorities has not changed since the revolution, although they 
have been given automatic places within the pNuc to air their grievances. unfor-
tunately calls for ethnic rights, particularly by the hungarians, have also led to the 
heightening of nationalism amongst romanians. Nationalism had been carefully 
fostered by the ceausescu regime and it now presents a major problem for future 
governments.
61. economically romania has one major advantage: it has little foreign debt. 
however, the economy will need vast investment and re-organisation to overcome 
many years of decapitalisation and structural distortion. political parties seem com-
mitted to some form of a market economy, but specific economic plans have not 
been put forward by anyone. reconstruction will probably mean unemployment 
and inflation, neither of which are vote winners in the run-up to free elections. At 
present romania is being run on short-term economic strategies aimed at tiding the 
country over until the elections. The provisional government is drawing down for-
eign currency reserves paying for imports of food, fuel and energy. independent 
trade unions calling for better working conditions and a five-day week have been 
established. There is fear of mass unemployment amongst the industrial workforce. 
The Nsf council’s decree on small scale private businesses (any business with up to 
20 employees) hopes to promote private enterprise. Agriculture also suffered from 
central planning, rigid, unrealistic production targets and prices, and a complete 
lack of consideration for local conditions. in his New Year message, president ilies-
cu announced that peasants in collective and state farms are entitled to elect “gener-
al assemblies” which are to decide production quotas and agree delivery contracts 
with the Government. peasants can receive a private plot of roughly one acre.
62. The interim government has set out to improve romania’s foreign rela-
tions. it has stated that it will abide by all previous bilateral and international 
agreements and has affirmed its commitment to the csce process. united Na-
tions and csce member governments have been asked to act as observers during 
the may elections to ensure a properly conducted vote. relations with hungary 
are still strained over the minorities issue. relations with moscow have improved. 
But there could be problems over relations with the neighbouring soviet repub-
lic of moldavia, if there were to be pressure by the moldavians for reunification 
with romania. romania has however recognized the inviolability of its neigh-
bours’ borders. humanitarian aid from foreign governments has poured into the 
country since the revolution mainly to help romania’s appalling health service 
problems; direct aid to government is conditional upon romania’s progress to-
wards democracy after 20 may.
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iX. BulGAriA
63. The reformist group that forced out todor Zhivkov on 10 November 1989, 
aimed to save the communist party in Bulgaria from the fate which had already 
befallen the communists in poland, hungary and east Germany. The population’s 
longstanding apathy and alienation had begun to reach critical levels by 1989. The 
regime’s campaign against the turkish minority was especially severe.120 Dissi-
dent groups which had been slowly proliferating over the previous two years man-
aged to extend their reach despite near-overwhelming pressure from the party 
and security services. The october 1989 csce eco-forum,121 which was to have 
been sofia’s triumphal debut in big-league european diplomacy, instead triggered 
an explosive increase in dissident activism, which threatened to sweep away the 
communist party itself.
64. After taking over as party General secretary, petar mladenov engineered 
extensive changes in the Bcp politburo, secretariat and central committee, in 
which Zhivkov’s associates were replaced by generally younger, more pragmatic, re-
form-minded personalities. Zhivkov himself was expelled from the party and is now 
in prison. Almost none of his former colleagues remain in the party and Govern-
ment leadership. one of the major beneficiaries of these changes has been Andrey 
lukanov, the former minister for foreign economic relations, who took over as 
prime minister from the discredited Atanasov in february. Alexander lilov, who 
became Bcp party president at the Bcp party congress at the end of January, has 
achieved a remarkable comeback; having been sacked by Zhivkov in 1983 and spent 
the last six years in the political wilderness, he was re-appointed to the politburo in 
December and now heads a reformist four-member presidium elected by the new 
supreme party council.
65. The new leadership has declared its intention to build a law-based demo-
cratic state, meeting the highest international standards. The leading role of the par-
ty, now renamed the Bulgarian socialist party has been removed from the consti-
tution; multi-party elections will take place in June; the party is engaged in regular 
round table talks with the opposition which now has its own building and news-
paper; and demonstrations and strikes have become commonplace. The leadership 
has also signalled its determination to improve Bulgaria’s human rights record with 
the repeal of some of the catch-all political offence clauses in the penal code, and, 
most importantly, a declaration on 29 December reversing Zhivkov’s ethnic turk-
ish assimilation policy. This encouraged many ethnic turks to return, in the hope of 
recovering their rights and property in Bulgaria. This led to a nationalist backlash. 
120  [see footnote to paragraph 9.]
121  from the middle of october 1989 under the aegis of the csce an international conference was 
held on environmental issues in sofia.
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An especially convened council for the discussion of the nationality question even-
tually calmed the nationalists’ protests without backing down from the decision on 
rights, but hard-line party leaders in the provinces who exploited the protests con-
tinue to wield significant power and practices are still far from reflecting the new 
laws and regulations.122
66. The union of Democratic forces123 unites under its umbrella a spectrum 
of opposition groups from the soft-line Discussion club124 to the hard-line free 
trade union “podkrepa”.125 Despite internal squabbling, podkrepa exercises a pow-
erful influence: almost every decision the party has taken to liberalise policies has 
been adopted either in response to a major opposition demonstration, or in antici-
pation of one. The Agrarian party, a subservient coalition partner for 40 years, cut 
overt ties to the communists, called itself a third force at the round table talks, and 
has wooed the petkov Agrarians,126 who belong to the union of Democratic forces. 
A united Agrarian party would pose a serious challenge to communist pre-emi-
nence, since it would combine the developed organisational infrastructure of the 
formerly coopted Agrarians with the credibility of the petkov Agrarians.
67. under mladenov (who is now the state president), the authorities have 
shown greater candour in discussing Bulgaria’s problems. They now admit to a pro-
gressive decline in recent years in the rate of growth of national income. in 1989 na-
tional income actually fell by 0.4% and trade turnover declined by 8%. inflation (pre-
viously not acknowledged) is now admitted to be running at 10% annually and the 
122  [see footnote to paragraph 9.]
123  The union of Democratic forces (uDf/sDs) was based on the coalition of oppositional move-
ments and political parties established in the institute of sociology on December 7, 1989. The 
goal of the founding members was to overthrow the political monopoly of the Bcp and its suc-
cessor, the Bulgarian social party, and to initiate economic and political reforms necessary to es-
tablish a parliamentary democracy based on political pluralism, western orientation, respect of 
human rights, and free market economy.
124  The Debate club was established informally on November 3, 1989 at the university of sofia at a 
public meeting under the name Debate club for the structural reforms and the support of 
Glasnost’. on December 2, 1989 it was registered under the name club for Glasnost’ and De-
mocracy (KGD). They supported the reforms of Gorbachev, at the same time wanted to keep the 
political monopoly of the Bcp.
125  The independent confederation of labor – ‘podkrepa’ (NKt) was an independent trade union 
established by intellectuals and artists in plovdiv on february 8, 1989 following solidarity as its 
model. it became an alliance of trade unions on october 28, 1989. After the collapse of the com-
munist regime it became more and more a mass organization of workers, especially popular 
among miners. it organized several strikes and achieved political concessions from Bcp and Bsp 
governments.
126  The Bulgarian Agrarian National union (BZNs, BANu) was established by the Bulgarian peas-
antry in 1899. After wwii the communist influence in the party began to increase: Nikola pet-
kov, who created an overtly anti-communist fraction within the party, was condemned to death 
in 1947 and executed. other anticommunist members were imprisoned. The party decided to 
cooperate with the communists (as no other choice remained) at its 27th congress in 1947.
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authorities have disclosed a budget deficit. There is a large savings overhang (25 billion 
leva). in recent months the supply position has deteriorated, with widespread shortag-
es of basic foods. even early official attempts to mobilise all available labour reserves to 
plug gaps left by the exodus of over 300,000 ethnic turks in the summer of 1989 could 
not reverse a sharp slide in production.127 from having traditionally been an agricul-
tural exporter, Bulgaria has now become a net importer. The deterioration in Bulgar-
ia’s hard currency current account has contributed to a growing problem of external 
debt, which now amounts to $10 billion (gross). reserves stand at only $1.3 billion 
and debt servicing this year could absorb 50% of hard currency revenues. Against this 
background a request to the west for debt restructuring seems increasingly likely. The 
new leadership attributes these negative developments to serious political, economic 
and social errors which have built up over many years.
68.  The government’s immediate aim is to launch an economic stabilisation 
programme to deal with the internal and external financial crises. But with an eye on 
elections on 10 and 17 June, it is unlikely to risk introducing the drastic policies 
needed. A major short-term objective is to reduce budgeting expenditure. it is fore-
seen that subsidies (which currently amount to 25% of budget expenditure) will be 
drastically cut, although prices of basic raw materials and consumer goods are likely 
to remain under some form of control for a specified period. The stabilisation pro-
gramme is to be combined with longer-term restructuring focusing on agriculture, 
food processing, light industry and tourism. A declared central goal of the reform is 
to establish an open market economy which will in time be integrated into the 
world economy (Bulgaria is seeking membership of western finance and trade or-
ganisations including GAtt, imf and oecD, and is negotiating a trade and 
co-operation agreement with the ec).
69. Despite considerable progress towards political reform in the last four 
months, the prospects for a radical change in the political balance are still uncertain. 
The Bcp congress showed the strength of hardline influence in the party which 
resulted in early february in the splitting off of a sizeable reformist wing. The oppo-
sition groups are inexperienced, disorganised and only loosely united. They general-
ly lack charismatic leadership. They also lack the confidence and ambition to win an 
election. unlike elsewhere in eastern europe, the communist party’s real hold on 
power has not yet been seriously weakened, although party organisations in the 
armed forces have been abolished. The Bcp/Bsp has been more successful than 
others in keeping ahead of the opposition by offering concessions and thereby con-
trolling to some extent the pace of reform. Although the opposition have little con-
fidence in assurances that the interior ministry and state security bodies have been 
depoliticised and restricted to their proper functions, the pervasive atmosphere of 
127  [see footnote to paragraph 9.]
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fear which characterised the Zhivkov era has been much reduced. in the absence of 
a more cohesive and effective opposition the Bsp still seems likely to emerge as the 
biggest single party from the elections.
* * *
X. YuGoslAViA: the mArKoVic GoVerNmeNt  
AND the reform process
70. Yugoslavia has not undergone dramatic change in the manner of the countries 
of central and eastern europe. it nonetheless continues in its efforts to conduct 
economic reform and to introduce potentially far-reaching political changes. Dur-
ing the past year, increasing inflation developed into hyper-inflation and had begun 
to jeopardise the foundations of the economic system and the processes intended to 
increase economic stability and to improve life generally in the country. in the face 
of this situation, which was becoming more and more serious and was endangering 
major changes already made in the economic system to reduce state intervention 
and to bolster free markets and free enterprise, the markovic government saw itself 
obliged to submit to parliament, towards the end of 1989, an austerity plan.
71. Among the radical measures in the government’s austerity plan, the most 
spectacular was currency reform (introduction of a “heavy” dinar). markovic pro-
posed several other measures including freeing interest rates, removing price con-
trols until 30th June 1990 with the exception of certain basic services, and indexa-
tion of salaries based on the rate of the Dm, with November 1989 salaries as a 
benchmark. The measures, which came into force as from January 1990, also includ-
ed a proposed law on the movement and the employment of socially-owned capital, 
as well as a proposed law on financial revitalisation and on bankruptcy and liquida-
tion of banks and other financial organizations.
72. The initial results seem encouraging and international financial institu-
tions support the government’s reforms. During a single year under markovic, na-
tional indebtedness has been reduced from $21 billion to $16 billion and currency 
reserves have risen to $7.5 billion. monthly inflation which had been of the order of 
64.5% in December 1989, was reduced to 17.3% in January 1990 and 8.4% in feb-
ruary 1990. however, the freeze in salaries until June 1990 has given rise to increas-
ing popular discontent because of the persistent rise in prices.
73. internecine quarrels continue to create serious tensions between the re-
publics. Kosovo has proved a catalyst for the development of some of the arguments. 
in December, serbs from Kosovo and from other regions of Yugoslavia planned a 
demonstration in ljubljana. The slovenes banned it. The serbs reacted by institut-
ing a blockade against slovenian goods. The situation in Kosovo itself remains tense. 
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trouble flared in January and early february, with large demonstrations throughout 
the province, resulting in many deaths. The slovenes withdrew their contingent 
from the special federal militia force in Kosovo. They are currently withholding 
payments to the federal fund. so far, the military has not been deployed in a direct 
security role in the Kosovo, though units have been reinforced in the province.
74. Disputes between the republics contributed to the breakdown of the 14th 
extraordinary congress of the league of communists, which was held in January. 
Also at issue were questions relating to democratic centralism, communist monop-
oly of power, the future shape of the lcY and the introduction of a multi-party 
system. The lcY had become steadily weaker and polarised. The republican con-
gresses in December mostly concluded that political reform had to be embraced, 
but for some it was more a question of rhetoric rather than showing a real commit-
ment to reform. it was obvious that it would be difficult for the federal party to 
contain the differences. with the disintegration of the lcY at the federal level and 
the inability of the federal presidency to act decisively, it was possible for markovic 
to step into the political vacuum and attempt to take a grip on the federal situation 
and act as a government more in the western european mould.
75. from the beginning of his tenure in march 1989, markovic had acknowl-
edged the linkage between a market economy and a pluralistic political system, 
both of which he supports. But for tactical reasons, he moved first on the economy 
– because it was in crisis and because he felt a healthy economy could ameliorate 
political tensions. with the bulk of his economic reforms in place, early in 1990 he 
introduced constitutional amendments to institute secret, democratic multi-party 
elections throughout Yugoslavia. several of the republics have already instituted 
such changes. slovenia and croatia have amended their constitutions and sched-
uled multi-party elections in April. only serbia, where milosevic had moved the 
elections up to November 1989, and macedonia will not have elections this year. 
Although at that time the most popular local politician, milosevic nevertheless 
rigged his own race; three relatively unknown candidates were added to the ballot 
at the last minute to make it a “competitive election” and candidates from other 
parties were not allowed.
76. political parties are springing up. The problem with this is that most are 
based on one republic, some are even more localised. There are no strong all-federa-
tion parties. A number have been established by disaffected intellectuals and it is hard 
to judge how much real popular support they can attract. many of them are in fact 
strongly nationalist, especially in croatia, serbia and slovenia. it is difficult to predict 
the outcome of the elections. The April elections in slovenia resulted in a majority for 
the coalition of center-right parties (Demos). however, the communist party will 
remain the single largest party in parliament. in croatia it seems possible that the 
right-wing croatian Democratic union will emerge as the largest party.
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Xi. AlBANiA: rumours AND reAlities
77. in a period when there were dramatic changes in central and eastern europe, 
Albanian leaders said they would continue to pursue their “independent socialist” 
line, uninfluenced by events beyond their borders. The regime has maintained that 
the case of Albania is different because the communist regime was not imposed on 
them. The reality is in fact more mixed. After the events in romania there was spec-
ulation in the west that something similar might happen in Albania, and in January 
there were reports of demonstrations and general unrest. it was reported that in the 
northern city of shkoder a 1000-strong student-led protest took to the streets, fol-
lowed by disturbances in several other districts. The authorities were then quick to 
react and put down the unrest, holding many under arrest. A party plenum was then 
held immediately to cope with the situation. however, there is no doubt that these 
accounts were much exaggerated, particularly as they were presented in the foreign 
media. Nevertheless, some impact seems to have been felt by the Albanian leader-
ship, as the outcome of the hastily convened 9th plenum of the party (22–23 Janu-
ary) subsequently showed.
78. At the plenum, in a speech mixing flexibility and traditional Albanian 
communist intransigence, president ramiz Alia put forward a number of economic 
reforms, called for further decentralisation. The latter was to be reflected in the 
opening-up of basic level party meetings to all. There should be competition in the 
election/appointment of managers, specialists and party cadres. he also appeared 
to propose multi-candidate elections for the people’s Assembly. he said that consid-
eration should be given to the possible limitation of any individual’s mandate in a 
given organisation to a specified number of terms. several recent speeches have in 
addition talked of the need to combat bureaucracy and to decentralise some of the 
decision-making process.
79. The plenum’s decisions are being implemented step by step: construction 
activity is encouraged and people have started building their own houses; people are 
now allowed to own livestock, to till gardens around houses and to sell products at 
competitive prices. travel restrictions are eased, people can now travel abroad on 
presentation of an invitation, regardless of family connections; passport formalities 
are also simplified. Attention is paid to the human rights situation for the first time, 
which could also affect in the future the condition of the Greek minority in Alba-
nia. The interior minister spoke publicly on the number of political and ordinary 
prisoners and about their treatment. A ministry of Justice will be recreated to pro-
ceed with judicial reforms. telephone communications have been improved: inter-
national automatic dialling is being introduced as a result of a co-operation agree-
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ment (italy, Greece, uNDp,128 itu129). however, except in the case of the two 
co-operating countries which supply technical assistance and know-how, the system 
functions one way in providing Albania with world-wide connections. markets, yet 
in short supply, are beginning to improve; basic commodities are available, though 
rationed items remain unchanged.
80. As events in eastern europe may have affected Albania’s domestic policy, 
they are also likely to have done so in the case of international relations. 1989 saw 
the expansion of Albania’s relations with western states and the extension of con-
tacts with east european countries, including re-establishment of full diplomatic 
relations where there had been a rupture. Questions must now arise as to whether 
the reforming countries of eastern europe will continue to show interest in Albania 
and if they do not, whether other countries will exploit this. in any event the Alba-
nians have expressed interest in widening their external relations. sokrat plaka, the 
Deputy foreign minister, in an interview earlier this year, said that Albania wished 
to be friends with all those who wished to be friends with them. he also expressed 
the wish for Albania to have contact with the european community and to become 
in some way associated with the csce process. Balkan co-operation retains its im-
portance. much effort will be devoted to the ministerial meetings to be held in ti-
rana in october 1990. The Adriatic initiative between italy and Yugoslavia might 
be enlarged by the addition of Albania and possibly Greece.
81. in view of its new foreign policy orientations, Albania needs more support 
than criticism from the west. At the same time, continuing severe violations of hu-
man rights in Albania must be taken into account. The priority given to economic 
recovery might also prepare the ground for more political changes. however, given 
the possibilities of the country and the basics of its history, rapid changes of the kind 
which occurred in eastern europe seem unlikely. A moderate approach would 
therefore provide further incentives for the process of opening-up and rapproche-
ment with the west.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(90)11 (may 
8, 1990).
128  The united Nations Development programme is a global network of development of the uN, 
and one of the executive organs of the General Assembly of the uN, seated in New York. in co-
operation with local governments it tries to solve problems of development. it supports mainly 
investments improving human life quality and not only economic growth.
129  The international telecommunications union (itu) is a specialized agency of the uN since 
1947, whose task is to promote international cooperation in telecommunication. its numerous 
committees elaborate proposals which are taken into consideration by national governments 
when adjusting their laws regarding telecommunication. seated in Geneva.
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH DOCUMENT
20th November 1990
c-m(90)66
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe 
April 1990 to octoBer 1990
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach a report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern eu-
rope” forwarded to me by the chairman of the expert working Group which met 
at NAto headquarters from 17th–19th october 1990.
2. i would remind you that the report is the responsibility only of those ex-
perts who participated in the working Group.
3. This report will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 28th 
November.
(signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto,
1110 Brussels.
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
Note by the chairman of the expert Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, turkey, the united Kingdom and the united states met 
at NAto headquarters from 17th to 19th october 1990 to prepare the attached 
report.
2. This document covers the period 12th April 1990 to 19th october 1990.
(signed) o. sereBriAKoff
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i.  General trends and outlook 1–18
ii. The situation inside the soviet union 19–31
iii.  The Army and the power in the ussr 32–38
iV. poland: The first year of the mazowiecki government 39–43
V. czechoslovakia: forging a new identity 44–49
Vi. hungary: The internal political spectrum 50–56
Vii. Bulgaria: The struggle for democratic reform 57–64
Viii. romania: is it going anywhere? 65–72
* * *
iX. Yugoslavia: The outlook 73–79
X. Albania: prospects for internal reform 80–85
i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. In the USSR, the last few months have been marked by a rapid decline in the 
prestige and authority of central political institutions, including the government, 
the supreme soviet and president Gorbachev himself.
2. This decline was accompanied by the polarisation of political forces. The 
right-wing conservatives within the party were active and outspoken in opposition to 
perestroïka at the 28th party congress and especially during the first stage of the rus-
sian party congress; the left radicals, following their successes in the local and republic 
elections in the spring, acquired a significant political base in the russian parliament 
and in the soviets of moscow, leningrad and a number of other major cities.
3. There have been increasing signs of disintegration of the soviet federation 
and of fragmentation of political power. The assertion of varying degrees of sover-
eignty by the republics sparked off a further round of declarations of their own 
sovereignty by autonomous formations and ethnic groups within them. Yeltsin’s 
election at the end of may as chairman of the rsfsr supreme soviet dealt a severe 
blow to Gorbachev’s authority. with his espousal of russian sovereignty, he seems 
to have gained support for a programme which combines radical economic and po-
litical reform with robust defence of russia’s economic interests.
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4. This period has witnessed numerous attempts to construct a new econom-
ic reform programme, with Gorbachev so far unsuccessful in steering a course be-
tween incompatible proposals. Although initial reactions to his compromise pro-
gramme are not very promising, it remains to be seen what the reactions of the re-
publics will be.
5. The break-down of political structures has been fuelled by the continuing de-
terioration of the economy marked by growing shortages of basic commodities includ-
ing bread, cigarettes, meat, vodka, etc. political instability in turn has exacerbated the 
economic situation. republican and regional protectionism has hampered distribu-
tion, helping to create shortages; while the breakdown of political and administrative 
authority has obstructed the gathering in of what should have been a record harvest.
6. As a small sign of encouragement, trends towards democratization and 
greater freedom continued as indicated by recent votes by the supreme soviet on 
religious freedom and legalization of other political parties.
7. Arms control and east/west relations continued to be the top soviet for-
eign policy priorities. for example, Gorbachev accepted German membership in 
NAto and condemned iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – the latter was a major test of 
“new thinking” – and took particular care to keep moscow’s new relationship with 
washington on track with his visit to the united states in may/June and his meet-
ing with president Bush in helsinki on 9th september. for the soviets, the key 
achievement of the washington meeting was the signing of a trade agreement.
8. shevardnadze’s Asian trip in early september reflected continued soviet 
interest in promoting policy goals first outlined in Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok 
speech. soviet Third world policy was generally seen in efforts to reduce economic 
and political costs.
9. Although multiparty elections were held in most of eastern europe in the 
spring of 1990, the transition to pluralist democracy has proceeded at an uneven 
pace. At one extreme, the GDR collapsed more rapidly than most had expected. 
“reform” communist parties were defeated and discredited in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, and political debate focused more and more on the pace and scope of 
economic reform and removal of former communists from positions of power in 
ministries and the economy. in Poland, the emergence of independent parties from 
within solidarity has accelerated, and a consensus developed that the de jure divi-
sion of power agreed to in the round table accord must be replaced by direct presi-
dential and parliamentary elections in the near future.
10. in Bulgaria and Romania, reconstituted communist parties won majorities 
in free, if flawed, elections but appear increasingly unable to govern effectively in the 
face of domestic economic deterioration.
11. Ethnic tensions, largely repressed under communist rule, have re-emerged 
and created internal and foreign policy problems for several countries. The Antall gov-
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ernment’s emphasis on the treatment of hungarian minorities in neighbouring coun-
tries has increased friction with romania and czechoslovakia. tension between hun-
garians and romanians in transylvania erupted into violent clashes in march130 and 
the National salvation front government thus far has rejected the ethnic hungarians’ 
principal demands for local autonomy. A strong slovak push for autonomy has made 
negotiations on the restructuring of the czechoslovak federation a priority concern in 
prague. in Bulgaria, though the fact that the turkish minority was able to form a po-
litical organisation (movement for rights and freedoms – mrf)131 and is now rep-
resented in the Assembly constitutes a positive development, the mrf’s eligibility has 
been challenged by ethnic Bulgarian nationalist groups.
12. Removal of the communist nomenklatura from positions of power has been 
a central element in opposition criticism of government policy in poland and hun-
gary, and to a lesser extent in czechoslovakia. in each case non-communist govern-
ments, while working to establish political control of their military and intelligence 
establishments, have rejected comprehensive purges that might deprive them of the 
services of qualified professionals; they also have moved slowly on the replacement 
of officials in economic ministries and large state enterprises. opposition parties 
and groups, such as the centre Alliance in poland132 and the free Democrats and 
Young Democrats in hungary, sharply attacked this policy, arguing that it has, in 
essence, given the nomenklatura the opportunity to retain its position.
13. A second point of cleavage that emerged between non-communist govern-
ments and oppositions has been the desirability of radical market-oriented reforms, 
thus far identified primarily with the Balcerowicz plan in poland. The oppositions, to 
some degree, have joined the former communists in stating that not enough attention 
is being paid to devising social safety nets sufficient to cushion the population against 
130  in march 1990 riots took place between ethnic hungarians and romanians in târgu mureș 
(marosvásárhely, at that time having a hungarian majority). The unrest resulted in five deaths 
(three hungarians, two romanians) and 278 injured. The antecedent of this event was a hungar-
ian demand for the establishment of mother tongue education. in response, Vatra românească 
transported romanians from the countryside with the aid of the romanian government, who 
vandalized the city center, then attacked peacefully protesting ethnic hungarians.
131  The movement for rights and freedoms (Dps, mrf, hÖh) is a political party in Bulgaria 
whose aim in general is to secure human and civil rights with special attention to minority rights. 
in practical terms this meant that the party dealt with the problem of ethnic turks, therefore it 
was often called “turkish party.” it was established on January 4, 1990 in Drûndar (near Varna) 
as successor to the turkish National movement for liberation, then it became a national organ-
ization on march 26–27, 1990.
132  The center civic Alliance (poc) was an alliance established by several parties joining their 
forces in the parliamentary elections of 1991 in poland. it was organized by the center Agree-
ment from the remainder of the solidarity citizens’ committee, independents, and rightist 
christian parties. The goal of the alliance was to organize broad support for lech wałęsa, who 
was unwilling to approve it. in the elections of 1991 they advertised and demanded foreign poli-
cy supporting the west, accelerated privatization, and broad economic reforms.
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inflation and unemployment. in this connection, the extent to which trade relation-
ships with the soviet union should be preserved (primarily to assure reliable energy 
supplies, but also to ease unemployment by preserving export markets for otherwise 
unsaleable goods) has also become an important ingredient in the political debate.
14. in the sphere of foreign policy, the most striking development during the 
period has been the de facto dissolution of the soviet alliance structures, the war-
saw pact and the council for mutual economic Assistance (cmeA). most of the 
concerns which hitherto justified continued eastern european allegiance to the 
pact – the need to assure progress in cfe negotiations133 and to institutionalise the 
csce process – have either been addressed satisfactorily or undergone major 
change. The political consultative committee meeting scheduled for November is 
likely to be the summit at which the transformation of the warsaw pact will be de-
cided. As a multilateral organisation, cmeA has for all intents and purposes ceased 
to exist. Beginning in 1991, cmeA trade is to be conducted in hard currency at 
world market prices, but the east europeans are seeking to preserve some measure 
of barter trade to assure minimum imports of soviet oil and gas and to preserve 
markets for some manufactured goods.
15. to fill the vacuum created by the demise of the Warsaw Pact czechoslovakia 
and poland are actively promoting a new security structure within the csce. There 
are also efforts to increase co-operation through such subregional groupings as the 
Balkan co-operation134 and the pentagonale,135 and general interest in participa-
tion is high. multilateral meetings between heads of state and Government and 
foreign ministers have become commonplace. finally, east european countries – 
especially poland, romania, and hungary – have cautiously and carefully begun to 
establish political and economic contact with independent parties and movements 
inside the soviet union itself.
16. Despite their difficulties over oil, central and eastern european countries 
have joined the trade embargo against iraq136 and, as compensation, are hoping to 
receive economic assistance as well as general financial support for the reform process.
* * *
133  see footnote 77.
134  in september 1987 the foreign ministers of the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, romania, 
Yugoslavia and turkey) met in Belgrade. several proposals for cooperation were discussed. A year 
later, in June 1988, the representatives of the foreign ministers met again and agreed to continue 
the negotiations.
135  for the antecedents see footnote 117. czechoslovakia joined the Quadrilateral (now pentago-
nale) cooperation in 1990 and poland in 1991 (now hexagonale).
136  The sanctions imposed by the uN security council meant an almost total financial and com-
mercial embargo, which began on August 6, 1990 and lasted until may 2003. The overt aim of 
the measures was to force iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to pay a war indemnity, and to abandon 
its plans for the development of weapons of mass destruction (wmD).
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17. The weakening of Yugoslavia’s federal structure accelerated as non-commu-
nist governments elected in croatia and slovenia began immediately to develop 
plans for a confederal structure, which serbia strongly opposes. serbian repression 
of the Albanian majority in Kosovo and tensions between the serbs, croats and 
others have made the problem of beginning the structuring of a new Yugoslav state 
even more difficult.
18. Albania, the only country in central and eastern europe where a leninist 
party retains a monopoly of power, stepped up its campaign of opening to the out-
side, permitting selective travel abroad, seeking diplomatic relations with the unit-
ed states and the ec, and requesting full membership in the csce.
ii. the situAtioN iNsiDe the soViet uNioN
19. in previous years, the sign that mr. Gorbachev was back at his desk after a long 
summer break has been some spectacular, surefire, political move. This year he re-
turned early, his holiday cut short by the need to cope with such crucial and sensi-
tive issues as economic reform, reconstitution of the union and the soviet–lithua-
nian negotiations. After the period starting in 1985 when mr. Gorbachev went 
from strength to strength, the ground now seems to be slipping from under his feet.
20. from an institutional point of view, there is a clear risk that the central 
 authority will be pushed to the sidelines by the demands of the new republican 
 authorities. The recent battering administered by the russian parliament and its 
president, mr. Yeltsin is the most significant development in this connection: de-
cree banning the sale by the federal authorities of russian strategic resources (ener-
gy, gold, diamonds...) without the republic’s permission; economic agreement ne-
gotiated directly between russia and lithuania; diplomatic feelers put out by mr. 
Yeltsin (particularly towards Japan). Demands are also coming in from other repub-
lics, particularly in the field of internal security (national militias in the caucasus) 
and even of defence (constitution of a “national army” currently being discussed in 
the ukraine).
21. politically speaking, mr. Gorbachev is suffering from a “lack of legitimacy”. 
There are signs of the “erosion of power” phenomenon, with public opinion laying 
the blame for the failure of economic reform and the sharp drop in living standards 
fairly and squarely at the door of the past five years’ leadership. furthermore, despite 
his declared intention of co-operating with the reformers, mr. Gorbachev is still 
General secretary of a party which is fast losing its hold. The end result is a loss of 
presidential credibility: mr. Gorbachev has resorted to “ukazes” (decrees) to coun-
ter some of the bolder republican initiatives (decree annulling the control of the 
russian banking system decided by the parliament of the rsfsr; decree requiring 
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the disbandment of nationalist militia; decree declaring null and void the estonian 
declaration of independence). These texts have remained a dead letter.
22. At the 28th party congress, and although mr. Gorbachev remained Gen-
eral secretary, some of the most popular party members resigned, thereby creating 
an ongoing haemorrhage. The politburo has undergone structural changes such that 
its days as an official decision-making body are over.
23. The crunch for economic reform will come this autumn. The crisis is deep-
ening, with a breakdown of the main pillars of the economy on the one hand 
(budget deficit, financial crisis, underlying unemployment, an estimated foreign 
debt of 60 billion roubles, a fall in industrial output, widespread shortages, disaffec-
tion with monetary transactions) and economic disintegration on the other hand 
(erection of protectionist barriers by the republics, and even the cities, rise of eco-
nomic nationalism and even “localism”).
24. The soviet economy has continued to go rapidly downhill in 1990. Ac-
cording to statistics published at the end of July, soviet national income fell by 2%, 
labour productivity by 1,5% and the shortage of food and consumer goods gathered 
pace during the first six months of the year, compared with the same period in 1989. 
The winter looks set to be hard, with the possibility of insufficient heating and the 
probable need to provide food aid for certain cities, a situation which could spark 
off social unrest.
25. The political will to force the pace and scope of economic reform is now 
clearly evident. Among the planners, however, there is disarray. mr. Gorbachev and 
mr. Yeltsin together launched the debate on the new government programme, 
which provides in particular for the dismantling of economic monopolies and the 
reform of the banking system. mr. Yeltsin, however, is insisting on the resignation of 
the ryzhkov government, which mr. Gorbachev is keeping on for fear of destabiliz-
ing the central authority. in his usual way, the General secretary tabled a compro-
mise proposal, which appears to be a modified version of the 500-day plan already 
adopted by the russian parliament. By 16th october, mr. Yeltsin was already voic-
ing his opposition.
26. whichever way the reforms are applied (either at federal or at republic lev-
el), there are bound to be a number of stumbling-blocks, both administrative (lack 
of appropriate executive structures, other than in the present ministries, which run 
on lines incompatible with reform) and social (initially, the effects of market forces 
are bound to cause dismay in the population).
27. Yet, it is the future of the union which constitutes the greatest challenge. 
The nationalities problem is now more central than ever. Developments in this area 
will hold the key to three basic issues. As regards the exercise of political power in 
moscow, pressure from the republics, now demanding some essential prerogatives 
(economic policy, diplomacy and even defence), could mean that eventually central 
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authority will lose all substance. Above all, and despite attempts at co-operation 
(through the creation, for example, of a joint economic group), there is plainly a 
deep-seated rivalry between mr. Gorbachev and mr. Yeltsin, fraught with one-up-
manship and discord. in addition, economic progress may be held back, or even 
prevented, both by continuing centrifugal tensions and by friction between special-
ists. last but not least, the ussr’s international standing is at stake.
28. The signs of internal disintegration are rife. Almost all the republics have 
now adopted declarations of sovereignty (and even, in the case of the Baltic states 
and Armenia, declarations of independence). The process of fragmentation is 
spreading. At present, it is the republics, and even the autonomous regions, which 
are challenging the authority of the federated republics (Karelia, the Adzhars137 and 
Abkhazes in Georgia,138 and so on). There is a continuing build-up of inter-ethnic 
tension.
29. The big question is whether what has now become the inevitable transfor-
mation of the ussr can be brought about by largely peaceful means. There is no 
disguising the many potential causes of violence which could change the course of 
events: 60 million people living outside their republic of origin (including 25 mil-
lion russians); close inter-meshing of different ethnic groupings (particularly in the 
caucasus and central Asia; attitude of organs of state such as the Army, the KGB 
and the communist party to a disorderly breakup of the union.
30. Another question is whether the process of dismemberment can be arrest-
ed by the new union treaty proposed by the central government. There are admit-
tedly a number of factors on the side of a negotiated transition to a new form of 
diversified co-operation, particularly economic interdependence and geographical 
solidarity. At all events, russia will continue to play a decisive rôle in the new struc-
ture. All the present evidence, however, points to a virtually irreversible tide of 
events. it is thus conceivable that the future union treaty will be obsolete even be-
fore the negotiations start.
31. There can be no doubt that mr. Gorbachev is now facing the most testing 
time since he came to power. Nevertheless, his position, though under attack, is not 
irretrievably compromised. he holds a number of cards: some institutional room 
137  Adjara, conquered by russia in 1878, was occupied by British and turkish forces after wwi, 
then after 1920 it belonged to the republic of Georgia. The turks relinquished the territory on 
condition that autonomy would be granted to the muslim minority. Therefore the Adjar Auton-
omous soviet socialist republic was established in the region under Georgian sovereignty.
138  Abkhazia became the part of independent Georgia, established in 1918 in the wake of the rus-
sian revolution in 1917. in 1921 the red Army occupied Georgia and stalin created the auton-
omous soviet socialist republic of Abkhazia. Despite formal autonomy, Georgian centralist 
tendencies remained in force. in early 1988 the Georgian opposition to communism declared its 
program for the abandonment of autonomies within Georgia. in 1989 Georgian nationalists 
organized mass protests in Abkhazia declaring the Abkhaz people northern caucasian immi-
grants and not indigenous in the region.
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for manoeuvre (a majority in the federal supreme soviet, the federal ministries’ 
power of obstruction, particularly where russian initiatives are concerned), the pos-
sibility of appearing as the arbitrator between the republics and ethnic groups. last 
but not least, there is his international prestige as winner of the Nobel peace prize 
and his ability to appear before soviet public opinion as the most credible spokes-
man with the west.
iii. the ArmY AND power iN the soViet uNioN
32. The Army, which is directly affected by the current political, economic and psy-
chological crisis in the ussr, is sometimes suspected – on the strength of indica-
tions that are diversely convincing but invariably difficult to interpret – of wishing 
to interfere in the internal political debate. it is ill-prepared to do so, however, both 
traditionally and organization-wise. The trials it is now experiencing testify, above 
all, to a painful and protracted modernization process ensuing from the new politi-
cal situation.
33. The Army’s inordinate encroachment on civilian society, a process aided 
and abetted by Brezhnev, was bound to be challenged by perestroika. After a tempo-
rary respite, the restructuring movement was extended to the soviet armed forces, 
which have since met with some humiliating rebuffs: the rust affair,139 the on-
slaught of “transparency” among the rank and file, the withdrawal from Afghani-
stan140 and the loss of the generals’ monopoly in the determination of military doc-
trine.
34. today, there are four aspects to this ongoing process: 
– attempts to counter the continuing erosion of central authority are primar-
ily an Army responsibility: massive commitment of the armed forces for peace-
keeping operations; repercussions of spreading anarchy; rising crime; demands by 
an increasing number of republics for their own armies (ukraine, Bielorussia and 
russia);
– the Army is experiencing the adverse effects of the – economic crisis just as 
much as other bodies, and perhaps even more: low pay, the housing crisis – most 
acute for military personnel;
– the pressure by most of the east european countries for a soviet withdrawal 
is affecting the troops’ morale;
139  mathias rust, German amateur pilot, became famous for his illegal landing with his private plane 
on red square in moscow on may 28, 1987. flying from helsinki to moscow, his plane was de-
tected by soviet anti-aircraft defense several times, but no order to destroy the intruder was given. 
rust’s penetration of soviet defense lines (supposed to be impenetrable) had a huge impact on 
soviet forces and numerous leaders and officers of high rank were relieved of their positions, in-
cluding the then minister of Defense, sergey sokolov.
140  see footnotes 5 and 44.
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– finally, the “new thinking” in soviet foreign policy has led to the crumbling 
of a set of values perhaps considered immutable by some members of the armed 
forces: waning of the ideological conflict with the west; unilateral disarmament 
measures announced in December 1987; cutback in the defence budget; surrender-
ing of Germany to NAto without any tangible quid pro quo. however, most of the 
officer corps seemingly support the new direction of soviet military policy.
35. The military seem unlikely to interfere in the political arena – at all events 
on their own initiative. however, mr. Gorbachev cannot afford to disregard the 
concerns of the Army as an institution. some of its top-ranking officers (Yazov, 
moiseyev) have been permitted to voice them publicly and a few symbolic gestures 
by the authorities (promotion to marshal of the Defence minister, tribute paid to 
the armed forces on 9th may – Ve Day141) have soothed the sharpest wounds to 
military self-esteem.
36. The armed forces will none the less have to undergo a radical shake-up, the 
shape of which is gradually emerging: after for long rejecting even the idea of a ca-
reer army, the minister of Defence has finally accepted the aim of gradual profes-
sionalization, to be achieved by “customized military service” arrangements. As if 
wishing to suggest that this idea, too, is now outdated, mr. Gorbachev himself has 
broached openly the possibility of forming a “professional Army of volunteers”, 
which would no doubt prove more loyal than an army of conscripts amid the up-
heavals still in store for the soviet union. he has also broken another taboo by 
suggesting the creation of “national-territorial” units, which would be assigned to 
the republics while remaining under central government control.
37. These proposals are designed to map out an alternative to the moves by the 
federated republics’ parliaments or authorities, which pose a far greater threat to 
union cohesion.
38. The new relationship between the central authorities and the republics will 
undoubtedly be decisive for the future of the soviet armed forces. one thing is cer-
tain: the Army cannot avoid a wide-ranging and painful modernization process. in 
the wake of the reductions stemming from the disarmament negotiations, it will be 
left with up-to-date and efficient weaponry. manning levels will have to be corre-
spondingly adjusted, in other words substantially cut. A move in this direction has 
already started. This reform, however, remains just as fraught with uncertainty as 
the future of soviet society.
141  The unconditional surrender of the Third reich was signed on may 7, 1945, it came into effect at 
11:01 pm on may 8, 1945, central european time. According to moscow time this was may 9, 
therefore in the soviet union the traditional victory parade always took place on may 9.
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iV. polAND: the first YeAr  
of the mAZowiecKi GoVerNmeNt
39. Disagreements over the pace of economic and political reform led to a split 
within solidarity. The presidential elections on 25th November will be followed by 
parliamentary elections in spring next year and their outcome will determine the 
future of the reform process.
40. The radical programme of economic reform and austerity followed by the 
government has had considerable success in its two priority areas: reducing inflation 
– down from 78% in January to under 2% in August – and eliminating the chronic 
shortages of food. This, however, has been at the expense of a deeper than expected 
recession; real wages have fallen by a third, industrial production is down by 30% 
and unemployment reached 820,000 (4.7%) at the end of August, with a forecast 
figure of 1.3 million by the end of the year. Though the government had planned for 
a smooth transition period, the effects of the austerity programme and the drastic 
drop in average living standards led to increasing social unrest and political discord. 
The strikes by railway workers in may, defused only by walesa’s intervention, were 
followed by farmers’ protests in July which culminated in the decision of the psl 
(polish peasant party) to withdraw from mazowiecki’s coalition on 19th septem-
ber because inter alia of the lack of influence on agricultural policy and especially on 
the farmers’ main demand, the reintroduction of guaranteed minimum prices. 
farmer unrest is likely to resume and to spread to other sectors, such as mining.
41. in the area of political reform, the government has found itself increasingly 
on the defensive. walesa has sharply criticised the prime minister for moving too 
slowly towards political pluralism, privatisation and restructuring, and for the gov-
ernment’s failure to root out the old communist nomenklatura, while mazowiecki 
has defended his more measured approach. The local elections held in may pro-
duced a low turn-out but demonstrated that with the exception of the psl, which 
won nearly 7% of the votes, none of the parties outside the solidarity movement has 
a significant electoral base.
42. walesa’s presidential ambitions have contributed to dividing solidarity and 
led to the development of two groups within the movement: the pro-walesa centre 
Alliance, and the citizens’ movement – Democratic Alliance (roAD)142 which 
supports mazowiecki. These two groups are likely to provide the focus for political 
debate in the run-up to the presidential election, although they have not yet defined 
142  The citizens’ movement for Democratic Action (roAD) was a free market based socialist polit-
ical party in poland in 1990–1991 with centrist socialist views in economic affairs and conserva-
tive and moderate conservative principles regarding social questions. it was formed from the 
members of the solidarity citizens’ committee who supported tadeusz mazowiecki during the 
presidential elections in November–December 1990.
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clear policy differences. The catholic church has largely refrained from exerting 
the direct political influence it brought to bear during the conflict with the commu-
nist régime, now that new democratic political institutions have been established. 
each group, however, is attempting to enlist the support of the church as the elec-
tion campaign gets underway.
43. in the field of foreign policy, the mazowiecki government’s overriding ob-
jective of poland’s return to europe has been pursued against a background of devel-
opments in its two powerful neighbours: the accelerating process of German unifi-
cation and domestic instability in the soviet union. mazowiecki and foreign min-
ister skubiszewski succeeded in securing guarantees for poland’s western border 
which will be enshrined in a treaty. partly as a result of the relaxation of tension over 
this issue, the process of soviet troop withdrawals is to be accelerated. As far as the 
warsaw treaty organisation is concerned, poland sees it as having only a limited 
rôle as a consultative mechanism that would provide an element of stability in the 
transition to a european security system. During the past year, warsaw has put for-
ward far-reaching plans for economic and political co-operation with czechoslova-
kia and hungary. Bilateral relations with the west have been strengthened, and 
poland has continued to pursue its long-term objective of membership of the coun-
cil of europe and of the european community; the terms of an association agree-
ment with the latter are currently under discussion.
V. cZechosloVAKiA: forGiNG A New iDeNtitY
44. czechoslovakia is going through a difficult period of transformation. with rev-
olutionary euphoria fading, havel and his relatively inexperienced team are facing 
up to the difficult business of governing. far-reaching changes in the federal system, 
in local government and in the economy have been put forward. some sections of 
the public have expressed disappointment with the pace of change, while others 
have voiced concern at its consequences. slovak nationalism is growing and chal-
lenging the basis of the czechoslovak state.
45. in June the first free elections held in czechoslovakia since 1946 resulted 
in a victory for civic forum.143 havel was re-elected president on 5th July and 
again named calfa as prime minister, with Dubcek as federal Assembly chairman. 
Thus all the key players from the November revolution have been returned to office. 
The new government is dominated by civic forum and public Against Violence 
(pAV),144 with support from the slovak christian Democratic movement (cD-
143  see footnote 113.
144  see footnote 114.
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m).145 A striking feature of the new cabinet is the absence of any of the historical 
czech parties and the abundance of ethnic slovaks. in accordance with electoral 
law, the current parliament will remain in office for only two years and will have the 
primary tasks of drafting a new federal constitution and enacting new economic 
legislation.
46. politically, the growth of slovak nationalism and the drive for equality 
with the czechs are the major issues. At a meeting of the prime ministers of the 
federal, czech and slovak governments at trencianske teplice in August, the slo-
vaks secured czech and federal agreement to a much more extensive devolution of 
powers to the two republics than had been expected. support for the idea of a sepa-
rate slovak state is growing, but given an increased willingness on the part of the 
czechs to accommodate slovak wishes, the federation may survive. The moravians 
are also demanding greater recognition of their identity and are likely to succeed in 
securing, in the forthcoming reform of local government, the restoration of 
moravia/silesia146 and Bohemia147 as major sub-divisions of the czech republic.
47. in the field of political reform, two new initiatives have been taken to root 
out old communist influence. under the reform of local government, the soviet 
style national committee system will be abolished and replaced by a commune sys-
tem of self-administered towns and villages. legislation to bring this about is being 
rushed through in time for communal elections on 24th November. secondly, a re-
view is to be undertaken of all leading posts in the administration and in the econo-
my with a view to purging the system of the old nomenklatura.
48. The economy is not performing well; GNp growth which slowed to 1% in 
1989 is expected to be negative this year. unemployment is still low but must inev-
itably increase as reform policies bite. The Gulf crisis148 has hit an economy that was 
already suffering disruption in vital oil supplies from the soviet union and a serious 
contraction in trade with the cemA countries. on 17th september, the federal 
Assembly approved the government’s blueprint for economic reform. it is based on 
145  The christian Democratic movement is a moderate rightist party in slovakia established in 1990 
supporting the quick introduction of a western style market economy.
146  moravia (in czech: morava, in German: mähren) is a historical region in the eastern part of the 
czech lands, including parts of the former silesia, moravian silesia. when frederick the Great 
conquered the larger part of silesia in the war of 1740–1748 (war of Austrian succession), the 
southernmost part of the province remained under habsburg rule. 
147  Bohemia is the name of a historical czech region located at the central and western part of the 
present day czech lands (in czech: Čechy, in latin and english: Bohemia, in German: Böh-
men). The term comprises the medieval czech Kingdom without the moravian part known as 
the margravate.
148  on August 2, 1990 at dawn, iraqi troops attacked and the same day occupied Kuwait. saddam 
hussein, the president of iraq, accused the state of petrol overproduction that decreased world pric-
es and this caused harm to the economy of iraq. further accusations were that Kuwait stole oil from 
iraq during the iranian–iraqi war and even occupied territories. The uN security council agreed 
to label the attack of iraq on Kuwait as aggression, and the usA sent troops to the region.
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price liberalisation, conversion to hard currency trading at world prices, currency 
convertibility and privatisation. prime minister calfa described the reform package 
as a definite decision to forge ahead with quick and radical measures towards a mod-
ern market system, although it emphasises social concerns and ecological priorities. 
specific pieces of legislation and a timetable will be submitted to the federal Assem-
bly at a later date. however, the transition to a liberal market economy is proving 
more problematic than the transition to political democracy.
49. in foreign affairs, czechoslovakia is seeking to reintegrate itself in the 
west. in march, a trade and co-operation agreement between the ec and czecho-
slovakia was signed in Brussels, and calfa later called for early talks on an associa-
tion agreement. in April, czechoslovakia was granted the status of “extraordinary 
guest” by the council of europe in response to its application for full membership 
and in september it was readmitted to the imf149 and the world Bank.150 czech-
oslovakia is also working towards disengagement from the warsaw treaty organi-
sation and is seeking a reform of its modus operandi with the cmeA countries. in 
parallel, it is seeking closer ties with NAto, as evidenced by secretary General 
wörner’s visit to prague in september, and has been playing an active rôle in region-
al co-operation and the csce process. it has produced new structures and prague 
as the site for the csce. with regard to the Gulf crisis, czechoslovakia is eager to 
establish its credentials as a responsible member of the united Nations.
Vi. huNGArY: the iNterNAl politicAl spectrum
50. The first period of the Antall government has gone relatively smoothly com-
pared with the difficulties experienced by some of the other emerging democracies 
of eastern europe. Although partisan wrangling over the nature of transition, rising 
unemployment, inflation and falling living standards have soured public attitudes, 
the government has proceeded with its democratisation programme and has dealt 
with legislation on local elections. There has also been some reform of the adminis-
trative system. The government has, however, been criticised for failing to remove 
wholesale the communist bureaucracy.
51. hungary’s multiparty elections in march/April, the first for 43 years, con-
stituted a milestone in its transition to parliamentary democracy. The centrist Dem-
ocratic forum won a surprisingly large victory that enabled its chairman Antall to 
form a coalition government with the right-of-centre smallholders and the chris-
tian Democrats. Antall immediately struck a backstage deal with the opposition 
149  see footnote 9.
150  The world Bank is an international financial institution established in 1945 in washington. 
Among its goals one can find the decrease of poverty and securing stable loans for developing 
countries.
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free Democrats to concede the presidency to free Democrat Goncz in exchange for 
a freeze on opposition to the government. This informal agreement did not last for 
long, however. in the run-up to the recent local elections, the free Democrats at-
tacked the government for concentrating on secondary issues at the expense of more 
important matters such as privatisation and land reform. The low turn-out in these 
elections, of which the free Democrats were the principal beneficiaries, provided 
some evidence of public apathy with democracy and scepticism about the govern-
ment’s ability to halt the economic decline.
52. further strains have been placed on the coalition by the smallholders’ elec-
tion pledge to return land to its pre-1947 owners which is impracticable and uncon-
stitutional. Antall has managed to duck the issue so far but further footdragging on 
land reform increases the risk of a split. The issue is an integral part of the pending 
ownership law which will have a major impact on creating a business climate attrac-
tive to foreign investment.
53. in the economic field, domestic difficulties have been partly offset by im-
provements in the external sector. industrial production by state enterprises and 
large co-operatives was 8% lower in the first half of 1990 compared with a year ear-
lier: GDp held up reasonably well but unemployment doubled to about 1% of the 
labour force in June and is expected to reach 2% by the end of the year, and consum-
er prices were 26% higher in the first half of 1990 and are still rising. on the other 
hand, hungary registered a $ 200 million surplus on the convertible currency ac-
count during the first half of 1990. however, the cut in soviet oil deliveries and the 
Gulf crisis, coupled with the effect of the summer drought on agriculture, are inev-
itably having an adverse effect on both internal and external sectors, and Budapest 
now forecasts a $200 million current account deficit for 1990.
54. The Antall government is moving ahead on privatisation, particularly in 
retail trade and services. As part of the privatization programme, it has proposed to 
sell 20 of its major companies, and to convert over half the farmland to private own-
ership. Bankruptcy proceedings have already been initiated against a number of 
loss-making state enterprises and more are in the pipeline.
55. in June, the hungarian parliament passed a resolution mandating hunga-
ry’s negotiated withdrawal from the warsaw treaty organisation by the end of 
1991. As a first step, Budapest has effectively halted all military contacts and ended 
participation in joint military manoeuvres. it also initiated bilateral talks to replace 
obsolete bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaties with co-operation agree-
ments. The government intends to link the pace of these negotiations with the cfe 
talks to avoid jeopardising the agreed withdrawal of soviet troops from hungary by 
30th June 1991.
56. The Antall government has made treatment of the ethnic hungarians liv-
ing in neighbouring countries and access to them a major thrust of its foreign policy. 
166
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
relations with Austria on this score are excellent and a new dialogue has been initi-
ated with Yugoslavia. But Antall’s declaration that he considered himself prime 
minister “in spirit” of all hungarians, including those living abroad,151 has contrib-
uted to friction with slovakia and romania. relations with the federal government 
in prague have so far been cordial, but slovakia’s increasing assertiveness is raising 
new concerns.
Vii. BulGAriA: the struGGle for DemocrAtic reform
57. The period under review has been dominated by the elections to the Grand 
National Assembly, mladenov’s replacement as president by the opposition leader 
Zhelev and by the continuing political stalemate which prevented the formation of 
a new government for so long. meanwhile, the economy has continued to deterio-
rate sharply, with the Gulf crisis aggravating Bulgaria’s difficulties.
58. in the June elections, the Bulgarian socialist party (Bsp) won almost 50% 
of the vote and 211 out of 400 seats in the new parliament, with the principal oppo-
sition coalition, the union of Democratic forces (uDf)152 gaining 144 seats, the 
movement for rights and freedoms (mrf) 29, and the Agrarian party 16. Despite 
some irregularities and instances of intimidation by the Bsp, the general view of 
western observers was that the elections had been free and fair and that such mal-
practices had not significantly affected the result.
59. But despite its election victory, the Bsp was unable to form a government 
for three months. it tried to persuade the uDf to join a coalition in order to share 
responsibility for the harsh measures which will be needed to reverse the economic 
decline. But the uDf, which had fought the election on a clear-cut anti-communist 
platform, had no incentive to let the Bsp off the hook. There followed a prolonged 
period of political stalemate during which public anxiety over the visible decline in 
living standards was matched by growing impatience with the political situation. 
strikes and demonstrations in June and July led to a wave of resignations and a fur-
ther purge within the ruling party. mladenov was forced to resign as president over 
evidence that he had advocated the use of tanks against demonstrators in December 
1989. After much deliberation, he was replaced by uDf chairman Zhelev with Bsp 
member semerdzhiev as Vice-president.
60. interim prime minister lukanov submitted the resignation of his govern-
ment in August, announcing that henceforth, the Bsp would only govern in a coa-
151  The sentence refers to the words of József Antall, hungarian prime minister at the third general 
meeting of the hungarian Democratic forum (mDf) on June 2, 1990: “in legal sense, according 
to hungarian public law i consider myself as the prime minister of all hungarian citizens of this 
country of 10 million – and in my heart i’d like to be prime minister of 15 million hungarians.”
152  see footnote 123.
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lition with the opposition. The uDf, however, still refused to join. The strained 
relations between the two parties were not helped by the ransacking and partial 
destruction by fire of the Bsp’s headquarters on 26th August. The new government, 
led by lukanov, was finally formed on 19th september and is composed almost 
entirely of Bsp members.
61. Both the main political parties remain fragile alliances. The Bsp is serious-
ly divided between the reformist faction led by lukanov and more orthodox ele-
ments centred on lilov, whose recent re-election as party leader has further limited 
the government’s room for manoeuvre. The uDf, established as an umbrella organ-
isation of 17 parties with widely differing philosophies and agendas, has been grow-
ing in popular support, particularly among the young, but has difficulty in imposing 
internal discipline on its constituent groups.
62. The third major force is the movement for rights and freedoms (mrf) 
which in practice is the party of the turkish ethnic minority. The fact that they were 
able to form a political organisation and are now represented in the Assembly con-
stitutes a positive development. however the mrf’s eligibility has been challenged 
by ethnic Bulgarian nationalist groups. There are widespread fears that the mrf’s 
justified pressure for human and cultural rights could be followed by demands for 
autonomy. The government has attempted to allay nationalist fears by stating that 
Bulgarian would remain the country’s official language, while Dogan, the mrf 
leader, has adopted a conciliatory style in parliament. The local elections in Decem-
ber will play an important role in consolidating the rights of the turkish minority.
63. The economy, which underwent a protracted slump in the 1980s, is now in 
a state of near collapse. repayments of capital and interest on the $ 10.8 billion ex-
ternal debt have been suspended and foreign trade is at a standstill. cuts in oil deliv-
eries from the soviet union have been compounded by the Gulf crisis and the sup-
ply position remains acute. industrial production is down and the population has 
been hit with food shortages, rationing and sharply higher prices. The political 
stalemate has left the economic reform programme in limbo, although Zhelev has 
announced his intention to submit to parliament far-reaching legislation on priva-
tisation and market reforms.
64. economic considerations are influencing the considerable emphasis on 
westward orientation that Bulgaria is placing in its foreign policy. in may, Bulgaria 
signed a trade and co-operation agreement with the european community. pro-
gress has also been made towards Bulgaria’s admission to the imf and world Bank. 
Bulgaria has supported uN sanctions against iraq in spite of the considerable eco-
nomic cost. trade with most of the cmeA countries is in serious difficulty.
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Viii. romANiA: is it GoiNG ANYwhere?
65. romania’s progress towards pluralistic democracy and a free market economy is 
halting and far from secure. The violent events of June153 seriously undermined the 
government’s credibility both at home and abroad. The summer has been character-
ised by a wave of social unrest. romanian nationalism appears to be growing un-
checked. further economic decline will heighten domestic discontent and, given 
the continued weakness of the opposition and relative strength of the military and 
security services, may produce more authoritarian responses to domestic challenges.
66. The presidential and parliamentary elections in may resulted in a landslide 
victory for iliescu and the National salvation front (Nsf). some cases of vote-rig-
ging and intimidation were reported, but it is unlikely that they had any significant 
effect on the final outcome. however, the political situation remained tense after 
the elections. some groups refused to accept the results and occupied university 
square, demanding an end to communist and securitate influence in the govern-
ment. talks between the demonstrators and the government collapsed and on 13th 
June, and violence broke out. when the police failed to restore order, iliescu sum-
moned thousands of miners to “protect the revolution”. Aided and abetted by 
“agents provocateurs”, they stormed through the capital, beating up student and op-
position demonstrators, ransacking the headquarters of the main opposition parties 
and attacking innocent bystanders.
67. Between 13th and 15th June over 1000 people were arrested, some of 
whom are still detained. The government’s repression and human rights abuses 
caused a storm of international protest. The decision by western countries to freeze 
progress on trade and aid agreements helped persuade the authorities to improve 
access to the detainees and may have deterred them from further recourse to mob 
rule by the miners.
68. As a result of the violence, the government was not formed until 28th June. 
with petre roman as prime minister, it contains a number of relatively young min-
isters, several of whom are pro-market, but lacks political and administrative experi-
ence. The newly elected parliament is still plagued by lack of formal procedural or-
der and rules. The Nsf controls both chambers but has yet to initiate substantive 
legislation. A constitutional commission has begun work on drafting a new consti-
tution but does not expect it to be promulgated for 18 months.
153  Between 1990 and 1999 there were six mineriadă protests of miners, the most significant taking 
place on June 13–15, 1990. The miners of the Jiu valley travelled to Bucharest to “restore order” 
among those who were demonstrating for democratic elections and the resignation of ion iliescu. 
The miners occupied and damaged several buildings and clashed with protesting crowds on uni-
versity square in Bucharest.
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69. since the new parliament began work, several parties have split or re-
grouped. There is, however, still no opposition large enough to play an effective role. 
There are also signs of splits within the Nsf itself. roman seems to have more re-
formist leanings and a better sense of the importance of human rights than iliescu. 
while iliescu’s position looks strong enough in constitutional terms, his perfor-
mance suggests that he is ill-suited to his role, and public confidence in the Nsf is 
diminishing.
70. The problems surrounding the hungarian minority persist. Although the 
minority’s party, the hDur, exhibited the most effective organisation by an oppo-
sition group in the elections, emerging as the second largest party in the parliament, 
the Nsf has so far failed to satisfy the hDur’s demands as regards the rights of the 
hungarian minority, and there is much potential for further discord. The govern-
ment has to some extent allowed the romanian nationalist lobby a free rein, possi-
bly to distract attention from the worsening economic situation.
71. economic prospects are poor and performance in many areas is down on 
1989. inflation, not yet a problem, could soar if price controls are lifted. unemploy-
ment was significant at midyear and rising. food supplies to the population in-
creased substantially during the first half of the year, but only when measured 
against the pitiful levels of the ceaucescu [ceausescu] years and shortfalls in supply 
continue to be reported. The iliescu government is slowly loosening central controls 
over the economy but has yet to announce a comprehensive reform programme. in 
July, parliament passed a law on privatisation that requires most state owned com-
panies to transfer 30% of their assets to a new national privatisation agency, and the 
government foresees 70% of the economy in private hands in three years. Neverthe-
less, the political environment necessary for market oriented reforms to flourish is 
still a long way off in romania.
72. in foreign affairs, romania would clearly like to strengthen its relations 
with the west and appears to understand the need to improve its human rights and 
democratisation record in order to meet the conditions for aid. The trade and 
co-operation agreement with the ec which was suspended following the events of 
13th to 15th June is to be signed in october. romania’s adherence to the policy of 
sanctions against iraq is causing hardship at home but has helped its image abroad. 
iliescu made his first official foreign visit to Yugoslavia where he expressed support 
for Balkan co-operation and proposed the establishment of a regional csce forum 
in the Balkans, and also visited New York for the uNGA. romania has expressed 
the wish to attend sessions of the pentagonale154 as an observer.
154  see footnotes 118 and 135.
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iX. YuGoslAViA: the outlooK
73. The erosion of the Yugoslav federation accelerated during the last half year. slo-
venia and croatia elected anti-communist governments in April/may multiparty 
contests, increasing the distance between them and the more authoritarian and cen-
tralist government of serbia. The economic programme introduced by the federal 
government at the end of last year continued to hold down inflation, but prime 
minister markovic has been unable to duplicate his economic success on the politi-
cal stage. The country’s overriding problem, Kosovo, grew steadily more intractable. 
serbia’s dissolution of the provincial government, selective firing of Albanian work-
ers, and militia occupation of the streets finally goaded ousted Albanian officials to 
declare an independent Kosovo republic and promulgate a constitution. most Yu-
goslavs now doubt that the country can continue in its present form, and even a 
confederal arrangement that includes all the republics is in doubt. The army remains 
the only force which is committed to the integrity of Yugoslavia.
74. After several unsuccessful attempts in the early spring to ressuscitate [resus-
citate] the league of communists of Yugoslavia, effectively dissolved when the slo-
venes walked out in January, even the serbian party gave up the attempt and, at a 
July congress, merged with its socialist alliance front to form the socialist party of 
serbia.
75. meanwhile, free elections in the republics, beginning in April, have brought 
to power leaders with dramatically different visions of Yugoslavia’s future. in slove-
nia, a coalition of anti-communist parties (Demos) won the majority of assembly 
seats, while the head of the reformed communist party (party of Democratic 
change) took the presidency.155 The government has since been drafting a new con-
stitution to define the republic’s “confederal” relation to the rest of Yugoslavia. The 
croatian elections were swept by a nationalist movement, the croatian Democratic 
union, led by franjo tudjman, who became the republic’s president. tudjman’s ex-
ploitation of nationalist symbols during the campaign and the serbian reaction 
aroused croatia’s serbian minority, some 12% of the population. in serbia, presi-
dent milosevic was elected president of the newly-formed socialist party of serbia, 
reuniting party and state powers in a manner directly contrary to the prevailing 
trend in eastern europe. elections are to be held in November in the republics of 
Bosnia–hercegovina and macedonia. There has been talk about elections in the 
republic of serbia, and at the federal level, but up to now no firm commitments 
have been made.
155  milan Kučan was the chairman of the ZKs (league of communists of slovenia) in 1986–1989, 
which was the predecessor (also in a legal sense) of the sDp (stranka demokratične prenove – 
party of Democratic change). he became the president of the collective presidency of slovenia 
in 1990–1992. for additional information see the Biographical notes in the Appendix.
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76. on the future structure of the country, the serbian authorities’ initial posi-
tion was to insist that the only possibility was a federation. Gradually, they appear 
to have realised that a serious discussion of the future of the federation must take 
place. federal president Jovic then took the initiative and proposed that there 
should be a referendum on the future federal structure. The proposal is likely to 
anger the slovenes and croats, as the cornerstone of their position is that republi-
can interests are paramount, and that any attempt to impose unwelcome constitu-
tional and legal reforms on the individual republics is unacceptable. croatia and 
slovenia have been considering ideas for a confederation.
77. These political developments are taking place against a backdrop of sporad-
ic inter-ethnic unrest. There have been clashes in croatia, in Bosnia, and in Kosovo.
78. The situation in Kosovo remains intractable. earlier in the summer the ser-
bian authorities took over virtual control in the province after Albanian delegates to 
the Assembly had declared that they would not accept the new serbian constitu-
tion. in early september a one day strike was held in protest. There have been further 
clashes between serbs and Albanians. The decision to promulgate a constitution 
taken at a covert meeting of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly on 7 september, was a 
direct challenge to the serbs and may have brought ethnic tensions to breaking 
point. The serbian authorities immediately sought to arrest the members of the As-
sembly who had adopted the constitution and four Albanians lost their lives in in-
cidents the following week.
79. Against this background of fragmentation, Ante markovic is trying to con-
tinue with his package of economic reform, but with increasing difficulty. markovic 
himself remains popular, and the only politician at federal level with any real degree 
of credibility, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for him to impose his will and 
push through his reforms.
X. AlBANiA: prospects for iNterNAl reform
80. Albania remains europe’s only totalitarian communist state; nevertheless, it is 
showing signs of opening up to the outside world. Domestic political and economic 
reform has as yet been marginal but the foreign policy changes – especially over-
tures to the csce – may well force the pace of domestic change.
81. Albania now has diplomatic relations with well over one hundred coun-
tries. party chief and head of state ramiz Alia speeded up the process when, on 17 
April at the 10th plenum of the Albanian workers party’s central committee, he 
expressed the desire to open diplomatic relations with the united states, the soviet 
union and the european community, and announced a liberalisation of travel pro-
visions, including issuing passports more freely. The timing of the Alia “democrati-
sation” initiative was presumably keyed to the visit, from 11 to 13 may, of the uN 
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secretary General Javier perez de cuellar who welcomed the moves, but under-
scored international concern with the human rights situation in Albania.
82. tirana’s official communications with western governments concerning 
its request to join the csce as a full participant before the paris summit in Novem-
ber156 stressed Albania’s adherence to the principles of the 1975 helsinki Declara-
tion,157 but omitted any reference to the csce sessions of the past 15 years. The 
Albanian regime, however, has not committed itself to implementation of the pro-
visions of specific csce documents, such as multiparty elections and free and com-
petitive market economies.158
83. Diplomatic relations with the ussr were re-established in August and a 
trade delegation visited moscow in september. Albania also made an effort in 
April–June to remove a number of longstanding irritants in bilateral relations with 
neighbouring countries; for example, six Albanians who had been living in the ital-
ian embassy in tirana for years were permitted to leave the country, as were two 
brothers who had been the subject of a number of démarches by the Greek govern-
ment. meanwhile the difficult conditions under which the Greek minority lives re-
main unchanged.
84. The regime took a much harder line in early July, when thousands of Alba-
nians took refuge in foreign embassies in tirana. The police used force to block 
entrance to the diplomatic premises and on several occasions entered diplomatic 
compounds to forcibly remove asylum seekers. But with the international spotlight 
on the drama, an apparently embarrassed government was moved to isolate the 
problem and find ways to get those already in embassies out of the country.
85. internal reforms thus far seem to be driven primarily by foreign policy in-
terests; that is, the Alia government seems willing to make only those internal 
changes necessary to gain acceptance in the international community. Albanians 
still have difficulty getting passports and permission for foreign travel. The govern-
ment has constructed a wall around the embassy section in tirana and turned it 
into a ghetto. economic reforms have been marginal: the size of private plots has 
156  This refers to the summit of the csce held in paris, November 19–21, 1990, where the europe-
an security policy, the economic situation in eastern europe, and the Gulf crisis (Kuwait) was 
discussed. on November 21, the charter of paris for a New europe was signed, which reflects the 
last fifteen years after the helsinki Accords (the development of free democratic elections as the 
only acceptable form of government, freedom rights, and minority rights) and proposes methods 
of future cooperation.
157  The final Act of helsinki (helsinki Declaration, helsinki Accords) is an agreement containing 
political obligations for the 35 countries of the csce who signed the treaty on August 1, 1975. 
in involved three groups of questions (“baskets”): common european security; scientific, eco-
nomic, technical and environmental cooperation; and humanitarian and other cooperation (es-
pecially in human rights) between member states.
158  Albania, which was not among the signatory states in 1975, requested full partnership at the 
paris summit, but was awarded only observer status.
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been increased, prices for sale of garden produce have been decontrolled, crafts 
shops may be opened, and religious propaganda has been decriminalised (although 
churches and mosques were not reopened). Alia has expressed a strong interest in 
western investment and indicated that Albania would permit the repatriation of 
hard currency profits from joint ventures, but no legislation or regulations have 
been enacted to liberalise treatment of foreign investors.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(90)66 (No-
vember 20, 1990).
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CONSEIL DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH DOCUMENT
24th April 1991 
c-m(91)18
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe 
octoBer 1990 to mArch 1991
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach a report on “The situation in the soviet union and eastern eu-
rope” forwarded to me by the chairman of the expert working Group which met 
at NAto headquarters from 25th–27th march 1991.
2. i would remind you that the report is the responsibility only of those ex-
perts who participated in the working Group.
3. This report will be placed on the Agenda of the council meeting on 2nd 
may 1991.
 (signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto,
1110 Brussels
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND eAsterN europe
Note by the chairman of the expert Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
united states met at NAto headquarters from 25th to 27th march 1991 to pre-
pare the attached report.
2. This document covers the period 20th october 1990 to 27th march 1991.
(signed) h. J. peters
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i. GeNerAl treNDs AND outlooK
1. Soviet domestic politics took a turn to more conservative positions during the 
last half year, primarily because of the democratic forces’ disorganization, a growing 
assertiveness on the part of traditionalists, and the continued unravelling of ethnic, 
social and economic structures. As a result, the military-industrial complex, the se-
curity services, and the cpsu apparatus have become more influential in both do-
mestic and foreign affairs.
2. Republic pressure for greater autonomy and even outright independence 
has shifted the internal political climate in the soviet union significantly. faced 
with a threat to the integrity of the union, the Kremlin has chosen to clamp down 
rather than permit the centrifugal spiral to continue. media controls, greater KGB 
visibility, and joint army/mVD patrols in the union’s cities are all part of this effort.
177
DocumeNt 7
3. The establishment of the council of the federation as the main official 
body within the presidency, the growing voice of the republics in budgetary mat-
ters, and the role played by republican representatives in negotiation of the new 
union treaty all suggest that the republics that are willing to remain within the 
union are gaining power at the expense of the centre and may well continue to do 
so in the future.
4. These developments have tended to circumscribe Gorbachev’s power, al-
though he still enjoys considerable freedom of manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the loss of 
most, if not all, of the original team that introduced perestroika, notably the resigna-
tion of shevardnadze, has weakened the reformist impulse, at least for the moment. 
Yeltsin’s challenge, moreover, could pose serious dangers for Gorbachev, particularly if 
Yeltsin is able to become a popularly elected president of the russian federation.
5. meanwhile, the negative factors that caused economic deterioration in 1990 
accelerated as the soviet union entered 1991. The country’s central administrative 
apparatus has been hampered, and there has been no viable replacement. on the 
contrary, since the defeat of the shatalin 500-day radical plan last october, mar-
ket-oriented economic reform has been thrown into disarray. After nearly 18 
months of furious debate and false starts, economic reform is still floundering. ret-
rograde decrees and public statements by the new prime minister and the head of 
the KGB on the economy are further steps away from reform.
6. on the foreign policy front, Gorbachev remains persuaded that the basic 
innovations associated with “new thinking”159 still serve soviet interests. The do-
mestic imperatives that argued for “new thinking” – the need for foreign economic 
support and a stable international environment – remain compelling. The tone and 
style of soviet foreign policy have changed, however. At the very least, some of the 
nimbleness and intellectual vitality associated with shevardnadze is gone. further, 
domestic challenges have forced Gorbachev to rely more on traditional sources of 
power. Given the resurgence of more conservative voices, the public debate on for-
eign policy issues has sharpened. one result has been an emphasis on pursuing pol-
icy lines less visibly identified with the west, notably on arms control issues.
7. with the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty’s military structure de-
cided on 25th february, and the likelihood that both the warsaw treaty itself and 
the cmeA will soon formally cease to exist, the soviet union’s relations with its 
former allies in eastern europe have entered a new phase. They are now negotiating, 
or intend to negotiate, new bilateral treaties with the soviet union (and with each 
other) containing elements of passive security. separate agreements on military 
co-operation dealing with matters such as the purchase and resupply of equipment 
are likely to follow. These agreements may go some way towards meeting concerns 
159  see footnote 57.
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about a security vacuum in eastern europe as well as reducing the soviet union’s 
sense of isolation. moscow may also try to insist on a strictly neutral status for these 
countries, analogous to that of finland or Austria, while trying to preserve a droit 
de regard for itself in the region. it already views with suspicion the declaration on 
 triangular co-operation signed by hungary, czechoslovakia and poland at Visegrad 
on 15 february, as well as their aspirations to have closer relations with NAto.
8. two issues – the desirability of radical, market-oriented economic reform and 
the adequacy of efforts to purge the communist nomenklatura from positions of influ-
ence – dominated politics in poland, hungary and czechoslovakia. having won elec-
tion as Poland’s president, walesa chose to retain Vice-premier Balcerowicz and voiced 
general support for continuation of the “shock therapy” of his reforms. This alienated 
many of his campaign supporters as well as the new leadership of solidarity, which has 
brandished the threat of general strikes to win rollbacks of wage controls and subsidy 
cuts. A similar cleavage split the Czech civic forum, divided between a right-of-center, 
radical reform party led by finance minister Klaus, and a liberal “movement” commit-
ted to improvements in the social safety net. The vetting of former secret police “collab-
orators” in czechoslovakia also threatened to compromise senior federal, czech, and 
slovak officials. in Hungary, the Antall government maintained a decisive majority 
coalition but appeared increasingly vulnerable to accusations of hesitancy in develop-
ing a clear economic programme and – as in the case of arms sales to Yugoslavia – to 
establish effective controls over military and intelligence activities.
9. Balkan politics, by contrast, remained bogged down in the fundamental 
controversy over the legitimacy of communist or successor parties in implementing 
democratization and market reforms – even when such parties had come to power 
through essentially free elections.
10. only in Bulgaria did the advent of a coalition government in December 
1990 finally permit adoption of a radical reform programme acceptable to the 
imf.160 it also appeared to leave the opposition union of Democratic forces161 and 
Agrarian party well positioned to win local and national parliamentary elections as 
early as this spring. in Romania, by contrast, the National salvation front (NsfG) 
government’s efforts to enunciate and implement slightly less ambitious reforms 
aroused substantial opposition from organized labor, including two serious rounds 
of transport strikes. A disunited collection of urban intellectuals, trade unions, and 
parliamentary opposition parties perceives the Nsf as a communist movement op-
posed to market reforms and unwilling to reform the secret police. however, a ma-
jority of the population continues to support the government.
* * *
160  see footnote 9.
161  see footnote 123.
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11. Yugoslav politics remained totally dominated by efforts to find a new mo-
dus vivendi in face of competing visions of the best possible future relationship. This 
follows the traumatic events in Belgrade in early march162 from which new hope 
emerged that flexibility will be shown in efforts to find a solution. The economic 
reforms begun by prime minister markovic in 1989 have been severely hampered by 
political conflict but a minimal agreement will hopefully emerge on a government 
programme for the transitional period.
12. in Albania, communist leader ramiz Alia progressively yielded to demands 
for democratization to an extent unimaginable only six months earlier. in rapid suc-
cession, he got rid of some of the leading hard line elements from the ruling workers’ 
party, permitted formation and registration of opposition parties, delayed sched-
uled parliamentary elections to permit them time to organize, and allowed forma-
tion of independent unions and an independent human rights organization. Alba-
nia, however, still faces enormous economic problems and powerful conservative 
forces which could derail the reform process.
ii. the eXercise of politicAl power iN the soViet uNioN
13. rejection of shatalin’s radical economic programme, the enhancement of Gor-
bachev’s presidential powers, the crackdown in the Baltic republics and increasing 
control of the mass media all represented a shift away from the broadly reformist 
programme of the early days of perestroika.
14. Although Gorbachev appeared to support it last summer, the shatalin eco-
nomic reform plan eventually lost out because it gave too much power to the repub-
lics and called for too rapid a switch to a market economy, steps threatening to many 
of the industrial managers. Gorbachev’s turn to more conservative economic figures 
represents a commitment to give economic stabilization priority over efforts to 
move towards a modified or regulated market economy.
15. Gorbachev asked in mid-November for establishment of a presidential 
form of government with greater formal powers for himself and the council of the 
federation. This reorganization which included transformation of the council of 
ministers into a cabinet of ministers subordinated to the president and abolition of 
the presidential council, is still in process. it is intended, however, to give Gor-
bachev and the republics greater power to meet more effectively the many challeng-
es posed by the growing crisis within the country.
162  on march 7, 1991, disregarding its prohibition by the serbian government, a crowd of almost 
a hundred thousand people protested on the streets of Belgrade to demand the resignation of 
the milošević government and the television leadership. tanks, armored cars, and riot police 
attacked the protesting crowd. two victims died, more than 90 were injured, and 600 were 
arrested.
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16. The crackdown in the Baltics appeared at the time to presage a decided 
turn to the right and the likelihood of presidential rule in the Baltics and perhaps 
elsewhere. Gorbachev’s defence on 14 January of the previous day’s killings in 
lithua nia163 fostered this impression since he appeared to countenance illegal ac-
tions taken by the military. The role of the mVD in the subsequent events in latvia 
suggested further that the security forces were united in the need for repressive ac-
tion and would be able to get their way. subsequent events have, however, weakened 
this impression; the Baltic republics still enjoy some degree of internal autonomy 
and the armed forces have had to return to their barracks. lithuania’s ability to con-
duct its plebiscite on independence and to establish, with regime compliance, its 
own postal service, as well as latvia’s and estonia’s plebiscites on independence, sug-
gest that moscow might be prepared to tolerate a wide range of activities in the 
Baltics as long as they do not directly confront the soviet authorities there.
17. in recent months, Gorbachev has pointed to the deterioration of executive 
power at all levels of government as one of the major dangers facing the country. his 
reform of the presidency is one step toward repairing this situation, and proposals 
for changes at lower levels have addressed the same problem of making old institu-
tions – soviets and their executive committees – serve new democratic objectives. 
Another step in this direction has been the enhanced power given to the republics 
in Gorbachev’s latest reorganizations.
18. how much additional authority has actually been given to the republics is 
still unclear. The performance of the council of the federation to date suggests that 
Gorbachev recognizes he will succeed only if he is able to enlist the support of a 
majority of the republics and that he is willing to give them new powers to gain this 
support. Negotiations between the centre and the republics over the 1991 ussr 
state budget indicated a shift of power and responsibilities to the republics that may 
become more pronounced in coming months.
19. improved relations with the republics, and the revised claim to represent a 
political centre that Gorbachev stressed in his visit to Bielorussia, are the basis for 
his latest tactics for coping with the traditionalists. These steps have become par-
ticularly important in light of the failure of the democratic forces to unite and de-
velop a cohesive programme. furthermore, the hopes created by the establishment 
of freely elected soviets at the republic and local levels earlier in 1990 did not mate-
rialize as they failed to become agents of democratic reform. under these circum-
163  on January 13, 1991, just a few hours after Gorbachev had confirmed at the session of the su-
preme soviet that he did not want to use force, soviet military troops occupied the buildings of 
the radio and television and some ministries in Vilnius. The occupation of parliament was hin-
dered by a living chain of lithuanian civilians. At least thirteen people were crushed by tanks, 
and 230 were injured.
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stances, Gorbachev has had to look elsewhere for support to maintain his own free-
dom of manoeuvre.
20. Yeltsin is meanwhile stepping up his direct challenge to Gorbachev, laying 
the groundwork for the establishment of the position of a popularly-elected presi-
dent of the russian federation, a post he expects to win. The intensity of the attacks 
each has made on the other recently suggests that at least under present political 
circumstances, neither is seeking compromise, but the defeat of the other. Yeltsin 
holds many cards, including his personal popularity, the low esteem in which many 
russians hold Gorbachev, and growing social discontent. on the other hand, he has 
not yet had to stand the test of political responsibility, and his impulsive tempera-
ment and political inconsistency may make him vulnerable.
iii. the soViet uNioN : the iNcreAseD politicAl role  
of the ArmY, the KGB AND the cpsu
21. Gorbachev’s new reliance on the traditional instruments of power in order to 
strengthen the authority of the centre has been accompanied by a rapid growth in 
the political prominence of the army, the KGB and – once again – the cpsu. in 
speeches during his visit to Bielorussia at the end of february Gorbachev described 
the army and the KGB as “the institutions which form the pillar of statehood” and 
called for the “renewed cpsu” to form the nucleus of a “coalition of centrist forc-
es”. The revival of the old power structure has been facilitated by the failure of the 
new democratic structures to function cohesively or effectively.
The Armed Forces
22. The new political prominence of the army was strikingly underlined by the re-
cent attendance of Gorbachev for the first time at the traditional meeting on 22 
february to mark Armed forces day164 and at the mass demonstration in support of 
the army organised in central moscow on the following day. only about 18 months 
ago the army’s prestige, influence and public profile had reached a low ebb. in the 
summer of 1989 General Yazov was barely confirmed as minister of Defence and a 
supreme soviet resolution forced the release of students from military service 
against bitter military opposition. military uniforms had almost disappeared from 
164  The day of the armed forces was first celebrated in soviet russia in 1919, commemorating the 
first mass enlistment in the red Army on february 17, 1918. in January 1919 the celebration of 
this event was merged with the commemoration of the establishment of the red Army. in 1919 
the date february 17 happened to be a monday. Thus, the celebrations were postponed to the 
next sunday, february 23. from then on this became the date of the commemoration, originally 
named the Day of the red Army. Beginning in 1923 it became the Day of the red Army and the 
fleet, renamed in 1949 as the Day of the soviet Army and the fleet.
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the lenin mausoleum on ceremonial occasions. The armed forces were being reviled 
in the press for their intervention in tbilisi in April 1989165 and in Baku in January 
1990166; for the bullying of recruits; and for devouring the lion’s share of the na-
tion’s economic resources. The military counter-attack was launched last year with 
outspoken speeches at the rsfsr and All-union party congresses excoriating the 
“anti-army” press and questioning “new thinking” in soviet foreign policy. in No-
vember Gorbachev was heckled at his meeting with military deputies.
23. The military have recently adopted an increasingly overt political role. At the 
february plenum, the chief of the General staff moiseev made an outspoken attack 
on Boris Yeltsin. Dozens of generals have signed letters in the military and party press 
condemning Yeltsin for his comments following the Vilnius killings in January. The 
group of public figures who appealed in January to Gorbachev to declare a state of 
emergency and introduce presidential rule in zones of major conflicts if “constitution-
al methods” proved ineffective included the Deputy minister of Defence Varennikov, 
the chief of the General staff moiseev, marshal Kulikov, Admiral chernavin (the 
Naval commander in chief ) and General shatalin (head of the mVD troops).
24. At the party congresses last summer the generals were shouting their com-
plaints from the wings. Now their views are being voiced from near the centre of the 
political stage. marshal Akhromeev, Gorbachev’s military adviser, and author of an 
outspoken article in Sovetskaya Rossiya last November which referred to the possible 
use of the army to preserve the unity of the state and its social system, has recently 
published a keynote article on soviet foreign policy in Pravda (admittedly in much 
more measured terms). Yazov, now promoted marshal and recently reconfirmed by 
the supreme soviet as minister of Defence in the new cabinet, this time with a solid 
majority, recently published an interview in Pravda for Army Day in which he ap-
peared to take issue with official policies on a number of fronts, suggesting that the us 
bombing in the Gulf had gone beyond the uN security council’s mandates167; ex-
pressing alarm at “one-sided concessions” in arms control agreements; and rebuking 
the supreme soviet for last year abolishing the draft of students.
165  The nationalist riots in Georgia (see footnote 138 and 170) were transformed into mass protests 
for independence in April 1989, which were brutally suppressed by soviet forces in tbilisi. six-
teen persons, mainly women, were killed: they were brutally beaten or died in a gas attack.
166  in order to hinder the escalation of tensions between Armenians and Azeris, the supreme soviet 
of the soviet union introduced state of emergency for the whole area of the ssr of Azerbaijan 
(excluding the capital, Baku) on January 15, 1990. This was extended to the capital several days 
later. more than 26,000 soldiers were deployed to restore public order in Baku on January 19–20, 
1990.
167  The uN security council condemned iraq because of the attack on Kuwait (decision 661) and 
implemented economic sanctions against the aggressor (see footnotes 136 and 148). After long 
diplomatic negotiations, on November 29, 1990 the uN delivered an ultimatum to iraq (deci-
sion 678) to withdraw its forces by January 15, 1991. At the same time it authorized the interna-
tional coalition to implement the decisions with “any necessary means.”
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25. formerly, especially after the bloodshed in tbilisi in April 1989, the army 
appeared reluctant to be drawn into internal politics or to take on the “inappropri-
ate role” of maintaining public order. in Vilnius in January the security forces 
seemed only too eager to take the law into their own hands; while the appointment 
of General Gromov as first Deputy minister for internal affairs and the joint decree 
by the ministry of Defence and the ministry of internal Affairs of December 1990, 
recently backed by presidential edict, has institutionalised the army’s involvement 
in policing functions. in the Baltic republics and increasingly elsewhere the army 
has become a significant political constituency.
The KGB
26. The KGB as an institution came under severe attack under glasnost as revela-
tions multiplied about its past crimes and abuses and pressure grew to reduce its 
powers in keeping with the proclaimed intention of introducing a state based on the 
rule of law and parliamentary democracy.
27. The response of the KGB was to launch a public relations campaign stress-
ing its less tainted role in foreign intelligence (from which most of its new leader-
ship has been recruited), and to shift the emphasis of its internal activities from 
countering political subversion to the fight against organised crime and corruption. 
however, new functions and rights recently assigned to the KGB in a series of pres-
idential edicts have in practice given it considerable power to interfere in and influ-
ence the economy; those powers in turn are being exploited to influence the inter-
nal political struggle.
28. The new economic powers acquired by the KGB in recent months include:
a) to check on distribution of food and consumer goods, together with 
 workers control bodies.
b) to monitor the implementation of the monetary exchange together with
 Gosbank168 and the ministry of finance. to take part in “special groups”
 for this purpose sent to central and republic banks.
c) Additional powers to enter “without hindrance” the premises of enterprises
 and organisations including joint ventures, cooperatives and individual 
 businessmen; to search for and confiscate documents; to check goods and
 raw materials; obtain information on foreign economic deals concluded 
 by any organisation.
d) to investigate, together with the ministry of internal Affairs, criminal 
 associations with inter-republican, international and “corrupt” links.
168  Gosbank, the central Bank of the soviet union, was the only bank in the country between the 
1930s and 1987. it was one of several soviet economic authorities.
184
Secret NAtO repOrtS AbOut the eASt eurOpeAN trANSitiON, 1988–1991
29. There are clear signs that the KGB is in fact using its powers for specific 
economic and political ends. A series of commercial “scandals” which the KGB has 
exposed (and probably set up) have served to discredit prominent democratic poli-
ticians, eg rsfsr Deputy prime minister filshin, and the rsfsr Deputy and 
chairman of the moscow cooperatives Association, Artem tarasov.
30. Kryuchkov’s own public statements make it clear that the KGB has a vest-
ed interest in stirring up hostility towards the market economy and that it is success-
fully exerting influence on economic policy.
31. The KGB is clearly acquiring increased authority and influence in the deci-
sion-making process. At a meeting in November last year with a group of people’s 
deputies Kryuchkov said that the KGB should be represented as “a structural part” 
of the new security council (to which Kryuchkov has now been appointed). he 
suggested that part of the KGB’s role would be to provide the council with “an an-
alytical service” on political developments in the soviet union and abroad. The 
KGB is already a rival to the mfA in supplying intelligence on foreign affairs and 
the principal source of information for the leadership of internal political develop-
ments.
THE CPSU
32. The cpsu, apparently destined for the political sidelines following the aban-
donment of its constitutionally enshrined leading role and failure to reform itself at 
the 28th party congress, is again reasserting itself. Gorbachev, who had appeared to 
distance himself from the party, is now increasingly identifying himself publicly 
with the cpsu, describing it insistently as “the ruling party”, which, as he claimed 
in minsk on 26 february has “gained the upper hand”.
33. party officials are being assigned to key posts in the state and government 
hierarchy, notably Yanaev as Vice president and pugo as minister for internal Af-
fairs. And among Gorbachev’s advisers, academics are being replaced by party func-
tionaries. party officials are also involving themselves more overtly in policy matters. 
The politburo and secretariat no longer confine their agenda to internal party mat-
ters. The party groups in the ussr and the rsfsr supreme soviets are beginning 
to function in a more active way.
The Failure of the New Structures
34. The rise in influence of the old instruments of power has been facilitated by the 
failure of the new state structures to function effectively as a system of political pow-
er. This is partly due to the uncontrollable dynamic of the rapidly unfolding politi-
cal power struggle.
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35. Gorbachev set up the new state structures in 1988–90 in order to outflank 
cpsu opposition to economic reform while creating a legitimate democratic basis 
for political power, but the new institutions lacked any effective mechanism for im-
plementing central decisions and maintaining nation-wide cohesion to replace the 
former nomenklatura.
36. in spite of their successes in the spring 1990 local and republic elections, the 
reformers virtually abandoned any attempt to gain influence at the centre, which as a 
consequence came increasingly to be dominated by the right. republic institutions 
then sought to increase their own power at the expense of the centre, ignoring or over-
riding presidential edicts and engaging in the “war of laws”. Democratically elected 
local soviets proved equally unresponsive to central instructions and embarked on 
uncoordinated policies, which often reflected their inexperience or incompetence.
37. The essential weakness of the centre was Gorbachev’s own lack of real le-
gitimacy as a president elected by a quasi-democratic congress rather than by pop-
ular vote. his attempts to shore up his authority by accumulating more and more 
formal powers only compounded the problem and underlined his impotence. The 
frequent constitutional amendments and changes in the power structure under-
mined the centre’s credibility, further damaged by the constitutional anarchy un-
leashed by the republics.
iV. the NAtioNAlitY issue iN the soViet uNioN
38. in the Baltics, the quest for independence posed the most direct challenge, and 
became the focal point for a heavy-handed Kremlin response. After the soviet Defence 
ministry announcement that troops would be moved into the Baltics and other re-
publics to enforce the draft, a violent confrontation took place on 13 January at the 
Vilnius tV tower which left 15 dead and hundreds wounded. public announcements 
that a shadowy national salvation committee had taken over the republic further in-
flamed the situation. The lithuanian leadership barricaded itself inside the supreme 
council building, soviet forces occupied other communications facilities, and sporad-
ic clashes occured [occurred] throughout the republic. But in the face of strong inter-
national and domestic criticism, a stalemate evolved; the centre attempted to distance 
itself from the events, the central press began a coverup [cover-up], and Gorbachev, 
Defence minister Yazov, and mVD chief pugo all sidestepped accountability.
39. The talks that were supposed to get underway last fall have not yet started, 
and after the Vilnius violence, lithuania announced that they would not be possi-
ble until the radio and tV facilities and other occupied buildings are returned to 
local control. The Kremlin named a new team for the talks, replacing the one an-
nounced last July, but neither side now seems to place much faith in the process. in 
its own response to the All-union 17 march referendum on the future of the un-
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ion, lithuania held an independence poll on 9 february. Days before the poll Gor-
bachev issued a decree declaring it “juridically invalid”. Nevertheless, 85 percent of 
the voters participated and 91 percent of them voted for independence.
40. fears of a soviet crackdown in latvia began growing in November, after a 
war of words broke out between the latvian supreme council and moscow over 
the status of soviet military personnel in the republic. following the lithuanian 
tV tower episode, the latvians erected barricades throughout riga to block soviet 
military access. Nevertheless, black beret units attacked and occupied a number of 
latvian institutions, including the press center and a police training school. A 20 
January black beret attack on the local mVD building resulted in 5 killed and a 
number of wounded. with tension high, the latvian parliament decided to follow 
lithuania’s example and held its own vote on independence on 3 march; over 77 
percent of the 88.9 eligible who voted opted for independence.
41. estonia also held an independence referendum. 77.8 percent (82.9 percent 
of the eligible participated) voted for independence on 3 march. it has, however, 
managed to hold to a less confrontational approach. strikes organized by russian 
nationalist interfront forces and several bomb explosions in tallinn, evidently part 
of a deliberate effort to destabilize the situation, did not result in bloodshed.
42. several jurisdictions of the rsfsr have also accelerated their drive for 
greater autonomy. Thirteen of the rsfsr’s sixteen autonomous republics have 
passed sovereignty declarations proclaiming the supremacy of their laws over those 
of the rsfsr or the union. All expressed an intent to remain in the soviet union, 
and to sign the union treaty, but two, tataria and the chechen–ingush republic, 
have chosen to secede from the russian federation.169 As in the rest of the union, 
the autonomous republics are plagued by a host of economic and environmental 
problems and seek greater sovereignty in order to control their own resources.
43. under pressure from a growing independence movement, the ukrainian 
Government made serious attempts to implement its June 1990 sovereignty Decla-
ration. The parliament, despite its communist majority, gave in to student demands 
last october that prime minister masol resign and that a new republic constitution 
be adopted before a union treaty is signed. public protest, aroused by the arrests of 
169  Though tatarstan (tatar Autonomous ssr) declared its independence from the soviet union 
on August 30, 1990 and in 1992 a referendum was held about the new constitution also declaring 
independence (supported by the 62% of the participants), full sovereignty was not achieved as 
the russian constitutional court considered it unconstitutional. The chechen–ingush Assr 
was divided into two parts on June 4, 1992. ingushetia remained part of the russian federation, 
while the legal status of chechnya continued to be debated after two wars of the republic of 
chechnya against russia (1994–1996, 1999–2000). in 2009 the russian troops left the region, 
while a government of pro-russian chechens was formed. As a result of the second chechen 
war, chechnya remained subject to the russian federation.
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opposition Deputy Khmara and of a western ukrainian religious leader, demon-
strate the difficulty of implementing a harder line toward political opposition.
44. Although over a hundred pro-independence political parties emerged in 
Georgia before its october multi-party parliament elections, the victorious round-
table party, led by now-president Gamsakhurdia, effectively dominates the parlia-
ment.170 The Gamsakhurdia government has adopted an extremely defiant attitude 
towards moscow; it immediately declared a 3–5 year transition to independence 
and began arming a newly-created national guard, which it plans to staff through 
compulsory republic conscription. Adding to tensions in the republic, tbilisi im-
posed a state of emergency in part of south ossetia after that autonomous region in 
mid-December declared itself a republic, independent of Georgia.171 since then, at 
least 33 have died in clashes between Georgians and ossetians, and the ussr 
 supreme soviet is debating intervention.
45. moldova is now split three ways, with a radical popular front, a moderate 
faction supporting sovereignty, and conservative communists favouring moscow – 
all contending for influence. republic president snegur has so far played a rather 
passive, but liberal, political role, and been tolerated by all three blocs, but the 
strains of polarization are beginning to tell; he threatened resignation in february 
and demanded more presidential power. separatist moves by the Gagauz minority 
in october,172 and by the russians and ukrainians in the Dnestr region in Novem-
170  Zviad Gamsakhurdia with his comrades in 1988 established the society of saint ilia the right-
eous, which was a religious organization and a political party at the same time. in the first demo-
cratic elections in Georgia the organization entered into alliance with the helsinki union of 
Georgia and other democratic forces establishing the round table – free Georgia (in Georgian: 
mrgvali magida — tavisupali sakartvelo) coalition obtaining 64% of the votes and majority in 
the supreme council of Georgia. for more details on the activity of Gamsakhurdia see the Bio-
graphical Notes.
171  After the red Army occupied Georgia in 1921, the south ossetian Autonomous region was 
organized within the Georgian ssr. on November 10, 1989 the regional council of south 
ossetia asked the supreme council of Georgia to reorganize the region into an autonomous 
republic. in the summer of 1990 the supreme council of Georgia prohibited the establish-
ment of regional parties. As a response on september 20 the establishment of the south osse-
tian Democratic republic within the soviet union was declared. The Georgian government 
led by Gamsakhurdia declared the December elections in ossetia illegal and on December 11 
the autonomy of the region was suppressed by the central government. As a response to this 
step moscow declared a state of emergency in south ossetia and sent troops to its seat, 
 tskhinvali. soon, on January 1, 1992, russian troops were suddenly withdrawn, after which a 
bloody civil war began.
172  The Gagauz are a turkish speaking, christian people who live mostly in one region of southern 
moldavia. The change in the constitution of the moldavian ssr in 1989, which established 
the moldavian official language, initiated heavy resistance among the minorities of moldova, 
including the Gagauz. They considered this the first step toward the unification of romania 
and moldavia. Thus the Gagauz ethnicity supported soviet, then russian orientation instead 
of unification.
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ber,173 were declared illegal by the Kishinev parliament and triggered a series of 
moldovan nationalist demonstrations against the minorities.
46. The Nagorno-Karabakh territorial dispute remains the key issue for Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan. Armed attacks by both sides in the outlying regions of the most-
ly Armenian-inhabited region have resulted in several deaths and serious local 
shortages of food and energy supplies. At the same time, Azerbaijani blockades of 
rail lines to Armenia have aggravated the already bleak economic conditions in the 
latter republic. The soviet military remains a forceful presence in Azerbaijan. The 
Armenian supreme soviet has been moving in a separatist direction and rejected 
the 17 march All-union referendum.
V. polAND: situAtioN iN the ruN  
up to the GeNerAl electioN
47. The momentum of political and economic reform has slowed over the last 6 
months. presidential elections were held at the end of 1990 and the campaign was 
bitter. They revealed the fragility of poland’s nascent democracy. walesa’s decisive 
victory over mazowiecki during the first round of balloting but failure to achieve a 
majority of ballots had been anticipated. most observers were shocked, however, 
when the premier finished third, falling behind stanislaw tyminski, a polish-born 
canadian entrepreneur who emerged from nowhere to capitalise on the collapse of 
support for the government and the divisions in the ranks of solidarity movement. 
he effectively tapped into the most disgruntled segment of the population by 
pledging instant wealth. in the second round run-off against tyminski on 9 Decem-
ber walesa won nearly three-quarters of the vote as mazowiecki’s supporters rallied 
to him against the tyminski threat.
48. walesa decided to retain Balcerowicz, believing that to do otherwise would 
risk loss of substantial international asssistance [assistance] but the decision alienat-
ed many key supporters and caused his first choice for premier, Jan olszewski, to 
withdraw. walesa then chose Jan Bielecki, a parliamentarian from the small liber-
al-democratic congress,174 for the premiership. Bielecki, deeply committed to free 
173  on september 2, 1990 the ukrainians and russians living along the Dniester river seceded from the 
moldavian soviet socialist republic and declared the independence of the transnistrian ssr. 
Though Gorbachev refused in his presidential decision to accept this, the separatist authorities re-
mained strong. on march 2, 1992 a conflict evolved between moldavia and the separatists that 
provoked the intervention of the fourteenth russian army in the conflict. According to the peace 
treaty of July 21, 1992, moldavia renounced its right of interference of any kind, but refused to ac-
knowledge the independence of transnistria, still considering it an integral part of moldavia.
174  The liberal-Democratic congress (KlD) was a conservative-liberal political formation in po-
land originating within solidarity and led by Donald tusk. it encouraged the adoption of a free 
market economy, the broadening of personal freedom and rights (in the catholic sense), europe-
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market reforms, appointed members of the mazowiecki government including Bal-
cerowicz and skubiszewski to his own cabinet and added several experts from his 
own movement. walesa meanwhile moved to increase the powers of the presidency 
vis-à-vis both the government and parliament. The idea was criticized as an improp-
er effort to enhance presidential authority, and he opted finally instead for a small, 
twelve-member advisory commission. The sejm rejected proposals for an election 
on may 26 and resolved to dissolve itself in the autumn. elections are to be held by 
the end of october.
49. some political parties have already begun to realign in anticipation of par-
liamentary elections. They are seeking either to forge coalitions or to turn existing 
coalitions into unified parties. The sejm voted in favour of a proportional electoral 
system last october. support for a mixed proportional/majority system has since 
increased amongst the larger parties in particular. At the end of february walesa 
sent the marshal of the sejm his own draft electoral law based on a mixed system. 
All political parties have the additional problem of establishing their identity with a 
public which is still confused over the splits within the solidarity movement. At the 
beginning of march the centre Alliance (pc), which supported walesa in the pres-
idential elections, established itself as a unified party under the same name, mod-
elled on Germany’s christian Democratic union. it is most likely to win the largest 
share of the vote. even on their own reckoning, however, this is unlikely to be more 
than 20 per cent, at most.
50. poland’s stabilization programme produced impressive results during the 
first half of 1990. The zloty exchange rate remained firm with minimal intervention 
but inflation is still stubbornly high, though much of it is associated with corrective 
price rises. inflation ended the year at a monthly rate of 5.9 percent and rose to 12 
percent in January 1991. structural change and systemic reform also continued to 
lag behind expectations. Against this backdrop, the economy continues to experi-
ence substantial negative growth. GDp fell 12 percent in 1990, with industrial pro-
duction in state enterprises falling 23 percent compared with 1989. observers note, 
however, that economic activity in poland does not give the appearance of a country 
in the throes of deep economic recession. it has shown enormous resilience in diffi-
cult times, increasing its output by 17 percent (private industrial output rose 8.5 
percent), according to official statistics. employment in the private sector now ac-
counts for 11.6 percent of non-agricultural employment. unemployment rose to 
1.1 million by the end of 1990, equivalent to 6.1 percent of the labor force. The 
monthly increase in job losses accompanying the decline of the public sector peaked 
in July, however, and diminished steadily during the remainder of the year. real 
an integration, rapid privatization, and the decentralization of the government. in 1991 the party 
obtained 7.5% of votes, which meant 37 seats in the sejm.
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wages fell nearly 31 percent in 1990. The bulk of the decline was early in the year. 
wages grew faster than prices beginning in July.
51. poland continued to post impressive gains in its hard currency trade ac-
counts during 1990. exports soared 39 percent to 11.9 billion dols [dollars]. The 
resulting trade surplus was more than double that achieved in 1989. for this reason, 
poland will continue to conduct some ruble-denominated trade in 1991 with Bul-
garia, czechoslovakia, hungary, and romania until its surpluses with those coun-
tries are reduced. The shift away from the old cmeA trade and payments mecha-
nism to hard currency settlement and world market prices in January 1991 means a 
further reduction in trade in the region.
52. in foreign policy, poland is working hard to develop close relations with 
western states and institutions. Negotiations are underway on an Association 
Agreement with the european community. After fully free elections have been 
held poland will join the council of europe. Negotiation of the “friendship and 
cooperation treaty” with Germany was interrupted while poland underwent its 
change of government, but have resumed. with the demise of the warsaw pact, 
poland is anxious to avoid a security vacuum in central and eastern europe. it is 
pursuing regional cooperation with czechoslovakia and hungary and should join 
the pentagonal175 in August. Good relations with the soviet union remain a neces-
sity. The new polish government condemned the soviet use of force against the Bal-
tic republics in January, but maintained a cautious line on the issues of lithuanian 
sovereignty and independence despite public pressure. An agreement has yet to be 
signed on the withdrawal of soviet troops from poland. The soviets want until 
1994 but the poles are insisting they leave by the end of 1991. This has led to diffi-
culties with the transit of troops through poland from the former GDr.
Vi. cZechosloVAKiA
53. in the general political field the problems of drafting new constitutions which 
will accommodate the often conflicting demands of the federation and slovakia 
found temporary solution in a law on the competences of the federal, czech and 
slovak governments passed by the federal Assembly in December. under this pow-
er-sharing agreement, the federation will retain control of defense, monetary, and 
foreign policies and continue to formulate domestic and foreign economic strategy. 
federal and republic budgetary and taxation authorities will be independent of each 
other. The two republics will control social policy, will have broad powers to regu-
late their own economies under the umbrella of a federal market, and will be able to 
enter into international agreements with the consent of the federation. The trilater-
175  see footnotes 117 and 135.
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al negotiations that produced this agreement represented a triumph of consensus 
politics, in which all three participants remained committed to the process and will-
ing to compromise to bring it to a successful conclusion.
54. some major areas of potential disagreement remain however to be re-
solved. The debate about the status of moravia and the insistence of the christian 
Democratic movement that the federation should be based on a treaty between 
“sovereign” czech and slovak republics which would delegate certain powers up-
wards to the federation, eg defence, highlight fundamental disagreements about the 
structure of the state which are likely to cause lively dispute. while clumsy handling 
might lead to the danger of slovak secession, public opinion polls in slovakia sug-
gest that at present there is limited popular support for independence. There is, 
however, undoubtedly support for a considerable measure of autonomy. The most 
likely outcome is a compromise producing a federation considerably looser than 
many czechs would wish. moravian aspirations could be satisfied by devolution 
within the czech republic, perhaps by the re-creation of czech and moravian pro-
vincial local governments.
55.  New parties and new inter-party alliances continue to be formed and 
strains in existing parties and movements have produced splits. some of the 
post-November 1989 parties are dividing along national lines with the slovak or-
ganisation becoming independent. The most significant feature of this process has 
been the evolution of civic forum176 into an alliance between a new right wing 
civic Democratic party consisting of supporters of Vaclav Klaus and a centre group 
called civic movement, including Jiri Dienstbier and supported by centre left social 
democratic elements who want to preserve the original concept of civic forum as a 
broad coalition. it was agreed, however, that the forum would continue to exist as 
an entity and its two constituent parts have agreed to a “firm” coalition until the 
June 1992 parliamentary elections. Divisions in the public against Violence177 are 
rather different although they may have the same result for pAV in the longer term.
56. Vaclav havel played an indispensable role both as president and the coun-
try’s moral leader by fostering a stable, tolerant climate to guide the transition from 
totalitarianism to democracy. he facilitated the negotiations over czech–slovak 
power-sharing and urged a moderate approach to the vetting of former communist 
officials; he may be the only political leader capable of maintaining the current 
screening process within reasonable limits. his great popularity probably ensures 
re-election in 1992 if he wants it, but his departure from political life cannot be 
precluded.
57. economic conditions worsened during 1990 as a result of uncertainties 
associated with economic reform and the deteriorating external environment. Net 
176  see footnote 113.
177  see footnote 114.
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material product178 fell an estimated 3.5 percent, led by declines in industrial pro-
duction and in construction activity. Agricultural output is expected to show some 
growth. Devaluation raised the cost of imported imputs, [inputs] particularly of oil, 
which was already in short supply. The leadership however, continues to transform 
the economy to a market system and took some important first steps during 1990. 
czechoslovakia’s trade balance deteriorated significantly in 1990 despite generally 
restrictive financial policies.
58. concern about recent developments in the soviet union has increased 
czechoslovak eagerness to strengthen its security position. it has accordingly culti-
vated relations with NAto and sought to sign specific agreements with neighbour-
ing countries, particularly hungary and poland. czechoslovakia also sought the 
earliest possible orderly rescinding of the military structures of the warsaw pact.
Vii. huNGArY
59. The socio-political climate in hungary continued to worsen because of falling 
living standards, government hesitations, and growing tension between the center-
right coalition led by the Democratic forum and the opposition, especially the 
center-left Alliance of free Democrats. The most serious crisis faced by the govern-
ment was a blockade of main roads throughout the country by taxi drivers and haul-
iers at the end of october 1990. The unrest was triggered, among other things, by an 
increase in the price of petrol. After three days, a compromise was reached; the main 
opposition party, the Alliance of free Democrats (AfD) together with the Young 
Democrats, condemned the government for failing to consult anyone before intro-
ducing the increases. The main consequence of the taxi blockade was to bring a 
change in the government attitude towards economic problems. since this crisis, 
the Antall Government has somewhat improved its communication with the popu-
lation while defining a more coherent economic policy.
60. The Antall government’s relationship with the independent smallholders’ 
party was precarious, marked by the latter’s threats that it might bolt the ruling co-
alition. The government’s draft compensation bill, introduced in february, sparked 
a stormy debate in parliament which is likely to drag on for weeks. if adopted, the 
bill would end the supremacy of state property in the agriculture field and provide 
the first compensation to those whose possessions were seized in the forced collec-
tivization after 1949.
61. The government came in for heavy criticism for slowness in tackling hun-
gary’s economic problems. The latest available data show that as a result of the col-
178  Net material production was one of the main macroeconomic indices in the comecom coun-
tries. most branches of the tertiary category were not included in these calculations, only the 
sectors characterized by material products.
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lapse of the old welfare system, an inflationary economy, and unemployment, an 
increasing number of hungarians lived below the officially defined “social mini-
mum”. Yet the bulk of hungary’s insolvent state enterprises have yet to undergo re-
structuring. however, the appointment last December of mihaly Kupa as minister 
of finance brought a more coherent economic thinking into the Government.
62. GDp fell 2.5 percent last year as hungary struggled to convert to a market 
economy. inflation ran at over 30% in 1990. The 21 billion dollar foreign debt im-
poses a debt service of 3.9 billion dollars in 1991. hungary now is experiencing se-
vere balance of payments stress, largely resulting from the phaseout of cmeA bar-
ter. Budapest has satisfied imf terms for a three-year funding facility and has lined 
up loans from the G-24179 and other sources to cover much of the remaining 1991 
payments gap.
63. in foreign policy, the government enjoyed some success, particularly in its 
effort to assert hungarian national interests, proceed towards integration into eu-
rope, joining the council of europe in November 1990, find a new relationship 
with the ussr, and strengthen bilateral and regional ties (trilateral and pentagonal 
co-operation) with countries of the region. Nevertheless, the handling of the con-
troversial arms sale to croatia last December – denial of the deal for weeks followed 
by an embarrassed acknowledgement and expression of regret by Antall in Belgrade 
– strained relations with Yugoslavia and sparked a major domestic crisis. The oppo-
sition free Democrats called for the resignation of foreign minister Jeszenszky and 
interior minister Boros [Boross] for their role in the arms deal.
Viii. BulGAriA: the struGGle for DemocrAtic reform
64. The resignation of socialist party (Bsp) prime minister Andrey lukanov on 
December 19 marked a significant move away from the communist era. for six 
months, the lack of understanding between the opposition union of Democratic 
forces (uDf) and the Bsp had paralyzed the parliamentary process.
65. The new government, formed in December and led by a non-party lawyer, 
Dimitur popov, is a coalition of Bsp, uDf, Agrarian and non-party representatives. 
however, it includes no members of the third largest parliamentary group, which 
represents the interests of the population of turkish origin, the movement for 
rights and freedoms.180 At first sight, the uDf appeared to have done rather less 
well in the distribution of portfolios than they might have expected as the main 
179  G-24 [Group of 24] was a section of the G-77 established in 1971 by the developing countries of 
the united Nations. its main aim is to coordinate the point of view of the developing countries 
in financial and development questions and to represent their interests during international fi-
nancial negotiations. Though the organization does not belong to the imf, the latter provides a 
secretariat and services to the G-24 in washington.
180  see footnote 131.
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opposition party. But the most unpopular Bsp representatives from the previous 
government (eg Gotsev, the former foreign minister) were forced to stand down; 
the ministry of the interior was at last prised away from the Bsp and entrusted to a 
non-party lawyer, Khristo Danov; the key economic ministries are now in the hands 
of uDf representatives and several of the Bsp ministers are reformers.
66. in January all the major political parties reached an agreement “on guar-
anteeing a peaceful transition to democratic society”, incorporating a legislative 
programme which included major economic and constitutional reforms; the 
original aim was to hold local elections in march and further parliamentary elec-
tions in may, although both are now likely to be delayed. in addition, the govern-
ment, trade unions and employers organisations signed a “social peace” agreement 
under which the government undertook to combine economic reform measures 
with provisions to protect the most vulnerable sections of the population. The 
trade unions undertook to refrain from general strikes; the agreement will be in 
force until the end of July.
67. The Bsp meanwhile has suffered a steady drop in popular support. fur-
thermore several small factions have formed within the Bsp’s majority parliamenta-
ry bloc; the latest, the “europa” group, contends it will no longer vote in lockstep 
with the party leadership. This fragmentation coincided with a developing uDf 
effort to assign the Bsp full responsibility for the consequences of communist rule. 
Zhelev, a former uDf leader, pressed the attack in partisan fashion on february 13, 
urging the Bsp to return assets it inherited from the communist party, admit guilt 
for the country’s current economic catastrophe, and open communist party ar-
chives as agreed in the December political agreement. Zhelev may have calculated 
that supporting attacks on the Bsp could forestall defections from the uDf’s un-
easy 16-party coalition. podkrepa181 has already left the uDf, taking on associate 
status, and its leader, constantin trenchev, has said the trade confederation will 
soon field a political party, possibly advocating a constitutional monarchy.
68. having secured a measure of political consensus on a plan of action, and 
with the encouragement of the imf, the government has recently embarked on a 
long-awaited programme of radical economic reform. The key elements are a sub-
stantial liberalisation of prices with effect from 1 february, an increase in interest 
rates from a basic 1% to between 35% and 46%, and a ban from 1 April on all hard 
currency trading within Bulgaria. The exchange rate of the lev against hard curren-
cies will be allowed to float entirely free, despite the risks arising from the lack of 
foreign currency reserves. parliament has also approved a budget for 1991 on lines 
agreed with the imf. This programme of shock therapy is accompanied by emphasis 
on privatisation, together with reform of taxation, demonopolisation and normali-
181  see footnote 125.
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sation of foreign economic relations. A new law on foreign investment is said to be 
ready in draft. These radical moves have been made against a background of rising 
inflation and unemployment, and falling industrial production (down 11% in 
1990) and exports (down by one-third). There remain critical shortages of food and 
energy with consequent real hardship for the population. offers of western finan-
cial assistance have so far done little to compensate for losses to Bulgaria arising 
from the Gulf war,182 the transition to hard-currency accounting for intra-cmeA 
trade at world prices, a decline in soviet oil deliveries and the disapperance [disap-
pearance] of the GDr market.
69. in foreign policy, Bulgaria has joined other central and eastern european 
countries in condemning soviet action in lithuania,183 and in pressing for the early 
dissolution of the warsaw treaty’s military structures. But its efforts to join other 
regional groupings, such as the pentagonale and the tripartite group of czechoslo-
vakia, poland and hungary have only been partially successful. president Zhelev has 
continued actively to pursue a policy of closer links with western europe, having 
during the period under review visited paris (for the csce conference), the coun-
cil of europe in strasbourg and the united Kingdom. he has also visited Japan, the 
soviet union and czechoslovakia. prime minister popov attended the world eco-
nomic forum at Davos, and in february there was an exchange of prime ministerial 
visits between Bulgaria and Greece. The Greek Defence minister also visited Bul-
garia, and the chiefs of the Armed forces of the two countries signed a protocol on 
co-operation in defence matters. relations with turkey have improved considerably 
during the period under review. under an economic and trade agreement signed in 
January, turkey undertook to supply fuel oil and electrical energy, as well as to ex-
tend a consumer and investment loan of 75m dollars. however, the Bulgarian Gov-
ernment’s decision to allow turkish to be taught in schools in turkish-speaking ar-
eas, even on an experimental basis, has provoked a series of protests and strikes by 
Bulgarian nationalists in the areas concerned.
iX. romANiA
70. The ruling National salvation front (Nsf) has faced intermittent labor and 
social unrest since last November, when prime minister petre roman announced 
economic reforms which aroused initial opposition from a people reeling from dec-
ades of privation. however, the Government still appears to enjoy the support of 
the majority of the population.
71. The government has at times sought to boost its popularity by appealing to 
nationalist and ethnic sentiments. There are also continuing doubts about the gov-
182  see footnotes 136, 148 and 167.
183  see footnote 163.
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ernment’s performance on other matters of human rights. The official report on the 
suppression of student demonstrations last June failed to criticize fully the conduct 
of the police, military, and security services, and placed the responsibility for calling 
in coal miners to attack the students on president iliescu. weekly opposition televi-
sion broadcasts were ended in late January, and half of the hungarian and German 
language programmes were shifted to a channel broadcasting mainly in the south, 
where minority populations are smallest, (the Government claims that it does not 
control romanian tV). opposition newspapers still find it difficult to procure 
newsprint and upgraded office space, though there is no evidence that the govern-
ment is trying to stifle them.
72. roman continues to maintain a certain distance between his government 
and iliescu. he and his young and technocratic team in the government are keen to 
press ahead with economic liberalisation, and are relatively responsive to western 
attitudes to issues such as human rights in romania. The minister of culture, plesu, 
resigned in protest at the ejection of ex-King michael from the country, while on a 
one-day visit on christmas Day (he later withdrew his resignation). This incident 
gave rise to a controversy over whether a referendum should be held to decide be-
tween a republic or a monarchy.
73. The president, who resigned from the Nsf last July, has maintained con-
tact with the party, but has also had meetings with representatives of other parties, 
opposition groups, trade unions and church representatives. he has travelled 
abroad, including a visit to china, during which he appeared to condone the tian-
anmen square repression,184 but a visit to the soviet union was postponed because 
of developments in the Baltic republics. iliescu is very unpopular with the intellec-
tuals in the non-parliamentary opposition, who see him, with some justification as 
an unreconstructed communist. he has become chairman of a National council 
for Defence, which includes relevant members of the government and is responsible 
for a range of security issues. After one of its recent meetings the public were re-
minded of the 1969 law requiring citizens to report to the police within 24 hours 
details of any foreign guests in their homes. This was put in the context of the threat 
of terrorism connected with the Gulf situation.
74. The economy is in a very bad state. production declined dramatically in 
1990, in some sectors by up to 40%, and has only picked up slightly in some sectors 
this year. Agriculture did quite well, however. sanctions against iraq, from whom 
romania was to receive considerable deliveries of oil in repayment of debt, was esti-
mated by the romanians to have cost some $3 billion. to add to the energy crisis, 
the soviet union refused to supply further oil and gas if romania did not fulfil its 
obligations for deliveries to the ussr. many industries have been shut down for 
184  see footnote 112.
197
DocumeNt 7
two months to conserve energy and ensure supplies to the population in what has 
been a very harsh winter. The government managed to resolve the recent rail strike, 
which was preventing deliveries of romanian exports to the soviet union upon 
which energy supplies from the ussr to romania depend. it came close to declar-
ing a state of emergency, but a new law on labour disputes was rushed through par-
liament and a deal was done with the union. The minister for social Affairs, stoica, 
resigned, however. A strike in the airline, tArom, at the turn of the year caused 
large losses, and led to the airline being closed down and being recreated as a share-
holding company.
75. A law on land has been adopted, providing for some private ownership, but 
allowing the large state and collective farms to remain intact if they wish. further rises 
in retail prices, including food prices (after the intervention of the president), are 
planned for April, postponed from 1 January because of popular discontent. many 
people felt that price liberalisation in advance of privatisation, and hence competition, 
was unjust, and would simply give rise to uncontrolled inflation. There are plans to 
issue vouchers to the population, for the purchase of shares in enterprises.
X. whAt future for YuGoslAViA?
76. it is extremely difficult to predict what the future holds for Yugoslavia and 
whether it can stay together, or whether there is sufficient will to compromise in 
order to work out even a minimum functioning constitutional set-up. if the will 
does not exist it is possible to envisage a further erosion of the powers and influence 
of the centre. This raises the spectre of the country descending into outright civil 
war. Kosovo and the serbian minority area of croatia remain particularly danger-
ous potential flashpoints. At the same time, the economic reform programme re-
mains the subject of great contention.
77. The federal authorities are still making efforts to bring the representatives 
of the republics together and to work out a new constitutional arrangement. prime 
minister markovic is at the same time endeavouring to secure agreement on mini-
mum functioning for the federation in the transitional period. The format for these 
talks has been that of “summit” meetings with all members of the federal presiden-
cy present, together with the presidents of the republics. so far these meetings have 
achieved little, but it might be argued that the very fact that they are still talking is 
a positive sign.
78. There have now been six such meetings but at least two have been abortive 
because president tudjman of croatia has not been present, owing to allegedly pro-
vocative actions taken by the serbian federal president Jovic. At a recent meeting 
on 1st march, preliminary consideration was given to a draft agreement on a future 
Yugoslavia. After the 19th march statement by the supreme Defence command, 
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the agreement to hold a round of meetings among the republic presidents raised 
hopes of new flexibility and determination to find a way out of the constitutional 
impasse towards a new modus vivendi.
79. up to now the participants in these summit meetings have divided along 
predictable lines. The slovenes and croats have supported the idea that Yugoslavia 
should become a confederation of independent sovereign states, modelled on the 
european community. serbia and montenegro are in favour of a federation, with 
considerable powers for the central authorities. The two remaining republics find 
themselves in the middle. At one point the Bosnian president, Alija izetbegovic, 
suggested that there might be an asymmetric federation, i.e. a federation of four re-
publics linked in a confederation to the other two. it has also tended to be the Bos-
nian view that they want a federal Yugoslavia but this must include both slovenia 
and croatia. The moslems in Bosnia together with many other Yugoslavs fear that 
confederal proposals (and possibly even ideas of asymmetry) would lead in effect in 
a Greater serbia.
80. The slovenes had participated in these talks, while at the same time taking 
steps to dissociate themselves from Yugoslavia. A plebiscite in December produced 
a massive majority for independence and gave the government and parliament six 
months to prepare for severance from the federation. while it appears that some in 
the republic are concerned about secession and its political and economic conse-
quences, a momentum has built up which means that the process is moving inexo-
rably forward and it is now doubtful whether any political leaders could backtrack.
81. The situation of croatia is certainly more problematic. 12% of the popula-
tion of the republic are serbs, who have already declared an autonomous province 
of Krajina. Already this year there have been confrontations between the serbs and 
the croatian police, most recently in pakrac. This followed a tense period in Janu-
ary, when the federal authorities ordered the disarming of croatian special militia. 
subsequently the military prosecutor in Zagreb ordered the arrest of the republic’s 
Defence minister, martin spegelj. most recently, president tudjman has been ac-
cused of endangering the country’s independence, an act contrary to the constitu-
tion, because he wrote to president Bush expressing his concern about events in 
Yugoslavia. tudjman has accused the serbian authorities of using the Yugoslavian 
people’s Army ( JNA) to provoke unrest, with the ultimate aim of toppling the cro-
atian government.
82. The serbs may demonstrate more flexibility in negotiations on the future 
shape of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the traumatic events of early march in Bel-
grade, with opposition demonstrators on the streets, a heavy-handed security re-
sponse, and eventual concessions to the opposition. All this has shown the vulnera-
bility of serbia’s president milosovic in his own republic. moreover, differences 
have appeared between serbia’s staunchly pro-Yugoslav Army and milosovic, who 
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took a more clearly pan-serbian than federalist stand during the crisis involving the 
functioning of the federal presidency. The end of the close alliance between the 
Army and serbia could, if confirmed, dissuade the serbs from the use of force in 
solving internal problems and considerably de-dramatize the Yugoslav scene.
83. The next few months are crucial with the deadline for slovenian prepara-
tions for secession on 23 June and with the key date of 15 may for the handover 
within the presidency. The croatian leadership have said that they cannot envisage 
staying in a Yugoslavia without slovenia. The Bosnian leadership have said they can-
not conceive of a Yugoslavia without its western republics. The serbs are adamant 
that croatia cannot secede from the federation taking any serbs with them. if they 
try to do a deal with the croats to change the internal borders, which they claim are 
purely administrative, many Bosnians fear that their republic would be carved 
up.185 to see a way out of the impasse will need considerable imagination and flexi-
bility on the part of all the leaders in Yugoslavia.
Xi. AlBANiA: prospects for iNterNAl reform
84. Albania has made strides toward political and economic reform in the past sev-
eral months. party leader and head of state ramiz Alia tried to regulate and mod-
erate the pace of change as the country moved toward its first multi-party elections 
on 31 march but on several occasions appeared on the verge of losing control of the 
process. many Albanians continued to vote with their feet, as the flow of refugees to 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and italy continued.
85. in early December 1990, Alia announced the legalization of independent 
political organizations. within days, the first opposition party, the Democratic par-
ty, was formed and registered. The Democrats were followed by several other par-
ties, including the republican party, ecology party, and, most recently, Agrarian 
party. in addition to the electoral parties, a forum for the defence of human rights 
and independent trade unions have appeared. The government originally set parlia-
mentary elections for 10 february, but, in the wake of a miners’ strike, postponed 
them until 31 march, in partial accession to opposition requests for more time to 
organize and campaign. The Democrats and republicans are publishing their own 
newspapers, and the government press has given some coverage to the opposition 
demonstrations and unorganized protests.
86. The human rights situation in Albania remains problematic. The forum 
for human rights has detailed the numbers and conditions of political prisoners 
185  it is difficult to evaluate the reasonability of the Bosnians’ fears due to the lack of evident sources. 
The statement that tuđman croatian and milošević serbian presidents decided to dismember 
Bosnia during their secret talks in Karađorđevo on march 25, 1991 cannot be proven without a 
doubt.
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after a widely publicized New Year’s pardon. religion remains a grey area. mosques 
and churches have recently been reopened, but religious practice has not yet been 
legalized.
87. Albania hosted the Balkan foreign ministers conference in october, con-
sidered a great achievement by tirana. tirana since has seen high level visits from 
Bulgaria, turkey and italy, while the visit of the Greek prime minister was the first 
by a western head of Government in the post-war period. Negotiations on diplo-
matic recognition are underway with the united Kingdom and the european com-
munity, and Albania also applied for full participation in the csce, while diplo-
matic relations have been re-established with the united states.
88. tirana’s policy toward the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo 
meanwhile changed significantly. The regime’s position, at the Balkan foreign min-
isters conference for instance, had been that although it was concerned for the hu-
man rights of ethnic Albanians in a neighbouring country, Kosovo was an internal 
Yugoslav matter. in its first political pronouncements, however, the Democratic 
party called for a peaceful, democratic union of Kosovo with Albania. After the 
Democrats had thus made Kosovo an issue, Alia became much more aggressive in 
his statements and in receiving visitors from Kosovo. The continuation of serbia’s 
purely repressive policy in Kosovo, whilst Albania proceeds on the road to democ-
ratization, would in any case strongly reinforce separatist forces within the province, 
causing a significant deterioration in relations between Albania and Yugoslavia.
89. if Albania is to continue down the road to reform, the new Assembly will 
have to adopt a new constitution and the Government will have to get to grips with 
such issues as depoliticisation of the army and the disastrous economic situation. 
Alia has been remarkably frank about the difficulties the Albanians are encounter-
ing, both those from natural causes as well as those brought about by human fail-
ings. A hard winter followed by a summer drought has led to crop failure and a 
drastic reduction in hydro-electric power. A fall in labour productivity has meant 
that objectives have not been reached. unemployment has consequently increased. 
hard currency losses amount to one third of the country’s entire annual exports. 
Albania is not to export food for the time being in order to try and improve food 
distribution for the population.
90. The reform process appears irreversible. however, there remains the possi-
bility that it could be derailed by further outbreaks of violence, giving a pretext for 
intervention by the conservative forces.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and eastern europe, c-m(91)18 
(April 24, 1991).
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c-m(91)93
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND the other  
ceNtrAl AND eAsterN europeAN couNtries 
mArch to octoBer 1991
Note by the secretary General
1. i attach a report on “The situation in the soviet union and central and east-
ern european countries” forwarded to me by the chairman of the expert working 
Group which met at NAto headquarters from 23rd to 25th october 1991.
2. The report is the responsibility only of those experts who participated in 
the working Group.
3. in accordance with the document cm(91)54 on new procedures of the 
expert working Groups approved by the council on 17th July 1991, the expert 
working Group on the soviet union and other central and eastern european 
countries is still to produce one yearly report; the autumn session appeared as a 
more appropriate occasion to do it.
4. This report will be placed on the agenda of the council meeting on 4th 
December 1991.
(signed) m. wÖrNer
NAto,
1110 Brussels
the situAtioN iN the soViet uNioN AND other 
ceNtrAl AND eAsterN europeAN couNtries
Note by the chairman of the expert Group
1. experts from Belgium, canada, Denmark, france, Germany, Greece, italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, portugal, spain, turkey, the united Kingdom and the 
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united states met at NAto headquarters from 23rd to 25th october 1991 to 
prepare the attached report.
2. This document covers the period 28th march to 25th october 1991.
(signed) o. sereBriAKoff
coNteNts
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ii. The Baltic states 12–16
iii. The general situation in the new democracies of eastern europe 17–21
iV.  poland on the eve of first democratic elections 22
V. hungary: internal disenchantment 23
Vi. separatists and federalists in czechoslovakia 24–25
Vii. romania: frustration and contestation 26
Viii. Bulgaria: The struggle to democratic reform 27
iX. The disintegration of Yugoslavia 28
X. Albania: on the way to democratisation? 29
i. ussr: politicAl AuthoritY AND repuBlics’ role
1. Gorbachev is trying to create a constituency for a functioning centre. however, 
given the realities of power at the moment, such a constituency can only come from 
the republics; most of them now appear to believe that their interests are better 
served by keeping the centre weak or by seeking complete independence, severing all 
relations with the centre. The outcome will depend on the russian republic and 
president Yeltsin who is now the dominant political force on the scene.
2. whether as a cause or catalyst, the devolution of power to the republics 
implicit in the draft union treaty was a major factor in prompting the coup at-
tempt of August 19. each of the republics responded to the coup’s failure differ-
ently, in line with specific internal developments and attitudes towards union 
within the ussr.186 But the varied responses also reflected a number of similar 
186  on August 19–21, 1991 a coup d’etat took place in the soviet union to remove Gorbachev. 
According to contemporary observers the reason for this was objection of conservative, centrist 
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concerns, centering around a shared vulnerability to shifts of policy by the central 
authorities, as long as the centre retained control over the armed forces, security 
organs, and powerful organisations such as the communist party. to varying de-
grees, it was also brought home to all that their respective communist parties were 
primarily interested in maintaining themselves in power and willing to ignore es-
tablished laws to that end.
3. in consequence, even among those republics willing to remain in the un-
ion, the consensus was that a loose confederation, which left them considerable 
freedom of action, was the most centralized form of government that would be ac-
ceptable, and that for a transitional period only.
4. The republics together with Gorbachev are faced with decisions on the 
form of post-transitional government the country will have, the powers to be dele-
gated to central institutions, and the nature of the ties that will bind the republics. 
Differences run deep between centrists and those who want broad republic autono-
my, but all will be under strong pressure to move quickly to prevent a breakdown of 
services and order during the coming winter.
5. The main question is whether to re-establish some form of central authori-
ty. The tide is running very much against the federalists at the moment: power re-
sides largely in those republics that are determined to enhance their own authority 
and prevent any revival of a tyranny just thrown off.
6. furthermore, the role of authority is under question not only at the nation-
al level; many of the republics face destabilizing ethnic or political disputes within 
their borders. The resurfacing of inter-republic antipathies in the form of suspicion 
of russian intentions, or russian fears of mistreatment of russian minorities out-
side the rsfsr, as well as russian perceptions of subsidising other republics is a 
further destabilizing element. These factors, as well as the inherent weakness of 
some of the republic governments themselves, suggest that the erosion of authority 
at the centre could have a dangerous multiplier effect at the republic level.
7. Because of this, the main conflict in coming weeks is likely to be between 
the drive to decentralize and the necessity of preserving needed government func-
tions and services. The majority of the republics claim to want to limit the centre’s 
functions to foreign and defence affairs. But the legacy of a centralized state, with its 
economic integration at the national level and its nationwide communications, en-
ergy, and transportation networks, may make it essential to delegate considerably 
broader powers to moscow while posing practical barriers to meaningful independ-
groups (who wanted to keep the structure of the soviet union intact) to the signing of the new 
federal agreement (planned for August 20) which would secure broader autonomy for the mem-
ber states. The reaction of the leaders of the federated states is worth mentioning: ukraine, esto-
nia, latvia, lithuania, Kazakhstan, moldavia, and Kyrgyzia were against the coup, Azerbaijan 
approved, while the others (Belarus, uzbekistan, tajikistan, Georgia, and Armenia) remained 
neutral.
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ence for any republic seeking to leave the union. There will also be conflicts be-
tween individual republics in the same field.
8. Gorbachev has partially recovered from the humiliation of betrayal and 
captivity to regain a position of some stature in arranging the ussr’s political tran-
sition. he forced the congress of people’s deputies to sanction the republics’ efforts 
to abolish central organs and functions, and he now is the only viable figure of cen-
tral authority in the transitional government. Nonetheless, the final shape of a new 
union will depend largely on the republics themselves.
9. whatever his position over the longer term, Gorbachev has made it clear 
that he will try to reconstitute a centre that has a broad role. This runs counter to the 
inclination of the republics, most notably russia which is determined to forge a 
weak centre and the ukraine which is resolved to seek full independence. he has 
little more than the force of his personality at present, plus the grudging admiration 
of some politicians, to sustain him as he pursues what seems to be an elusive goal.
10. events since the coup have demonstrated the extreme fragility of soviet 
political life and the dangers of a further breakdown of authority, particularly as the 
country enters a bleak winter. if, as seems likely, the “transitional” organs of power 
created by the congress of people’s deputies prove their inadequacies, the imminent 
prospect of a breakdown of order may convince some republic politicians of the 
need for a federal system and a constitution that preserves an important role for the 
central government. others will seek solutions by cutting their ties with the centre 
and relying on bilateral inter-republic arrangements. in any case, there will be seri-
ous difficulties in coping with economic and security problems.
11. russia and ukraine are key to the new relationship among the republics. 
ukraine faces the challenge of fulfilling its stated commitment to non-nuclear sta-
tus, while reaching interim agreement on shared control of soviet nuclear forces on 
its territory, and seeking to assume complete control over soviet non-nuclear mili-
tary assets. while russia and Yeltsin appear committed to union arrangements, 
there is a significant number of russians who are of the opinion that their republic 
will best be served by dissolving a union which they believe is a drain on russian 
resources.
ii. the BAltic stAtes
12. estonia, latvia and lithuania are likely to develop differently, partly due to the 
varying size of the russian, polish and other sections of the population in the three 
countries. The current process of granting citizenship and thereby voting rights 
could either alienate or integrate the minorities.
13. large-scale prosecution of those who held responsible office during the so-
viet occupation could cause further ethnic tensions. At present the signs are encour-
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aging regarding the lithuanian–polish dialogue over the rights of the polish minor-
ity in lithuania.
14. The three Baltic governments have achieved some results in direct negotia-
tions with the soviet ministries of the interior and Defence and with the KGB, but 
official state-to-state negotiations have yet to begin.
15. A speedy withdrawal of the soviet forces remains a primary objective of the 
Baltic governments, but neither the soviet nor the russian or Belorussian leaders 
have yet formulated their positions. The soviet armed forces have stated that in 
their opinion, the withdrawal should not begin until the withdrawal from eastern 
europe has been completed.
16. Difficult negotiations with moscow lie ahead. The status of local russians 
and the future status of the Kaliningrad oblast187 could cause friction with the 
rsfsr, and long-buried border disputes may reemerge.188
GeNerAl situAtioN iN the New DemocrAcies  
of eAsterN europe
17. The demise of communism in the ussr constituted a watershed for the new 
democracies of eastern europe. The emergence of independent soviet republics 
added to east european concerns about border, refugee, and migration issues, and 
fears of instability in the east may stimulate new calls for a pan-european security 
structure. economic priorities – negotiating viable trade agreements and ensuring 
that new western assistance to the ussr is not at east european expense – are as-
suming greater importance.
18. The east european sense of living in a security vacuum continues to lead 
them to pursue further institutionalisation of csce; closer and more rapid linkage 
to ec, NAto, and the weu;189 and closer trilateral cooperation between warsaw, 
prague and Budapest and within the hexagonale.190
19. The soviet collapse has also created even greater uncertainty about the via-
bility of existing trade commitments. even within a much reduced volume of bilat-
eral trade, the soviet union has been unable either to make the hard currency pay-
187  see footnote 109.
188  see footnote 108.
189  The western european union (weu) was an international organization and military alliance 
created in 1954 by the amendments of the 1948 treaty of Brussels, which laid down the collec-
tive defense of Great Britain, france, Belgium, the Netherlands and luxemburg. it ceased to exist 
in 2011. its function was to secure the common defense of the western european allies of the us 
after the failure of the treaty establishing the european Defense community. lacking proper 
infrastructure and common army, its significance soon began to fade. in 1991 the member states 
were: Belgium, france, Greece (since 1995), the Netherlands, luxemburg, Great Britain, Germa-
ny, italy, portugal (since 1989), and spain (since 1989).
190  see footnotes 117 and 135.
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ments called for in bilateral agreements, or to deliver many of the goods contained 
in indicated lists for barter transactions. east european trading arrangements with 
individual republics – especially russia and its autonomous republics, ukraine, and 
those southern republics with oil reserves – have as a result already expanded, with 
emphasis on barter transactions in order to forestall unemployment. But the coup 
attempt placed in sharp focus eastern europe’s dependence on soviet energy sourc-
es and the potential for political intimidation by a hardline regime in moscow. re-
duction of reliance on soviet oil and gas is now a major east european objective.
20. There are signs of disillusionment with political processes in varying de-
grees in eastern europe; in some cases because political parties or parliaments do 
not adequately represent the agenda of important segments of society, in other cases 
because of frustration with the economic hardships that prevail in spite of political 
and economic reform. political processes are more mature in some countries than 
others, with romania and Albania having the farthest to go. Accompanying the 
disillusionment and frustration are signs of resurgent nationalism, most obvious in 
czechoslovakia, romania and in tragic proportions in Yugoslavia.
21. An extended period of continuing political jockeying, fragmentation and 
consolidation is anticipated in such countries as Bulgaria with fissures in the two 
leading parties, in czechoslovakia as it plays out the future relationship between 
czechs and slovaks (in all likelihood within the federation)191 and in romania 
with its still weak organised political opposition. in poland there could be tensions 
over the balance of power between president and parliament, particularly if 
post-election political parties fail to reach consensus on economic policy. The hun-
garian coalition bears watching, particularly to see if the smallholders party can 
outlive its essentially one-issue platform of compensation. Albania is expected to 
take further steps along the political reform road in the next round of national elec-
tions as it seeks to choose a parliament more widely representative of Albanian soci-
ety. Bulgaria and Albania face another winter of severe economic hardship and spe-
cial reliance on foreign assistance to see them through. in Yugoslavia, the interna-
tional effort to stop the fighting and settle the crisis peacefully continues.
iV. polAND oN the eVe of the first  
DemocrAtic electioNs
22. for whoever emerges as prime minister, the principal question will be the for-
mation of a coalition government likely to pursue the transformation programme, 
yet capable of making corrections to it. one thing at least is clear: the recession will 
inevitably persist. The state coffers will remain empty for a long time yet, and the 
191  eventually czechoslovakia disintegrated into two states on January 1, 1993: the czech republic 
and slovakia.
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population should not expect a rapid improvement in its lot. in addition, the new 
government will need to address calls for an anti-corruption campaign targetting 
[targeting] the former communist nomenklatura.
V. huNGArY: iNterNAl DiseNchANtmeNt
23. under the lacklustre Antall coalition government, hungary remains one of the 
most stable countries of the region, despite growing popular resentment over the 
uneven impact of the emerging market economy. indeed, the population exhibits a 
general sense of pessimism, deriving from the perception that political life is remote 
and inaccessible, resentment of prime minister Antall’s personal style of rule, and 
concern that the current deep recession will persist indefinitely. There is strong sup-
port for the government’s foreign policy, especially its emphasis on the rights of 
hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. how to respond to the Yugoslav 
crisis has become a principal foreign policy priority.
Vi. sepArAtists AND feDerAlists iN cZechosloVAKiA
24. in czechoslovakia, czechs and slovaks continue to be preoccupied with nego-
tiations on forming a new common state, but do not question the existence of such 
a common state. separatist sentiments on the part of a small minority of slovaks 
and czech impatience with slovak insistence upon weakened federal authority are 
unsettling, but all three governments appear determined to reach agreement on a 
new constitutional arrangement.
25. so far consensus on economic reform has not been seriously strained. 
But as the recession bites, particularly as unemployment rises, the standing of the 
left and of the trade unions, which had suffered from public disenchantment with 
anything which smacks of socialism, may begin to recover. pressure will grow for 
the relaxation of reforms in general and for special concessions to slovakia, which 
has been particularly hard hit by the recession because of its general dependence 
on inefficient large-scale state enterprises and vulnerability to cut-backs in arms 
production.
Vii. romANiA: frustrAtioN AND coNtestAtioN
26. The coalition government led by stolojan intends to continue the economic 
reform programme of its predecessor but has frozen prices of staple goods for the 
winter in the hope of warding-off further worker unrest. it still, however, faces sig-
nificant opposition on reform issues from the Nsf mainstream. There is reason for 
concern that though the new constitution to be adopted by the end of the year 
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guarantees human rights in theory, the new national security law does not adequate-
ly guarantee against abuses by security services on which the post-communist gov-
ernment has continued to rely. Nationalism is a growing force particularly in tran-
sylvania. The question of a possible reunification with moldavia also contributes to 
the nationalist trend which may be exploited in the forthcoming elections.
Viii. BulGAriA: the struGGle for DemocrAtic reform
27. The non-communist uDf movement192 won an important though narrow vic-
tory in the october parliamentary elections and will seek to accelerate political and 
economic reforms. several factors, however, suggest that the new government may 
prove unstable and that new elections may have to be called within a relatively short 
time. The socialist party remains a powerful force; several key constituencies repre-
senting more than 25% of the voters, notably the agrarians, are not directly repre-
sented in parliament, and the uDf remains potentially dependent on the move-
ment of rights and freedoms (mrf), which represents the turkish muslim minor-
ity,193 for a parliamentary majority. Bulgaria’s overall direction is likely to continue 
towards reform, but the break-up and formation of new political coalitions are 
highly possible.
iX. the DisiNteGrAtioN of YuGoslAViA
28. The efforts of the international community – uN, csce, and ec in particular 
– to assist a peace process for Yugoslavia remain decisive. The first essential step is to 
encourage an effective ceasefire in the interest of a successful negotiated resolution 
of the Yugoslav crisis. A continuation of the conflict is of critical concern to Yugo-
slavia’s neighbours.194 if continued repression of ethnic Albanian rights in Kosovo 
province provokes an uprising there, it carries the grave risk of drawing Albania in.
192  see footnote 123.
193  see footnote 131.
194  on June 25, 1991, due to the centralizing efforts of serbia led by milošević demanding more in-
fluence in the whole country, slovenia and croatia declared their secession from Yugoslavia. As a 
result, in the so-called “ten-Day war” between June 28 and July 7, 1991 slovenia gained its in-
dependence. The serbian minority in croatia did not approve the dissolution of Yugoslavia and 
croatian independence, and did not show loyalty towards the new state, but began to fight. The 
Yugoslavian peoples’ Army ( JNA) intervened in the fight on the side of the serbian rebels. A 
quarter of croatia was occupied by serbian volunteers and the JNA. in November 1991 both 
serbia and croatia asked for the intervention of the united Nations. in December the united 
Nations security council ordered a ban on weapon transports for the whole area of Yugoslavia, 
but the war waged for the independence and territorial integrity of croatia ended only in 1995.
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X. AlBANiA: oN the wAY to DemocrAtisAtioN?
29. Despite its substantial progress towards democratisation, Albania remains in a 
severe economic crisis and has only begun to implement key reforms. A difficult 
winter is in store and major shortages can only be relieved by substantial interna-
tional assistance. institutionalisation of political and economic reforms may take 
some time. Although opposition parties have assumed key economic responsibili-
ties, former communists remain in control of parliament and industrial, mining and 
agricultural enterprises. popular discontent verging upon despair is most likely to 
continue to generate strikes, demonstrations, crime, and mass emigration. substan-
tial violence in Yugoslavia’s autonomous province of Kosovo could have dire conse-
quences for Albania.
NA: The situation in the soviet union and the other central and eastern eu-
ropean countries, c-m(91)93 (November 22, 1991).
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Adamec, ladislav (1926–2007): czechoslovak politician. from 1987 member of the presidium of the 
communist party of czechoslovakia, in 1987–1988 prime minister of the czech socialist re-
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oslovakia.
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 union (1983). member of the cc of the cpsu, leading military advisor of Gorbachev. in 
1984–1989 chief of staff. After the failure of the coup d’etat against Gorbachev in 1991 he 
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Aleksandrov, chudomir Asenov (1936–1998): Bulgarian politician. in 1981–1988 secretary of the cc 
of the Bcp, in 1984–1988 member of the pB, in 1984–1986 deputy prime minister, supporter of 
reforms. As the presumed successor of todor Zhivkov he visited Gorbatchev in the summer of 
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him from power by accusing him of suppressing the fact that his wife’s father was a ’fascist’. After 
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Alia, ramiz (1925–2011): Albanian politician. in 1949–1955 the leader of the Albanian Association 
of the working Youth, in 1955–1958 minister of education and culture. After 1958 chair of the 
committee on foreign Affairs of the parliament. from 1982 speaker of the parliament, in 
1985–1992 head of state, between 1991 and 1992 president of democratic Albania. from 1948 
member of the cc of the Albanian party of labor, from 1961 member of the pB and secretary 
responsible for ideology, in 1985 he became first secretary of the party of labor of Albania.
Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984): soviet politician. in 1953–1957 ambassador to Buda-
pest. in 1961–1967 and 1982 secretary of the cc of the cpsu, in 1967–1982 chairman of the 
KGB. from 1973 member of the pB of the cpsu, in 1982–1984 general secretary of the cc, 
in 1983–1984 president of the presidium of the supreme soviet. 
Antall, József, Jr. (1932–1993): hungarian politician. from 1964 senior researcher of the Archives 
and library of the semmelweis museum of medical history, in 1964–1967 director of the same 
institute, in 1967–1984 executive director, in 1984–1990 general director. in 1989–1993 pres-
ident of the mDf (hungarian Democratic forum), in 1990–1993 prime minister of hungary.
Atanasov, Georgi ivanov (1933–): Bulgarian politician. from 1956 member of the Bcp, in 1966–
1990 member of the cc, in 1968–1976 head of the Department of science and education in 
the cc, in 1976–1978 leader of the Administrative Department, in 1977–1986 secretary of the 
cc and in 1984–1986 head of the Department of organizational Affairs. in 1986–1990 mem-
ber of the pB and prime minister of Bulgaria. in 1966–1990 member of parliament.
Atatürk, mustafa Kemal (until 1934, Gazi mustafa Kemal paşa, 1881–1938): turkish military officer 
and politician. hero of the war of independence (awarded with the title gazi), founder of the 
turkish republic and its first president in 1923–1938.
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Baka, wladyslaw (1936–): polish economist and politician. in 1981–1985 minister responsible for 
economic reforms, in 1985–1988 and 1989–1991 president of the polish National Bank. from 
1955 member of the puwp and staff member of the cc. in 1988–1989 secretary of the cc, in 
1988–1990 member of the pB. he was representative of the government for economic and so-
cial questions during the roundtable negotiations with the democratic opposition.
Baklanov, oleg Dmitrievich (1932–): soviet politician. from 1983 minister of general machine build-
ing. in the 1980s responsible for the space program. in 1981–1991 member of the supreme 
soviet of the ussr. in 1988–1991 member of the cc of the cpsu, participated in the coup 
d’etat against Gorbatchev in 1991.
Balayan, Zori Aykovich (1935–): soviet journalist, novelist, doctor, sports advisor, and traveller of 
Armenian origin. in his essays before 1985 he argued that Nagorno (mountainous) Karabakh 
has Armenian identity.
Balcerowicz, leszek (1947–): polish economist and politician. in 1969–1981 member of the puwp. 
At the end of the 1970s he participated in the economic advisory team of the prime minister. 
later he became an economic expert of solidarity. in 1989–1991 and 1997–2000 deputy prime 
minister and minister of finance. he is known for carrying out economic reforms and restructur-
ing the polish economy in the 1990s.
Beliyakov, oleg sergeyevich (1933–2003): soviet politician. from 1961 member of the cpsu, head of 
section then deputy head of department in the Department for the Defense industry of the cc 
and deputy secretary of the cc. in 1985–1988 leader of the Department for the Defense industry 
in the cc, in 1988–1991 head of the Department for Defense, in 1986–1990 member of the cc.
Berecz, János (1930–): hungarian politician. in 1966–1972 secretary of the party committee in the 
ministry of foreign Affairs. in 1972–1974 deputy head of Department for foreign Affairs at 
the cc of the hswp, in 1974–1982 head of the same department. in 1982–1985 editor in 
chief of the daily paper Népszabadság. in 1980–1989 member of the cc and in 1985–1989 
secretary for ideology, in 1987–1989 member of the pB.
Bielecki, Jan Krzysztof (1951–): polish economist and politician. from 1980 member of solidarity. in 
the middle of the 1980s he established a consulting office (Doradca) dealing with economics 
and taxation. in 1988–1991 member of the of the solidarity citizens’ committee and in 1991–
1994 member of the liberal Democratic congress. in January–December 1991 prime minister 
of poland.
Bolgin, Valery ivanovich (1935–2006): soviet politician. from 1960 member of the cpsu, from 
1961 staff member of the cc, in 1981–1987 deputy secretary of the cc, in 1988–1991 mem-
ber of the cc. in 1990 member of the presidential Board of the soviet union and cabinet chief 
of the president of the soviet union. member of the supreme soviet and the congress of peo-
ples’ Deputies. participated in the coup d’etat of 1991 against Gorbachev.
Boross, péter (1928–): hungarian jurist, politician. Arrested and interned in 1957 for revolutionary ac-
tivity. in may–July 1990 state secretary in the office of the prime minister, then became minister 
responsible for the information Agency and National security Agency. from December 1990 
minister of interior and deputy prime minister, in 1994 prime minister. from 1992 member of the 
mDf (hungarian Democratic forum), in 1993–1995 member of the presidency of that party.
Brazauskas, Algirdas mykolas (1932–2010): soviet politician of lithuanian origin. in 1977–1987 
secretary of the cc of the lithuanian communist party, in 1988–1989 first secretary. strong 
supporter of lithuanian independence. Broke with the cpsu, and established the Democratic 
labor party of lithuania. in 1993–1998 president of lithuania, in 2001–2006 prime minister.
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(the former pB) of the cc of the cpsu. in 1960–1964 and 1977–1982 chairman of the 
presidium of the supreme soviet, in 1964–1966 first secretary, in 1966–1982 general secre-
tary of the cc.
Bush, George herbert walker (1924–2018): American politician, member of the republican party. 
in 1967–1971 member of the house of representatives, in 1971–1973 us ambassador to the 
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oslovak federal government, in 1989 de facto acting president of czechoslovakia (for 19 days), 
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munism to parliamentary democracy.
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ceaușescu, Nicolae (1918–1989): romanian politician.  in 1945–1948 and from 1952 member of 
the cc of the rcp, from 1955 member of the pB. in 1965–1969 first secretary of the rcp, in 
1969–1989 general secretary. in 1967–1974 president of the state council, in 1974–1989 pres-
ident of the republic.
chebrikov, Viktor mikhailovich (1923–1999): soviet leader of state security and politician. in 1968–
1982 vice-chairman of the KGB, in 1982–1988 chairman. from 1950 member of the cpsu, in 
1971–1990 member of the cc, in 1985–1989 member of the pB, in 1988–1989 member of 
the secretariat.
chernavin, Vladimir Nikolayevich (1928–): soviet naval commander. from 1969 commander of the 
submarine fleet of the Northern fleet, from 1977 commander of the Northern fleet, in 1981–
1985 first deputy commander-in-chief of the soviet Navy, in 1985–1991 chief commander of 
the soviet Navy, in 1991–1992 commander of the Navy of the commonwealth of independent 
states Navy.
Danov, hristo Veselinov (1922–): Bulgarian jurist and politician. in 1947–1985 lawyer in sofia, in 
1985–1990 leader of the department dealing with the qualification of lawyers in the central 
council of the chamber of lawyers. in 1990–1991 minister of interior. in 1992–2000 again 
lawyer in sofia specializing in civil law. from 2000 chairman of the constitutional court.
Demichev, pyotr Nilovich (1917–2010): soviet politician. in 1974–1986 minister of culture, in 
1986–1988 first deputy president of the presidium of the supreme soviet. in 1961–1974 mem-
ber of the secretariat of the cc of the cpsu, in 1964–1988 candidate member of the pB. he 
was considered the chief ideologist of the cpsu, who disapproved of the liberal movements in 
the soviet union.
Dienstbier, Jiří (1937–2011): czech politician, journalist. in the 1960s he worked for  czechoslovak 
radio as a reporter dealing with American, west european, and middle eastern affairs. he con-
demned the occupation of czechoslovakia in 1968, therefore he was not allowed to continue his 
work as a journalist. in 1977 he signed charter ’77. he was sentenced to three years in jail in 
1979. he worked as a fireman after his release in 1982. After the collapse of the communist re-
gime in 1989–1992 minister of foreign affairs.
Dogan, Ahmed (1954–): Bulgarian philosopher and politician of turkish origin. researcher in the 
Department of Dialectical materialism of the Bulgarian Academy of sciences, institute of phi-
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National liberation movement. he was arrested and sentenced to ten years in jail, but was re-
leased in 1989. he became president of the movement for rights and freedom (Dps).
Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992): czechoslovakian politician. in January 1968–April 1969 first sec-
retary of the cpc, leading politician of the “prague spring”. in December 1989–January 1992 
president of the czechoslovak parliament.
falin, Valentin mikhaylovich (1926–2018): soviet politician and diplomat. in 1951–1958 he worked 
for the foreign ministry, in 1971–1978 ambassador in Bonn, in 1978–1983 first deputy chief 
of the international information Department of the cc of the cpsu. in 1982–1986 political 
correspondent of Izvestiya, later editor and editor in chief. in 1988–1991 head of the interna-
tional information Department of the cc. 
filshin, Gennadiy innokentevich (1931–): soviet economist and politician. in 1972–1990 lead re-
searcher, later director of the economic institute of the soviet Academy of sciences. in 1989–
1990 lecturer at German and American universities. in 1989–1991 member of the congress of 
peoples’ Deputies and the secretary of the supreme soviet planning and Budgetary-finance 
commission. in 1990–1991 deputy prime minister of the russian soviet socialist republic, 
then deputy minister of foreign economic relations.
fischer, oskar (1923–): politician in former east Germany (GDr). in 1965–1975 deputy minister of 
foreign affairs, then state secretary. in 1975–1990 minister of foreign affairs. from 1948 mem-
ber of the socialist unity party of Germany, from 1971 member of the cc.
fiszbach, tadeusz rudolf (1935–): polish politician and diplomat. from 1959 member of the puwp, 
in 1980 participated in the negotiations in Gdańsk. he opposed the introduction of state of 
emergency and martial law in 1981. from 1980 member of the polish embassy in finland, in 
1991–1995 ambassador in helsinki, in 2001–2005 ambassador in Vilnius.
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad (1939–1993): Georgian politican, translator, and critic. in 1987–1990 partici-
pated in the organization of mass public meetings for the secession of Georgia from the soviet 
union. in 1990–1991 president of the supreme soviet of Georgia, in 1991–1992 the first pres-
ident of independent Georgia.
Golushko, Nikolay mikhaylovich (1937–): soviet state security officer. from 1963 he worked for the 
KGB in the ukraine. in 1963–1991 member of the cpsu. from 1992 first deputy minister of 
state security in the russian federation, in september–December minister of state security. in 
December 1993–february 1994 director of the federal counter-intelligence service of the 
 russian federation.
Göncz, Árpád (1922–2015): hungarian writer, translator, and politician. After the 1956 revolution 
he was sentenced to life, but was released in the general amnesty of 1963. After world war ii and 
during the revolution of 1956 he was a member of the independent smallholders, Agrarian 
workers and civic party, in the era of the regime change he was member of the sZDsZ (Alli-
ance of free Democrats). in 1990 he became member of parliament, first chairman of the new 
parliament and de facto acting president. in 1990–2000 president of hungary. 
Gorbachev, mikhail sergeyevich (1931–): soviet politician. from 1951 member of the cpsu, in 
1971–1991 member of the cc, in 1978–1985 agricultural secretary of the cc, in 1985–1991 
general secretary of the cc, in 1988–1991 chairman of the presidium of the supreme soviet. 
on December 25, 1991 he resigned from all positions and declared the dissolution of the soviet 
union.
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December 1989–march 1990 deputy minister of interior, in 1990 minister of foreign affairs, in 
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minister of interior of Yugoslavia.
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of the hswp, in 1988–1989 general secretary of the cc, in 1980–1989 member of the cc, in 
1985–1989 member of the pB, in 1989 member of the newly established presidium, member of 
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and the formation of the hungarian socialist party (msZp) member of the cc again. in 1987–
1988 prime minister of hungary.
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minister of war. in 1976–1985 commander in chief of the army.
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1971–1987 general secretary, in 1975–1989 president of czechoslovakia.
iliescu, ion (1930–): romanian politician. from 1953 member of the romanian communist party, 
from 1965 member of the cc. in 1996–2000 and 2004–2008 president of the social Demo-
cratic party (psD). in 1967–1971 minister for the affairs of youth. in December 1989 leader of 
the National salvation front (fsN: Frontul Salvării Naționale). in 1990–1996 and 2000–2004 
president of romania.
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member of the presidium, in 1987–1989 general secretary of the party.
Jaruzelski, wojciech witold (1923–2014): polish military officer and politician. in 1968–1983 min-
ister of defense, in 1981–1985 prime minister, in 1981–1989 the first secretary of the puwp. 
in 1985–1989 chairman of the council of state (president), in 1989–1990 president of poland. 
in 1964–1989 member of the cc of the puwp, in 1970–1989 member of the pB.
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1987 founding member of the hungarian Democratic forum (mDf), in 1988–1990 member 
of the presidium of the party, in 1989–1990 leader of the committee for foreign Affairs in the 
party. in 1990–1994 minister of foreign affairs, in 1998–2002 ambassador in washington, in 
2011–2014 ambassador in oslo.
Jović, Borisav (1928–): Yugoslav politician of serbian origin. in may 1989–June 1992 he represented 
serbia in the presidency of Yugoslavia. in may 1990–may 1991 president of the presidium of 
the league of socialists of Yugoslavia, and general secretary of the Non-Aligned movement. 
member of the league of serbian communists and from 1990 member of the socialist party of 
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During the revolution of 1956 minister of state (in absentia) from october 30 to November 4, 
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ment, over which he presided in 1956–1958. in 1958–1961 again minister of state, in 1961–
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of the cc of the communist party of ukraine. in 1986–1988 ambassador to cuba, then leader 
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to the Democratic people’s republic of Korea.
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Komárek, Valtr (1930–2013): czech economist and politician. in 1964–1967 he lived in cuba as an 
advisor of ernesto che Guevara. in 1968 he was one of the  initiators of economic reforms, in 
1968–1971 chairman of the economic council of czechoslovakia. in December 1989–June 
1990 deputy prime minister. in 1990–1992 member of the federal Assembly.
Krenz, egon (1937–): politician in former east Germany (GDr). from 1955 member of the socialist 
unity party of Germany. in 1971–1990 representative of the people’s chamber, in 1974–1983 
leader of the free German Youth (fDJ). in 1981–1984 member of the state council, from 1983 
secretary of the cc responsible for security questions. from october 18, 1989 first secretary of 
the socialist unity party of Germany and chairman of the state council. resigned on Decem-
ber 6, 1989 and soon thereafter expelled from the transforming party.
Kruchina, Nikolay efimovich (1928–1991): soviet politician. from 1949 member of the cpsu, 
from 1971 member of the central Auditing committee of the cpsu. from 1971 candidate 
member and from 1976 full member of the cc, in 1978–1983 deputy head, then head of the 
Agrarian committee of the cc, in 1983–1991 acting chair of the cc and chief treasurer of the 
party. in 1966–1989 member of the supreme soviet, in 1989–1991 member of the congress of 
peoples’ Deputies.
Kryuchkov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924–2007): soviet jurist, diplomat and politician. in 1955–
1959 third secretary of the soviet embassy in Budapest. in 1974–1988 head of the foreign intel-
ligence branch of the KGB, the first chief Directorate (pGu). from 1978 vice-chairman, in 
1988–1991 chairman of the KGB. from 1944 member of the cpsu, from 1986 member of the 
cc and in 1989–1990 member of the pB. The main instigator and leader of the coup in August 
1991.
Kučan, milan (1941–): slovenian Yugoslav politician. from 1968 chair of the slovenian Youth As-
sociation, from 1978 chairman of the parliament of the slovenian federative republic. from 
1982 representative of the league of communists of slovenia in the cc of the league of 
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communists of Yugoslavia, in 1986–1989 president of the league of communists of slove-
nia, in 1990–1992 chairman of the collective presidency of slovenia, in 1992–2002 president 
of slovenia.
Kulikov, Viktor Georgievich (1921–2013): soviet military officer. in 1940 joined the red Army, in 
1967–1969 commander of the military district of Kiev, in 1969–1971 commander of the soviet 
troops in the GDr, in 1971–1977 chief of staff. in 1977–1989 supreme commander of the 
unified Armed forces of the warsaw treaty organization, marshal of the soviet union. from 
1942 member of the cpsu, in 1971–1989 member of the cc and deputy defense minister.
Kupa, mihály (1941–): hungarian economist and politician. Accused of conspiracy in 1958 and sen-
tenced to ten months in jail. later worked for the statistical Bureau of Budapest, from 1971 for 
the central statistical Bureau and the institute of financial research. head of the department 
responsible for financial political issues in the ministry of finance, in 1987–1988 head of the 
department responsible for public taxes. in 1989 leader of the secretariat of the Budget reform 
committee. in 1990–1993 minister of finances, leader of the economic cabinet of the govern-
ment.
Kwaśniewski, Aleksander (1954–): polish politician and journalist. in 1976–1977 chairman of the 
university council of the socialist union of polish students, in 1977–1982 member of the 
leadership at the same organization. in 1981–1985 editor of communist journals for the youth. 
in 1985–1987 minister for youth affairs, in 1988–1989 minister of the cabinet, participated in 
the round table negotiations. in 1977–1990 member of the puwp, in 1990–1995 founding 
member of the social Democracy of the republic of poland and in 1990–1995 its first chair. in 
1995–2005 president of the republic.
lenin, Vladimir ilyich (ulyanov) (1870–1924): soviet–russian politician. in 1903–1924 first leader 
of the Bolshevik party. in 1917–1924 first president of the council of peoples’ commissars.
ligachov, egor Kuzmich (1920–1990): soviet politician. in 1976–1990 member of the cc of the 
cpsu, in 1985–1990 member of the pB, in 1983–1990 member of the secretariat and presi-
dent of the committee responsible for agrarian politics in the cc. Though he originally support-
ed the policies of Gorbachev, in 1988 he was considered the leader of the conservative politicians 
who were dissatisfied with him. 
lilov, Aleksandar Vasilev (1933–2013): Bulgarian politician and philosopher. in 1972–1983 member 
of the cc of the Bcp, in 1974–1983 member of the pB and in 1976–1983 member of the state 
council. in 1983 he was  removed from power. returns to active politics during the regime 
change and from 1990 chair of the Bcp, then of Bulgarian socialist party. in 1962–2001 mem-
ber of parliament.
lobov, Vladimir Nikolayevich (1935–): soviet military commander. from 1954 member of the 
Armed forces, from 1984 commander of the central Asian military District, from January 
1989 first deputy of the chief of general staff, after the coup of 1991 chief of staff. in october– 
December 1991 member of the council of Defense of the president of the ussr. in 1989–
1991 member of the congress of peoples’ Deputies. 
lončar, Budimir (1924–): Yugoslav diplomat and politician. in 1945–1990 member of the league of 
communists of Yugoslavia. from 1950 worked at the foreign ministry, consul general in New 
York, in 1965–1969 ambassador in Jakarta, in 1973–1977 ambassador in Bonn, in 1979–1983 
ambassador in washington, in 1987–1991 minister of foreign affairs. in 1993–1995 special 
envoy of the uN for the Non-Aligned movement.
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lukanov, Andrey Karlov (1938–1996): Bulgarian politician. in 1973–1976 minister of foreign trade, 
in 1976–1986 vice-president of the council of ministers and until 1987 deputy president, in 
1987–1989 minister responsible for foreign economic relations. played a crucial role in the re-
moval of todor Zhivkov. in february–september and september–December 1990 prime min-
ister. in 1963–1990 member of the Bcp, secretary of the cc and member of the pB. in 1990–
1996 member of the Bulgarian socialist party, in 1990–1991 chair of the party.
lukyanov, Anatoly ivanovich (1930–2019): soviet politician. in 1956–1961 advisor of the legal 
commission of the council of ministers. in 1975–1977 participated in the elaboration of the 
soviet constitution of 1977. 1977–1983 head of the secretariat of the supreme soviet. in 
1985–1987 chief of the General Auditing Department of the cc of the cpsu, in 1987–1988 
member of the secretariat, in 1988–1990 candidate member of the pB, in 1988–1990 vice-pres-
ident of the supreme soviet and in march 1990–August 1991 president.
lushev, pyotr Georgievich (1923–1997): soviet military officer. in 1941 enters the red Army. from 
1957 member of the cpsu, in 1977–1980 commander of the central Asian military District, 
in 1980–1985 commander of the moscow military District, in 1985–1986 commander of the 
soviet forces in the GDr. from 1986 first deputy of the soviet defense minister, in 1989–1991 
commander-in-chief of the unified Armed forces of the warsaw treaty organization. 
marković, Ante (1924–2011): Yugoslav politician of croatian origin from Bosnia. in 1980–1985 
president of the executive council of the croatian socialist republic, in 1986–1988 president 
of the presidency of socialist republic of croatia, in march 1989–December 1991 the last 
prime minister of Yugoslavia.
masol, Vitaly Andreyevich  (1928–2018): soviet politician of ukrainian origin. in 1987–1990 presi-
dent of the council of ministers in the ukrainian ssr, in 1990–1998 member of the ukrainian 
parliament, in 1994–1995 prime minister.
mazilu, Dumitru (1934–): romanian jurist, diplomat and politician. in 1975–1986 legal advisor of 
the foreign ministry, in 1983–1988 member of the subcommission of the uN Against Dis-
crimination and for the rights of minorities, in 1985–1992 prepared several reports for the uN 
regarding human rights and youth issues. in 1986–1989 he was placed under house arrest for his 
activity. in April 1989 he forwarded his report to the uN. from December 26, 1989 first 
vice-president of the National salvation front, he advocated the removal of communists from 
this organization.
mazowiecki, tadeusz (1927–2013): polish writer, politician and journalist. in 1958–1981 editor in 
chief of Więź, a roman catholic journal. in 1980, during the strikes in Gdańsk, he was an advi-
sor of wałęsa. participated in the formation of solidarity and became the chief editor of the 
solidarity’s weekly paper. During the state of emergency he was interned. in 1988 he was one of 
the founders of the solidarity citizens’ committee. in 1989–1991 prime minister, in 1991–
2001 member of the sejm.
medvedev, Vadim Andreyevich (1929–): soviet economist and politician. from 1970 deputy director 
of the propaganda Department of the cc of the cpsu, in 1976–1986 member of the central 
controlling committee, in 1986–1990 member and secretary of the cc. in 1986–1988 head 
of the department responsible for communication between the cpsu and other communist 
parties of the socialist countries. in september 1988–July 1990 member of the pB, in November 
1988–July 1990 chairman of the ideological committee of the cc. A close comrade of Gor-
bachev and in 1990 member of the presidential council of the soviet union.
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messner, Zbigniew stefan (1929–2014): polish economist and politician. in 1981–1988 member of 
the cc of the puwp, in 1983–1985 deputy prime minister, in 1985–1988 prime minister.
michael i. (hohenzollern-sigmaringen) (1921–2017): King of romania, the son of carol ii and he-
lena, Greek princess, grandson of ferdinand i, King of romania. ruled in 1927–1930 and 
1940–1947.
mikulić, Branko (1928–1994): Yugoslavian politician of croatian origin, from herzegovina. from 
1965 secretary of the cc of the league of communists of Bosnia and herzegovina, later, in 
1966 chairman of the party. in 1967–1969 prime minister of Bosnia–herzegovina. in 1982–
1984 president of the presidium of the socialist republic of Bosnia–herzegovina, in 1984–
1986 represents Bosnia–herzegovina in the presidium of Yugoslavia, in 1986–1989 president 
of the federal executive committee.
militaru, Nicolae (1925–1996): romanian military officer and politician. in 1969–1978 commander 
of the troops of the 2nd romanian Army. in 1978 he was accused of organising a movement 
against ceauşescu as the agent of the Gru (soviet military secret service) and was removed 
from his position. in December 1989–february 1990 minister of defense.
milošević, slobodan (1941–2006): serbian politician from montenegro. in 1986–1989 president of 
the presidium of the league of serbian communists, member of the presidium of the commit-
tee on foreign Affairs of the lcY. in may 1989–January 1991 chairman of the presidency of the 
republic of serbia, in 1991–1997 president of republic of serbia, in 1997–2000 president of 
the federal republic of Yugoslavia. in 1990–2006 founder and president of the socialist party 
of serbia.
mladenov, petar toshev (1936–2000): Bulgarian politician. in 1971–1989 minister of foreign affairs, 
in 1989–1990 general secretary of the Bulgarian communist party and chairman of the state 
council. in 1990 president of Bulgaria. from 1964 member of the Bcp, in 1971–1989 member 
of the cc, in 1977–1989 member of the pB.
moiseyev, mikhail Alekseyevich (1939–): soviet military officer. in 1961 joined the soviet Army. in 
the 1980s commander of a mixed army, then commander of the far east military District. in 
1988–1991 chief of staff. supported the coup in 1991.
molotov, Vyacheslav mikhailovich (skryabin) (1890–1986): soviet politician. in 1930–1941 chair-
man of the council of peoples’ commissars (premier). in 1939–1946 peoples’ commissar of 
foreign affairs, in 1946–1949 minister of foreign affairs. in 1953–1956 minister of foreign af-
fairs again and at the same time first deputy premier. in 1956 minister of state control. from 
1921 member of the cc of the cpsu and candidate member of the pB, in 1926–1957 member 
of the pB. removed from all positions in 1957.
Nagy, imre (1896–1958): hungarian politician. in December 1944 and in 1945 minister of agriculture, 
in 1945–1946 minister of interior, in 1950–1952 minister responsible for food supplies, in 1952–
1953 deputy prime minister, in 1953–1955 prime minister, in october 24–November 4, 1956 
prime minister of revolutionary hungary. in June 1958 sentenced to death and executed. in 1944–
1955 and in 1956 member of the cc of the hungarian communist party and (from 1948) hun-
garian worker’s party. in 1945–1949, 1951–1955 and 1956 member of the pB.
Németh, miklós (1948–): hungarian politician. in 1987–1989 member of the cc, in 1988–1989 
member of the pB of the hswp, in 1989 member of the party’s four-member presidency and 
member of the political executive committee that replaced the pB. in 1989 founder and member 
of the presidium of the hungarian socialist party. in 1988–1990 prime minister of hungary.
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Nikonov, Viktor petrovich (1929–): soviet politician. from 1954 member of the cpsu, from 1976 
member of the cc, in 1987–1989 member of the pB. in 1983–1985 minister of agriculture of 
the russian sfsr, in 1985–1989 secretary of the cc. member of the supreme soviet and from 
1989 member of the congress of peoples’ Deputies.
Nyers, rezső (1923–2018): hungarian politician, economist. in 1960–1962 minister of finance, in 
1974–1981 director of the institute for economics of the hungarian Academy of science. in 
1957–1989 member of the cc of the hswp, in 1962–1974 secretary for economic policy of 
the cc, in 1966–1975 and 1988–1989 member of the pB. in 1988–1989 minister of state and 
chairman of the hswp, chairman of the party’s four-member presidency and of the political 
executive committee. in 1989–1990 founder and president of the hsp.
ogarkov, Nikolay Vasilevich (1917–1994): soviet military officer. in 1937 joined the red Army and 
forty years later he became marshal of the soviet union. in 1977–1984 chief of staff and first 
deputy of the soviet defense minister. in 1983–1984 military spokesman.
olszewski, Jan ferdynand (1930–): polish lawyer, publicist and politician. in the 1960s he became a 
leading defense attorney in political trials. in the 1980s he joined the solidarity movement, in 
1988–1990 member of the solidarity citizens’ committee. in 1990–1992 member of the cen-
tre Agreement. in 1991–1993 and 1997–2005 member of the sejm. in December 1991–June 
1992 prime minister.
pérez de cuéllar de la Guerra, Javier felipe ricardo (1920–): peruvian diplomat and politician. from 
1940 he worked for the foreign ministry, in 1946 member of the peruvian delegation to the Gen-
eral Assembly of the uN, in 1964–1966 ambassador in Bonn, in 1966–1969 permanent deputy of 
the secretary, later general secretary of the foreign ministry. in 1969–1971 ambassador in moscow 
and warsaw, in 1971–1975 permanent representative at the uN. in 1975–1977 special envoy of 
the uN in cyprus. in 1978–1979 ambassador in caracas. in 1979–1981 united Nations un-
der-secretary-General for special political Affairs, in 1982–1991 secretary General.
philby, harold Adrian russell “Kim” (1912–1988): he was a high ranking officer of the British intelli-
gence service before he fled to the ussr in 1963. he served as both an NKVD and KGB operative.
plaka, sokrat (1932–2009): Albanian diplomat. from 1975 worked for the foreign ministry, ambas-
sador to Belgrade, in 1982–1991 deputy foreign minister. in the early 1980s he worked for the 
improvement of relations of Albania with Greece and turkey.
pleșu, Andrei Gabriel (1948–): romanian philosopher, publicist, art historian, and politician. re-
searcher in the institute for Art history in romania. in 1983 the publication of his works was 
banned. in 1991–1997 lecturer in philosophy of religion at the university of Bucharest. found-
er and publishing director of Dilema Veche, a weekly paper. in 1989–1991 minister of culture, in 
1997–1999 minister of foreign affairs, in 2000–2004 member of the National college for the 
study of the securitate Archives, in 2004–2005 presidential counsellor for external affairs.
popov, Dimitar iliev (1927–2015): Bulgarian jurist and politician. from 1970 judge of the sofia mu-
nicipality court, from 1983 vice-president, later president of the court. During the first free 
elections in June 1990 he was the secretary of the central committee for elections. in Decem-
ber 1990–November 1991 prime minister. he was not a member of any party.
pozsgay, imre (1933–2016): hungarian politician. in 1976–1980 minister of culture, in 1980–1982 
minister of education, in 1988–1990 minister of state. in 1983–1994 member of parliament. in 
1982–1988 secretary general of the party’s mass organization, the patriotic people’s front. in 
1980–1989 member of the cc and in 1988–1989 member of the pB of the hswp. in 1989 
member of the party’s four-member presidency and member of the political executive committee.
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pugo, Boris Karlovich [in latvian: Boriss pugo] (1937–1991): soviet politician of latvian origin. in 
1984–1988 first secretary of the communist party of latvia, in 1988–1991 president of the 
central control committee of the cpsu, in 1990–1991 minister of interior. he participated 
in the coup of 1991 and committed suicide after its failure.
rakowski, mieczysław franciszek (1926–2008): polish politician, historian and journalist. in 1958–
1982 editor in chief of the weekly journal Polityka. in 1975–1990 member of the cc of the 
puwp, in 1987–1990 member of the pB, in 1988 secretary of the cc, in 1981–1985 deputy 
prime minister, in september 1988–August 1989 prime minister, in 1988–1989 leader of the 
economic reform commission. in 1989–1990 the last first secretary of the puwp.
razumovsky, Georgy petrovich (1936–): soviet politician. from 1961 member of the cpsu, from 1961 
member and secretary of the cc, from 1988 candidate member of the pB. in 1983–1985 first 
secretary of the Krasnodar branch of the cpsu, in 1985–1988 head of the Department of organ-
isation and party work of the cc, from 1988 head of the Department of party construction and 
cadres policy of the cc, from 1988 chairman of the party construction and cadres policy. mem-
ber of the supreme soviet, from 1989 member of the congress of peoples’ Deputies.
reagan, ronald (1911–2004): American politician, member of the republican party. in 1967–1975 
governor of california, in 1981–1989 40th president of the us. in 1937–1964 he acted in more 
than fifty hollywood movies.
ribbentrop, ullrich friedrich willy Joachim von (1893–1946): German politician. from 1932 mem-
ber of the NsDAp. from 1934 advisor of the imperial government in foreign political issues. 
from 1936 ambassador to london, in 1938–1945 minister of foreign affairs.
rizhkov, Nikolay ivanovich (1929–): soviet politician. from 1956 member of the cpsu, in 1981–
1991 member of the cc, in 1982–1985 member of the secretariat, in 1985–1990 member of 
the pB. in 1982–1985 head of the economic Department of the cc of the cpsu. in 1985–
1991 chairman of the council of ministers.
roman, petre (1946–): romanian politician. in December 1989–october 1991 prime minister, 
1996–2000 chairman of the senate, 1999–2000 foreign minister. in 1989–1992 member of the 
National salvation front, in 1992–2003 member of the Democratic party.
sakharov, Andrey Dmitriyevich (1921–1989): soviet nuclear physicist, human rights activist. he par-
ticipated in the planning and production of the first soviet hydrogen bomb. from the 1960s he 
played a more and more important role in the struggle for human rights. in 1967 he announced 
his opposition to the arms race, in 1970 he was one of the founders of the committee on hu-
man rights in the ussr. Awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1975. Because of his overt opposi-
tional activity he was forced to live in internal exile between 1980 and1986. elected member of 
the congress of peoples’ deputies.
semerdzhiev, Atanas Georgiev (1924–2015): Bulgarian military officer and politician. participated in 
wwii as partisan. from 1966 deputy minister of defense, in December 1989–february 1990 
minister of interior. from february 1990 member of the supreme council of the Bulgarian so-
cialist party. in 1990–1992 vice-president of Bulgaria.
shatalin, stanislav sergeyevich (1934–1997): soviet economist. specialized in mathematical model-
ling and planning for the economy. from 1985 he was the most radical soviet economist, who 
overtly supported the implementation of a market economy. from 1989 director of the eco-
nomic Department of the soviet Academy of sciences. Advisor of Gorbachev. in 1990–1991 
member of the presidential council. he worked out a five hundred day program for the transi-
tion to a market economy that was rejected by the soviet government.
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shatalin, Yuriy Vasilevich (1934–2000): soviet military officer. participated in the war against Af-
ghanistan. in 1982–1984 commander of the seventh Army corps in transcaucasia, in 1984–
1986 first deputy commander of the moscow military District. in 1986–1991 commander of 
the internal security forces of the ministry of interior.
shevardnadze, eduard (1928–2014): soviet–Georgian politician. in 1972–1985 first secretary of the 
Georgian communist party, from 1976 member of the cc of the cpsu, from 1978 candidate 
member of the pB, from 1985 member of the pB. in 1985–1990 minister of foreign affairs. in 
July 1991 he resigned from the cpsu. from 1992 chair of the Georgian parliament, in 1995–
2003 president of Georgia.
shimko, Vladimir ivanovich (1938–1998): soviet politician. lecturer at the Department for Defense 
industry in the cc of the cpsu, head of the section later deputy head of Department for ra-
dio industry, in 1987–1988 minister for radio industry, in 1988–1989 head of the social and 
economic Department of the cc. in 1989–1991 minister for radio industry of the soviet un-
ion, then of the russian federation.
shultz, George pratt (1920–): American politician, economist, and businessman. worked for four 
republican us presidents. in 1982–1989 secretary of state (minister of foreign affairs).
skiba, ivan ivanovich (1937–): soviet politician. in 1983–1987 first deputy head of Department for 
Agriculture and food processing of the cc of the cpsu, in 1987–1988 head of the same de-
partment, in 1988–1991 head of the Agricultural Department, in 1986–1990 candidate mem-
ber of the cc. in 1989–1991 member of the congress of peoples’ Deputies.
skubiszewski, Krzysztof (1926–2010): polish jurist and politician. lecturer in international law at the 
university of poznań, expert on polish–German relations. Active member of solidarity. in 
1989–1993 minister of foreign affairs.
slyunkov, Nikolay Nikitovich (in Belarusian: slyunykou, mikalay mikitavich) (1929–): soviet politi-
cian. in 1983–1987 first secretary of the communist party of Belarusian ssr, in 1986–1990 
member of the cc of the cpsu, in 1986–1987 candidate member of the pB, in 1987–1990 
member of the secretariat, in 1987–1990 member of the pB. in 1987–1988 chairman of the 
committee on economic policy, in 1988–1990 chairman of the committee on socio-econom-
ic policy.
snegur, mircea ion (1940–): soviet–moldavian agrarian expert and politician. from 1964 member of 
the communist party of moldavia, in 1985–1989 secretary of the cc. in July 1989–April 1990 
chairman of the presidium of the supreme soviet of the moldavian ssr, in April 1990–septem-
ber 1990 chairman of the supreme soviet of the moldavian ssr, in 1991–1997 first president 
of moldova (as an independent state).
sokolov, sergey leonidovich (1911–2012): soviet military officer. in 1965–1984 commander of the 
military District of leningrad, in 1967–1984 first deputy of the defense minister. commander 
of the soviet troops attacking Afghanistan in 1979. in 1984–1987 defense minister, in 1985–
1987 candidate member of the pB of the cc of the cpsu. Gorbachev forced him to resign in 
connection with the rust Affair.
soloviev, Yuriy filippovich (1925–2011): soviet politician. from 1955 member of the cpsu, in 
1976–1990 member of the cc, in 1978–1984 first secretary of the leningrad municipal 
Branch of the cpsu. in 1984–1985 minister for industrial constructions, in 1985–1989 first 
secretary of the regional committee of the leningrad Branch of the cpsu, in 1986–1989 
candidate member of the pB. in 1979–1989 member of the supreme soviet, in 1986–1989 
member of the presidium of the same organization.
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Špegelj, martin (1927–2014): croatian–Yugoslav military officer. General of the Yugoslavian peoples’ 
Army ( JNA). in August 1990–July 1991 minister of defense in croatia, then chief of staff and 
inspector general of the new croatian Army. his activities focused on the organization and 
supply of the army, which contributed to the survival of croatia in the first years of the war of 
independence. retired in 1992.
stalin, iosif Vissarionovich (Dzhugashvili) (1879–1953): soviet politician of Georgian origin. in 
1917–1922 peoples’ commissar for nationalities, in 1919–1922 peoples’ commissar for state 
control. in 1922–1934 general secretary of the communist (Bolshevik) party of russia, in 
1934–1953 general secretary of the cc of the cpsu. in 1941–1946 president of the council 
of the peoples’ commissars, in 1946–1953 president of the council of ministers. from 1945 
generalissimus. he created the theoretical doctrine and totalitarian system named after him.
stoica, ion Aurel (1943–1994): romanian politician. in march–June 1990 deputy prime minister, in 
June 1990–february 1991 minister of state responsible for life quality and social security, in 
April–october 1991 minister without portfolio. he was one of the main ideologists of the fsN. 
in 1992–1994 senator, member of the committees for defense, public order and state security. 
stolojan, Theodor Dumitru (1943–): romanian politician and economist. in 1972–1989 worked for 
the ministry of finance. from 1982 deputy head of Department of international financial re-
lations. in september 1991–November 1992 prime minister. in 2000–2004 chairman of the 
National liberal party.
stolpe, manfred (1936–): German protestant leader, politician. in 1962–1969 head of the secretariat 
of the conference of Governing Bodies of the protestant churches in the GDr, in 1969–1981 
head of the secretariat of the federation of protestant churches. in 1982–1989 deputy chair-
man of the federation of protestant churches. in July 1990 joined the spD. in 1990–2002 
prime minister of Brandenburg, in 2002–2005 federal minister of transport, construction, and 
urban affairs.
straub, f. [ferenc] Brunó (1914–1996): hungarian biochemist. in 1970–1978 director general of the 
Biological research centre in szeged, in 1978–1986 director of the institute for enzymology at 
the same institution. in 1985–1990 president of the committee for settlement Development 
and environment protection of the parliament. in 1988–1989 chairman of the hungarian pres-
idential council. from 1946 corresponding member of the hungarian Academy of sciences, 
from 1949 regular member, in 1967–1973 and 1985–1990 vice-president of the hungarian 
Academy of sciences.
Štrougal, lubomír (1924–): czechoslovakian politician. in 1959–1961 minister of agriculture, in 
1961–1965 minister of interior, in 1970–1988 prime minister. in 1965–1970 secretary of the 
cc of the cpc, in 1968–1988 member of the presidium of the cc. expelled from the party in 
1990.
tarasov, Artyom mikhailovich (1950–2017): soviet and russian businessman and politician of Ar-
menian origin. he was the first officially declared millionaire of the soviet union in 1989. he 
initiated the progress dating agency, which was closed down within a week by the authorities in 
moscow despite its evident popularity.
tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980): Yugoslav politician. in 1937–1952 general secretary of the commu-
nist party of Yugoslavia, in 1952–1966 general secretary and 1966–1980 chairman of the 
league of communists of Yugoslavia. in 1945–1953 prime minister, in 1953–1974 president, 
in 1974–1980 president for life of Yugoslavia.
227
BioGrAphicAl Notes
tomášek, františek (1899–1992): czech catholic prelate. from 1976 cardinal, in 1977–1991 arch-
bishop of prague.
trenchev, Konstantin Nikolov (1955–): Bulgarian politician and syndicalist, originally doctor. in 
1989 imprisoned for more than a hundred days because of his protest against the government 
policy of forced assimilation of the turkish minority. in february 1989 he established the inde-
pendent confederation of labor – podkrepa (a trade union), which seceded from the sDs 
 (union of Democratic forces – uDf) in 1991.
tretyak, ivan moiseyevich (1923–2007): soviet military commander. in 1967–1976 commander of 
the Belarusian military District, in 1976–1984 commander of the troops in the far east, in 
1986–1991 deputy minister of defense, in 1987–1991 commander of the soviet air forces. in 
1976–1990 member of the cc of the cpsu.
tuđman, franjo (1922–1999): croatian–Yugoslav historian and politician. in 1972 he was impris-
oned because of his participation in the “croatian spring” reform movement. in June 1989–De-
cember 1990 president of the croatian Democratic community (hDZ), in may–July 1990 
chairman of the presidium of the croatian socialist republic, in July–December 1990 president 
of the presidium of the republic of croatia, in 1990–1999 first president of croatia.
tusk, Donald franciszek (1957–): polish politician of Kashubian and German origin. co-founder of 
the liberal Democratic congress (KlD), which later united with the Democratic union (uD) 
creating the freedom union (unia wolności). in 2001 co-founder of the civic platform. in 
2007–2014 prime minister, from 2014 president of the european council. his political views 
are a mixture of liberal market economy (freedom from state intervention) and social conserva-
tivism.
tymiński, stanisław (1948–): canadian businessman and politician of polish origin. he became fa-
mous just before the presidential elections of 1990, when he reached the second position in the 
first round of the elections, forcing wałęsa to run for the second round. in 1990–1995 leader of 
the X party founded by himself, which obtained three seats in the Sejm in the parliamentary 
elections of 1991.
urbánek, Karel (1941–): czechoslovakian politician. from 1984 leader of municipal Affairs com-
mittee in the cpc, from 1986 member of the cc. in November–December 1989 last gener-
al secretary of the cpc. he eliminated the clause of the constitution that gave the cpc a 
monopoly of power.
Väljas, Vaino (1931–): soviet–estonian politician. in 1963–1967 chair of the supreme soviet of the 
estonian ssr, in 1988–1990 first secretary of the communist party of the estonian ssr, in 
1990–1995 chair of the estonian Democratic labor party.
Varennikov, Valentin ivanovich (1923–2009): soviet military officer and politician. from 1979 depu-
ty chief of staff, one of the planners and leaders of the war against Afghanistan, and the personal 
representative of the soviet defense minister in Kabul. in 1989 commander of land forces and 
deputy minister of defense. participated in the unsuccessful coup d’etat against Gorbachev in 
August 1991.
Vllasi, Azem (1948–): Albanian politician and jurist in Kosovo. from 1974 chair of league of social-
ist Youth of Yugoslavia (reelected with the support of tito). in 1980 he publicly criticized enver 
hoxha and his Albanian regime. member of the cc of the lcY, from 1986 leader of the league 
of communists of Kosovo and president of Kosovo. in November 1988 he was removed from 
his position during the “antibureaucratic revolution” initiated by milošević, in 1989 he was ar-
rested (released in April 1990).
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Vorotnikov, Vitaly ivanovich (1926–2012): soviet politician. in 1983–1988 chairman of the council of 
ministers of the russian sfsr, in 1988–1990 chair of the presidium of the supreme soviet of the 
russian sfsr. in 1971–1990 member of the cc of the cpsu, in 1983–1990 member of the pB.
wałęsa, lech (1943–): polish politician, originally electrician. in August 1980 leader of the strike in 
the lenin shipyard in Gdańsk, signed the Gdańsk Agreement. in 1980–1990 chairperson of 
solidarity. interned in 1981 after the declaration of martial law, and in 1983–1990 worked again 
as an electrician. in 1987–1990 chair of the provisional executive committee of the solidarity 
trade union, in february–April 1990 co-chair of the round table negotiations, in 1990–1995 
president of poland.
wörner, manfred (1934–1994): German politician (frG). in 1965–1988 member of the Bundestag 
(cDu), in 1976–1980 chairman of the committee for Defense, in 1980–1982 deputy chair of 
the cDu/csu, in 1982–1988 minister of defense. supported strong alliance with the usA, in 
1988–1994 secretary general of NAto (the first German in this position).
wozniak, Konrad marian (1936–1996): polish politician and economist. from 1960 member of the 
puwp, from 1981 member of the cc, in 1981–1988 secretary of the cc, in 1982–1985 first 
secretary of the puwp in the warsaw committee, in 1982–1988 member of the pB, in 1988–
1990 ambassador in Beijing.
Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich (1923–2005): soviet politician and historian. in 1985–1986 head 
of the propaganda Department of the cc, in 1986–1990 member of the secretariat, in 1987–
1990 member of the pB. one of the major advisors of Gorbachev, initiator of his reforms. he 
was the first soviet politician to publicly acknowledge the existence of the secret protocols of the 
1939 ribbentrop–molotov pact with Nazi Germany in December 1989.
Yanayev, Gennady ivanovich (1937–2010): soviet politician. in April–July 1990 chairman of the 
All-union central council of trade unions. in December 1990–August 1991 deputy presi-
dent of the soviet union. in August 1991 he participated in the coup d’etat against Gorbachev, 
declaring himself acting president of the soviet union. After its failure he was arrested. in July 
1990–January 1991 member of the pB of the cpsu, and secretary of the cc.
Yazov, Dmitry timofeevich (1924–): soviet military officer. from 1944 member of the cpsu. in 
1984–1987 commander of the far east military District, from January 1987 deputy defense 
minister for four months, 1987–1991 defense minister. in August 1991 participated in the coup 
d’etat against Gorbachev.
Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1931–2007): soviet–russian politician. from 1961 member of the cpsu, 
from 1985 member of the cc, from 1986 secretary of the cc, in 1985–1987 first secretary of the 
cpsu in the moscow committee, in 1986–1987 candidate member of the pB. in July 1990 left 
the party. soon he was elected to the congress of the peoples’ Deputies. from may 29, 1990 chair-
man of the congress, in 1991–1999 the first elected president of russian federation.
Zhelev, Zhelyu mitev (1935–2015): Bulgarian philosopher and politician. in 1958 his mA thesis was 
rejected for political reasons, in 1965 he was expelled from the university of sofia and excluded 
from the Bcp. in 1966–1972 he lived in a village in internal exile. in 1974–1982 worked for the 
cultural institute. A leader of the Bulgarian antitotalitarian movement, in 1989 a founder of the 
club for Glasnost and Democracy. in December 1989 he created the union of Democratic 
forces from the numerous groups in opposition. After the regime change he became the leader 
of the united opposition, in 1990–1997 president of Bulgaria.
Zhivkov, todor hristov (1911–1998): Bulgarian politician. in 1954–1989 first secretary of the Bcp, 
in 1962–1971 prime minister, in 1971–1989 chairman of the state council (head of state).
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List of Abbreviations
AchAN: Allied command channel 
AclANt: Allied command Atlantic 
AmAe: french, Archives du ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
Assr: Autonomous soviet socialist republics
Bcp: Bulgarian communist party
Bsp: Bulgarian socialist party
BZNs / BANu: Bulgarian, Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden sajuz [BANu: Bulgarian Agrarian Na-
tional union]
cc: central committee
cDu: German, christlich Demokratische union Deutschlands [christian Democratic union]
cfe: conventional Armed forces in europe
comecoN, cmeA, cemA, or cAme: council for mutual economic Assistance
cpc: communist party of czechoslovakia [czech, KsČ: Komunistická strana Československa]
cpsu: communist party of the soviet union [russian Kpss: Kommunisticheskaya partiya sovet-
skogo soyuza]
cpuN: romanian, consiliul provizoriu de uniune Naţionalâ [provisional council of National unity]
csce: conference for security and co-operation in europe
csu: German, christlich-soziale union in Bayern [christian social union in Bavaria]
cusrpG: canada-us regional planning Group 
DBD: German, Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands [Democratic peasant party of Germany]
Demos: slovenian, Demokratična opozicija slovenije [Democratic opposition of slovenia]
Dp: Democratic party
Dps: Bulgarian, turkish, Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi; hak ve Özgürlükler hareketi [mrf: move-
ment for rights and freedoms]
ec: european communities 
ecosoc: economic and social council 
eec: european economic community
fDJ: German, freie Deutsche Jugend [free German Youth]
fiDesZ: hungarian, fiatal Demokraták szövetsége [Alliance of Young Democrats]
fsN: romanian, frontul salvării Naționale [Nsf: National salvation front]
GAtt: General Agreement on tariffs and trade
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GDp: gross domestic product
GDr: German Democratic republic [Deutsche Demokratische republik, DDr]
GNp: Gross National product
Gru: russian, Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [main intelligence Directorate – military secret 
service]
hDZ: croatian, hrvatska demokratska zajednica [croatian Democratic union]
hsp: hungarian socialist party [hungarian, magyar szocialista párt]
hswp: hungarian socialist workers’ party [hungarian, msZmp: magyar szocialista munkáspárt]
imf: international monetary fund 
iNf: intermediate-range Nuclear forces
itu: international telecommunication union 
JNA: serbo-croatian, Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija [Yugoslavian peoples’ Army]
KDh: slovakian, Krest’anskodemokratické hnutie [cDm: christian Democratic movement]
KGB: russian, Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [committee for state security]
KGD: Bulgarian, Klub za glasnost  i demokraciya [club for Glasnost’ and Democracy]
KlD: polish, Kongres liberalno-Demokratyczny [liberal Democratic congress]
Kor: polish, Komitet obrony robotników [workers’ Defense committee]
lcY: league of communists of Yugoslavia
lDpD: German, liberal-Demokratische partei Deutschlands [liberal Democratic party of Ger-
many]
mDf: hungarian, magyar Demokrata fórum [hungarian Democratic forum]
mDp: hungarian, magyar Dolgozók pártja [hungarian workers’ party]
mKp: hungarian, magyar Kommunista párt [hungarian communist party]
mNl ol: hungarian, magyar Nemzeti levéltár országos levéltára [National Archives of hungary]
msZmp: hungarian, magyar szocialista munkáspárt [hungarian socialist workers’ party]
msZp: hungarian, magyar szocialista párt [hungarian socialist party]
mtA: hungarian, magyar tudományos Akadémia [hAs: hungarian Academy of sciences]
mVD: russian, ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del [ministry of internal Affairs, su, russia]
NA: NAto Archives 
NAc: North Atlantic council 
NAcc: North Atlantic coordinating council
NAto: North Atlantic treaty organisation 
NDpD: German, National-Demokratische partei Deutschlands [National Democratic party of Ger-
many, east Germany]
NKt–podkrepa: Bulgarian, Nezavisima konfederatsiya na truda – podkrepa [independent confeder-
ation of labor – ‚podkrepa’]
NKVD: russian, Narodniy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del [peoples’ commissariat for internal Af-
fairs]
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NsDAp: German, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National socialist German work-
ers’ party).
Nswp [countries]: Non-soviet warsaw pact [countries]
NZs: polish, Niezależny Związek (Zrzeszenie) studentów [independent students’ union]
oDs: czech, občanská Demokratická strana [civic Democratic party]
oecD: organisation for economic co-operation and Development
oic: organization of the islamic conference
opZZ: polish, ogólnopolskie porozumienie Związków Zawodowych [All-polish Agreement of 
trade unions]
osce: organization for security and co-operation in europe
pB: political Bureau, politburo
pc: polish, porozumienie centrum [centre Agreement]
pc: political committee [a NAto committee]
pGu: russian, pervoe glavnoe upravlenie [first chief Directorate, KGB]
piB: hungarian, politikai intéző Bizottság [pec: political executive committee]
pNȚcD: romanian, partidul Național Țărănesc creștin Democrat [christian Democratic National 
peasants’ party]
poc: polish, porozumienie obywatelskie centrum [center civic Alliance] 
ppsh: Albanian, partia e punës e shqipërisë [party of labor of Albania]
prK: people’s republic of Kampuchea [khmer, sathéaranakrâth pracheameanit Kâmpŭchéa]
psD: romanian, partidul social Democrat [social Democratic party, romania]
psl: polish, polskie stronnictwo ludowe [polish people’s party; traditionally translated as polish 
peasants’ party]
puwp: polish united workers’ party [polish, pZpr: polska Zjednoczona partia robotnicza]
rcp: romanian communist party [romanian, pcr: partidul comunist român]
retÖrKi: hungarian, rendszerváltás történetét Kutató intézet és Archívum [research institute 
and Archives for the history of regime change]
rfe: radio free europe 
rmDsZ: hungarian, romániai magyar Demokrata szövetség [Democratic union of hungarians in 
romania]
roAD: polish, ruch obywatelski Akcja Demokratyczna [citizens’ movement for Democratic Ac-
tion]
rsfsr: russian soviet federative socialist republic
rssr: russian soviet socialist republic
sDA: croatian, stranka Demokratske Akcije [party of Democratic Action of croatia]
sDp: slovene, stranka demokratične prenove [party of Democratic change]
sDs: Bulgarian, sayuz na Demokratichnite sili [uDf: union of Democratic forces (uDf)] 
seD: German, sozialistische einheitspartei Deutschlands [supG: socialist unity party of Germany, 
east Germany]
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sfsr: soviet federative socialist republic
shApe: supreme headquarters Allied powers europe 
spD: German, sozialdemokratische partei Deutschlands [social Democratic party of Germany]
ssr: soviet socialist republic
stB: czech, státní bezpečnost [state security]
sZBK: hungarian, szegedi Biológiai Központ [Biological research centre, szeged]
sZDsZ: hungarian, szabad Demokraták szövetsége [AfD: Alliance of free Democrats]
uD: polish, unia Demokratyczna [Democratic union]
uNchr: united Nations commission on human rights 
uNDp: united Nations Development programme 
uNitA: portugese, união Nacional para a independência total de Angola [National union for the 
total independence of Angola]
uN(o): united Nations (organization)
uNGA: united Nations General Assembly
upp: united people's party [polish, polskie stronnictwo ludowe]
urp: ukrainian, ukrainska respublikanska partiya [ukrainian republican party]
ussr: union of soviet socialist republic
uw: polish, unia wolności [freedom union]
VoNs: czech, Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných [committee for the Defense of unjustly 
prosecuted]
VpN: slovak, Verejnosť proti násiliu [public Against Violence]
weu: western european union
wmD: weapons of mass destruction
wp: warsaw pact, formally known as the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual Assistance
ZKs: slovene, Zveza komunistov slovenije [lcs: league of communists of slovenia]
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A View from Brussels
secret NAto reports about the east european transition 
1988–1991 
“it is not easy to predict the future course of events, which will depend to a large 
extent on the overall political situation in the ussr” is the cautious evaluation of 
the confidential expert report for the North Atlantic council in october 1989. in 
1988–1991, the relationship was fundamentally transformed between the western 
alliance system led by the united states and the east european socialist bloc domi-
nated by the soviet union. The military, political, cultural and ideological confron-
tation – with the weakening of moscow and the collapse of its empire – was re-
placed during a few months by a new type of cooperation of the parties separated 
previously by the iron curtain. The eight reports (formerly classified confidential) 
from the NAto Archives, published in the present volume for the first time in 
english, illuminate the east european events of these four eventful years from the 
perspective of expert advisors of the alliance.
The analysis of the situation in the soviet union and its allies in central and 
eastern europe had by 1988 a decades-long tradition in NAto. The working 
Group on trends of soviet policy, which was established by the decision of the 
North Atlantic council of october 8, 1952, prepared its reports for the sessions of 
the foreign ministers of the NAto council. its activity was taken over on January 
1957 by the political committee, which was formed originally as the committee of 
political Advisers at the proposal of the committee of Three established for the re-
form of the alliance. There were five experts’ working groups belonging to this com-
mittee, among them those that examined the trends of soviet policy and the east 
european satellite states.
in the elaboration of these analyses about the soviet union and the other states 
of the soviet bloc a great role was played by the preliminary studies of the national 
diplomatic organs and the consultative discussions of the experts delegated by the 
individual states.  in the spirit of the decision-making principles of NAto, the pur-
pose of these meetings was to build a consensus.  most of the delegated experts 
worked in the sections of their respective foreign ministries that dealt with eastern 
europe and/or the soviet union.
i found four documents in the Archives of the french foreign ministry in 
which the french participants of the working group reported on the course of these 
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sessions. on the basis of these reports we can form an idea about the nature of these 
debates as well as about the methods of analysis employed in the experts’ reports. 
while the reports’ conclusions reflected a consensus, sharp disagreements often sur-
faced during the discussions. for instance, in the course of the meeting of march 
1988 the west German expert forcefully requested that a statement from the Brit-
ish draft be removed from the final text according to which the Brezhnev doctrine 
still was valid in the relations of the soviet union and the allied states, and that 
therefore moscow might still intervene if some of the east-european communist 
regimes were threatened by a sudden collapse. But the french delegation, supported 
by the American and British experts, spoke out against deleting the sentences in 
question.
The published papers reveal how the situation in the soviet bloc was evaluated 
by the foreign ministries of the NAto powers in 1988–1991 on the basis of their 
internal documentation, the consultations in NAto and among each of the foreign 
ministries, and other sources. But it should be emphasized that the NAto states, 
that is, the united states, Great Britain, france and Germany, that played a key role 
in the elaboration of these reports did not share all available information with their 
allies. They prepared the summaries for the ministerial sessions of the North Atlan-
tic council, occurring twice a year.  These documents, which review the previous six 
months of the soviet bloc, represent an excellent source on the views about eastern 
europe in the important decision-making centres of NAto in a given period.
The eight experts’ reports give a comprehensive overview about an eastern eu-
rope that was experiencing cataclysmic changes in this period. in the reports the 
summary and the main conclusions are usually included in the introduction. The 
first chapters generally describe the shaping of soviet domestic and foreign policy. 
The parts exploring the situation of the allied states are presenting in the order of 
importance ascribed to them by the experts, and focusing on the issues considered 
to be most pressing. Although they were not parts of the soviet bloc in that period, 
the analyses examining “eastern europe” reported, as in the past, on communist 
Albania and on Yugoslavia, which was sinking into an increasingly serious crisis in 
that period.
The introductory essay portrays the relationship of the North Atlantic Alliance 
and eastern europe in the period covered by the documents. The study illuminates 
the working principles of NAto. it analyses the sweeping changes in the alliance. 
lastly, it exposes the circumstances of the origin of the published papers, referring 
to the antecedents of the experts’ work dealing with eastern europe that dates back 
to the 1950’s.  The documents section presents the reports in chronological order, 
annotated with explanations in footnotes. The Appendix contains biographical 
notes, a list of abbreviations, and figures about the structure of the political and 
military organizations of NAto.
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91“It is not easy to predict the future course of events, 
which will depend to a large extent on the overall political 
situation in the USSR” is the cautious evaluation of the 
confidential expert report for the North Atlantic Council 
in October 1989. In 1988‒1991, the relationship was 
fundamentally transformed between the Western alliance 
system led by the United States and the East European 
socialist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union. The military, 
political, cultural, and ideological confrontation – with the 
weakening of Moscow and the collapse of its empire – was 
replaced during a few months by a new type of cooperation 
of the parties separated previously by the Iron Curtain. The 
eight reports from the NATO Archives (formerly classified 
confidential), published in the present volume for the first 
time in English, illuminate the East European events of these 
four eventful years from the perspective of expert advisors 
of the alliance. How were these dramatic changes in Eastern 
Europe perceived and interpreted in Brussels?
